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This dissertation considers the role of the UK General Anti Abuse Rule (‘GAAR’) in 
challenging loan relationship based tax avoidance in comparison with the other 
measures, which are at the disposal of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. In 
particular, the potential effectiveness of the GAAR is compared with the loan 
relationship Targeted Anti-Avoidance Rule at s455B – s455D of the Corporation Tax Act 
2009 (‘CTA 2009’), Section 441, CTA 2009 and the Ramsay Principle. The analysis is based 
on a detailed review of 13 recent loan relationship avoidance cases, including Greene 
King, Stagecoach and Suez Teesside, and provides an assessment of the impact GAAR 
could have on these cases. Finally, this dissertation briefly considers how conclusions 
reached in respect of loan relationships may affect the role of the GAAR when applied 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
It is an often cited quote attributable to Benjamin Franklin that there are only two 
certainties in life: death and taxes.1 Within a corporation tax context, given that 
companies do not necessarily die, that is to say liquidated or dissolved, perhaps this 
truism can be reframed to suggest that two certainties of corporate life are: tax and tax 
avoidance. As will be seen, there have been a number of recent tax cases, often involving 
big brands, where groups have, or are perceived to have, avoided tax. Often, these 
schemes involve loan relationships, which are brought into tax under Part 5, Corporation 
Tax Act 2009 (‘CTA 2009’). At the same time as they proceed through the courts, HMRC 
has sought to introduce legislation to prevent such schemes from being successful. 
Within a loan relationship context, these anti-avoidance measures range from specific 
provisions to prevent certain types of avoidance arrangement, to a targeted anti-
avoidance rule (‘TAAR’) for the loan relationship regime at Section 455B-D, CTA 2009 
(the ‘LR TAAR’).  
In addition to bring in specific measures counteracting loan relationship avoidance 
schemes, a General Anti-Abuse Rule (‘GAAR’) was introduced in 2013. Although 
corporation tax matters, including loan relationships, are within the scope of the GAAR, 
the question is: what is the role of the GAAR in defeating loan relationship avoidance 
schemes, given the introduction of the LR TAAR? This is the primary question that this 
dissertation has sought to answer. It is an important and timely question because both 
                                                     
1 Fred Shapiro, ‘Quotes Uncovered: Death and Taxes’ (Freakonomics, 17 February 2011) 
<http://freakonomics.com/2011/02/17/quotes-uncovered-death-and-taxes/> accessed 17 February 
2018. 






pieces of legislation were introduced in relatively quick succession and currently there 
is a level of uncertainty over how they will apply (both individually and combined). In 
addition to considering the role of the GAAR, the role of other anti-avoidance measures 
will also be reviewed. Specifically, the role of Section 441, CTA 2009, and the Ramsay 
Principle will be reviewed.2.   
After considering the role of the GAAR in defeating loan relationship schemes, the 
dissertation looks beyond loan relationships to how the insights gained may apply to 
other corporation tax matters. Given the difference between Part 5 and other areas of 
the corporation tax legislation, the commentary in this regard will be indicative only, but 
it will raise significant questions which could usefully be explored through further 
research. 
In seeking to answer the above questions, this dissertation is structured as follows. 
Chapter II introduces the methodology.  Chapter III then addresses the meaning of the 
term ‘tax avoidance’. This will serve to highlight that whilst the term is commonly used, 
it is a difficult word to define. The following three Chapters, Chapters IV – VI, introduce 
the key areas of detailed consideration, namely the GAAR, the Ramsay Principle and the 
Loan Relationship regime. Once these areas have been covered, Chapter VII provides a 
detailed comparison of the different anti-avoidance measures. Chapter VIII takes a step 
back and considers thematically the differences between the GAAR and LR TAAR. The 
final Chapter (Chapter IX) seeks to answer the question: what is the role of the GAAR to 
                                                     
2 Although, arguably the Ramsay principle are not, strictly speaking, ‘measure’ but rather case law 
principles, for simplify, this dissertation will continue to use the word ‘measure’ where is it referring to 
both legislative provisions and case law principle.   






counteract loan related avoidance? It then discusses briefly how these conclusions 
affect the application of the GAAR to other corporation tax matters, and proposes areas 
for further research.  
The substantive research contained within the dissertation is based on the 
legislation enacted prior to 1 June 2018. Similarly, this dissertation only considered case 
law judgement where those judgements were issued prior to 1 June 2018.    
Finally, it should be noted that the following terminological conventions have been 
used throughout: 
 Unless otherwise indicated references to the ‘courts’ should be read as 
including the FTT and the UT. 
 As noted in Chapter VI, Paragraph 13, Schedule 9, FA 1996 was rewritten 
as Section 441, CTA 2009 as part of the Tax Law Rewrite Project. Except 
when necessary, this dissertation does not seek to distinguish between 
references to Section 441 and Para 13.  
 References have been made to taxpayers entering into tax avoidance 
‘schemes’. Whilst other terms could have been used instead, such as 
‘transaction’ or ‘arrangements’, for simplicity, the word ‘scheme’ has been 
used to describe such arrangements. For the avoidance of doubt, although 
for some the word ‘scheme’ may have negative connotations, it has been 
used here in an entirely neutral and non-judgemental way. 






CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
II.1 Methodology  
Prior to discussing the specific method adopted within this research, it is important 
to briefly discuss the underlying methodology upon which it is based. Oats3 
differentiates method from methodology by explaining that whereas method “refers to 
the specific techniques employed in the pursuit of research” methodology refers to “the 
practices and assumptions of the researcher, with the ideas and presuppositions that 
they carry through into the research project.”3 As can be seen from Lamb et al.,4 there 
are a number of ways to undertake tax research including interdisciplinary perspectives, 
ranging from legal research5 to political6 or social policy research.7 
Given the subject matter of this thesis, the approach taken in this research is to 
look at the question from a legal perspective. This is not to deny that other perspectives 
could enrich the analysis.  For instance, Radaelli notes that “[c]ontemporary political 
systems are characterized by constraints, and political science explains the nature and 
source of constraints under which political actors operate, and the strategies used to 
relax or change them”. 8 In the field of taxation, HMRC exercises significant power and 
it could be argued that the GAAR is such a strategy that relaxes the constraint on HMRC’s 
                                                     
3 Lynne Oats, ‘On Methods and Methodology’ in Lynne Oats (ed), Taxation: A Fieldwork Research 
Handbook (Routledge 2012) 9. 
4 Margaret Lamb and others (eds), Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
5 Judith Freedman, ‘Taxation Research as Legal Research’ in Margaret Lamb and others (eds), Taxation: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford University Press 2005). 
6 Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Taxation Research as Political Science’ in Margaret Lamb and others (eds), Taxation: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford University Press 2005). 
7 Rebecca Boden, ‘Taxation Research as Social Policy Research’ in Margaret Lamb and others (eds), 
Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research (Oxford University Press 2005). 
8 Radaelli (n 6) 87. 






social power. However, given that the question posed by this dissertation is how various 
tax provisions interact, using a legal research method seems most appropriate, 
particularly given that such research “is rarely concerned with finding new facts or 
information. It is more likely to consist of ‘careful study’ – classification, and analysis and 
theorization.”9  
Freedman divides legal research into two subsets: a ‘black-letter’ approach which 
mainly consists of “attempting to fit the cases and legislation into a rational framework, 
pointing out the internal inconsistencies and the supposed ‘principles’” 10; and a broader 
approach where a wider framework is used. There are a number of such frameworks 
that can be used in this regard, including looking at a question from a historical 
perspective or using theoretical perspectives from other disciplines. In attempting to 
move beyond a pure black letter law approach, this dissertation will consider the 
historical context of the relevant tax provisions.  
II.2 Method  
II.2.1 A two-step approach 
Hutchinson and Duncan describe doctrinal legal research (the term they use for 
black letter law research) as a two-step process, which begins with “locating the sources 
of the law and then interpreting and analysing the text”.11 Within this approach, the 
purpose of the first step is to identify ‘objective reality’. Whilst acknowledging that legal 
scholars may reject the existence of ‘objective reality’, they argue that there are positive 
                                                     
9 Freedman, ‘Taxation Research as Legal Research’ (n 5) 13. 
10 ibid. 
11 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ 
(2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83, 110. 






statements of the law, for instance in Parliamentary statue. As such, they consider that 
the law only becomes contingent when it is interpreted and applied to specific facts. 
They describe the second step of the process as ‘more nebulous.’ Drawing on 
Chynoweth12, Hutchinson and Duncan comment: 
Those studying the methodologies of lawyers point to a number of 
techniques used within the synthesizing process once the documents 
are located and read. They call for a description of the particular line 
of inquiry being developed, whether it is conceptual, evaluative or 
explanatory. The application of such techniques, along with a 
description of, for example, the use of deductive logic, inductive 
reasoning and analogy where appropriate, would constitute the 
second part of the methodology. 13 
Chynoweth14 describes how each of these techniques can be used within the legal 
context. Deductive logic can be used by applying the law to a specific set of facts, which 
for a legal scholar “will be hypothetical and the purpose is to undertake a more in-depth 
analysis.”15 The main challenge with using this technique is that this type of reasoning, 
by itself, is unlikely to enable firm conclusions to be drawn on how the law will apply in 
specific situations. Inductive reasoning involves extrapolating from a specific case to 
create a more general rule. Chynoweth considers that this technique is particularly 
                                                     
12 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods 
in the Built Environment (2008). 
13 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 11) 111 (citation omitted). 
14 Chynoweth (n 12). 
15 ibid 32. 






useful where the law as it stands does not address a particular issue. Finally, analogy can 
be used to determine how a law will apply to a specific case, where a similar case had 
previously been considered by the courts. He points out that, given the inevitable factual 
differences between cases, it is possible to distinguish a case from its predecessors, 
which would allow the courts to come to a different conclusion. 
Discussed below is how this two-step model for legal research has been applied 
within this dissertation. Of the four anti-avoidance measures considered, two, namely 
the GAAR and the LR TAAR, have only recently been introduced whereas the other two 
measures, namely Section 441 (and its predecessor, Paragraph 13) and the Ramsay 
Principle have been around for a number of years. Specifically, Paragraph 13 applied to 
periods ending after 31 March 1996 and the judgement in Ramsay was handed down in 
March 1981. As a result, in respect of Section 441 and the Ramsay Principle, by analysing 
the judicial precedents it is possible to gain a good understanding of how these will apply 
going forward. As similar judicial precedents are not available in respect of GAAR and 
the LR TAAR, an alternative method has needed to be adopted and is discussed below. 
It is followed by a brief discussion of the impact of adopting this alternative method on 
the discussions in relations to Section 441 and the Ramsay Principle. 
II.2.2 The GAAR and LR TAAR 
As noted above the GAAR and LR TAAR are relatively new, and they have not, 
therefore, been considered by the courts. Although the precise wording of the 
provisions are freely available, without judicial precedents, there is a degree of 
uncertainty over how they will apply in practice. Thus, although this dissertation will 
undertake a side-by-side comparison of the text of the GAAR and the LR TAAR to identify 






the linguistic differences between these provisions, the practical relevance of these is 
difficult to determine without further context.  
That said, although there is not judicial precedent on how the GAAR and the LR 
TAAR will apply, the courts have considered a number of cases where loan relationships 
have been used as part of tax avoidance schemes. As HMRC has historically used 
multiple arguments to challenge tax avoidance schemes,16 the relevant judgements on 
these cases should contain sufficient information to consider how the TAAR and the 
GAAR may have applied to the schemes, which should, in turn, provide a better 
understanding of how these pieces of legislation might apply in practice. Within this 
dissertation, the facts of these cases, as described in the relevant judgements, together 
with the text of the underlying provisions, provide an ‘objective reality’ upon which the 
analysis has been based.  
In order to identify a suitable body of case law, a Westlaw search was undertaken 
in their ‘Case Analysis Documents’ data base, using the search criteria ‘ “loan 
relationship” AND “tax avoidance” ‘ within the free text field. This search identified 39 
items relating to 26 unique cases.17 Of these, 12 were considered appropriate to be used 
within the body of this dissertation. The reason for the exclusion of the remaining 14 
cases is contained within Appendix A. The 12 cases considered relevant are as follows: 
1. A.H. Field18 
                                                     
16 cf. Stagecoach Group PLC & Stagecoach Holdings Limited v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 120 (TC), [2016] SFTD 
982; Smith & Nephew Overseas Limited and Other v HMRC [2017] UKFTT 151 (TC). 
17 A list of these cases is contained within Appendix A. 
18 AH Field (Holdings) Limited v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 104 (TC). 






2. Bank of Ireland19 
3. Cater Allen20 
4. DCC Holdings21 
5. Fidex22 
6. Suez Teesside23 
7. Greene King24 
8. Smith & Nephews25 
9. Stagecoach26 
10. Travel Document Services27 
11. Versteegh28 
12. Vocalspruce 29 
For simplicity, the above cases will be referred to collectively as the ‘Relevant 
Cases’. 
A number of the above cases are subject to appeal; Appendix B contains a table 
indicating the current status of each. In addition, as will be discussed further at VII.3, 
                                                     
19 HMRC v Bank of Ireland Britain Holdings Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 58, [2008] STC 398. 
20 Cater Allen International Limited and another v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 232 (TC), [2015] SFTD 765. 
21 DCC Holdings (UK) Ltd v HMRC [2010] UKSC 58, [2011] STC 326. 
22 Fidex Limited v HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 385, [2016] STC 1920. 
23 GDF Suez Teesside (Formerly Teesside Power Limited) v HMRC [2017] UKUT 68 (TCC), [2017] STC 1622. 
24 Greene King PLC & Greene King Acquisitions Limited v HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 782, [2017] STC 615. 
25 Smith and Nephew (FTT, 2017) (n 16). 
26 Stagecoach (FTT, 2016) (n 16). 
27 Travel Document Service and Another v HMRC [2018] EWCA Civ 549. 
28 Spritebeam Limited and others v HMRC and another [2015] UKUT 75 (TCC), [2015] STC 1222; sub nom 
Versteegh Limited & Other v HMRC [2013] UKFTT 642 (TC), [2014] SFTD 547. 
29 Vocalspruce Ltd v HMRC9 [2014] EWCA Civ 1302, [2015] STC 861. 






Appendix C contains an analysis of the references to Ramsay and BMBF in the Relevant 
Cases. 
Moving on to the ‘more nebulous’ second step, this dissertation will use the three 
techniques outlined by Chynoweth30 to analyse the Relevant Cases. The primary method 
will be what he refers to as ‘deductive reasoning’ as this dissertation will consider the 
schemes in the Relevant Cases. Referring back to Chynoweth’s definition of deductive 
logic, these will be treated as hypothetical cases to which the GAAR and the TAAR will 
be applied. 
As Chynoweth notes, 31 the main challenge with this type of reasoning is that the 
law is rarely sufficiently clear cut to enable one to definitively conclude on how it should 
apply in a specific situation. However, this depends on the nature of that legislation. For 
instance, applying a similar method to investigate the UK dividend exemption should 
enable the researcher to reach near definitive conclusions as to when the dividend 
exemption would apply because the relevant legislation is relatively mechanical and 
unambiguous.  
This is in contrast to other provisions which tend to be drafted more broadly in 
order to apply to a wider range of situations. The GAAR is, arguably, an example of this 
because people may disagree as to what is a reasonable course of action in any given 
situation. Although the GAAR attempts to limit the uncertainty around what is caught 
by its provisions through inclusion of the phrase ‘cannot reasonably be regarded as a 
                                                     
30 Chynoweth (n 12). 
31 ibid. 






reasonable course of action’, a degree of uncertainty remains. Indeed, Way goes as far 
as saying that he does “not really know how this would operate in practice.”32 This same 
uncertainty appears in the LR TAAR as a result of the phrase “reasonably be regarded as 
consistent with any principles” on which the provision is based. As a result of the 
uncertainty in these provisions it would be difficult to produce any definitive conclusions 
about the application of the GAAR and the LR TAAR based solely on deductive reasoning 
using only the facts in the Relevant Cases and the wording of the legislation. That said, 
the use of deductive reasoning in combination with other techniques should enable this 
dissertation to draw some preliminary conclusions. This will be achieved by first placing 
the GAAR and LR TAAR into their broader context and then considering how they would 
apply to the schemes in the Relevant Cases.  
When seeking to apply the GAAR and LR TAAR legislation to historical cases, this 
dissertation asks a number of questions of the schemes concerned, thereby breaking 
them into their component parts. This is based on the process used within Part D of 
HMRC’s GAAR guidance,33 where HMRC outlines a number of real and hypothetical tax 
avoidance schemes and considers how the GAAR may apply to those schemes. The 
structure of these examples is set out at the beginning of Appendix D, followed by the 
case analyses of the Relevant Cases. 
In a number of the Relevant Cases, HMRC successfully challenged the 
effectiveness of the schemes in question. However, the analysis presented here will 
                                                     
32 Patrick Way, ‘The Rule of Law, Tax Avoidance and the GAAR’ (2013) XII GITC Review 79, 99. 
33 HMRC, ‘HMRC’s GAAR Guidance (Approved by the Advisory Panel with Effect from 30 January 2015)’ 
(2015). 






proceed on the basis that the schemes would have otherwise been effective. At first 
appearance, this type of counter-factual analysis may seem unusual and counter-
intuitive. However, the courts often use a similar type of analysis in its decisions where 
there are multiple issues to consider.34 The rationale for doing so is that although the 
courts may find in favour of HMRC on one decisive issue, they discuss and draw a 
conclusion regarding other issues in case their decision regarding the decisive issue is 
successfully appealed. As such, the counter-factual analysis applied here is not 
unprecedented; rather it is consistent with the decision-making process of the courts. 
II.2.3 Section 441 and the Ramsay principle 
With respect to the sections on the Ramsay Principle and Section 441, a different 
method can be employed as they have both been considered by the courts on multiple 
occasions. These cases can be considered in order to determine how Section 441 and 
the Ramsay Principle should apply to loan relationship avoidance cases, enabling this 
dissertation to consider the role of the GAAR vis-à-vis Section 441 and the Ramsay 
Principle. 
To identify suitable cases to consider in respect of Section 441, the starting point 
was the information contained in a ‘Legislation Analysis’ for Section 441 and its 
predecessor Paragraph 13 on Westlaw. Legislation Analysis identified the following: 
Paragraph 13 
                                                     
34 cf. Greene King PLC & Greene King Acquisitions Limited v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 385 (TC), [2012] SFTD 
1085; Stagecoach (FTT, 2016) (n 16); Iliffe News & Media Limited and others v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 696 
(TC), [2013] SFTD 309. 






1. A.H. Field35  
2. DCC Holdings36  
3. Explainaway37  
4. Fidex38  
5. Iliffe News & Media39  
6. Travel Document Services40  
7. Versteegh Limited41  
8. MJP Media Services42  
Section 441 
9. BCM Cayman 43  
Of these cases, all bar two were identified as part of searches undertaken to 
identify the Relevant Cases, with the two new candidates being BCM Cayman and Iliffe. 
A review indicated that only Iliffe is relevant to the questions posted by this dissertation. 
With respect to BCM Cayman, the citation identified was concerned with the taxpayers’ 
application for the FTT to direct HMRC to issue closure notices in respect of a number of 
ongoing enquiries, including in respect of the application of Section 441. As this case is 
primarily concerned with a procedural matter, limited information is provided about the 
underlying facts of the case. Although the substantive issues are noted, they are not 
                                                     
35 A.H. Field (FTT, 2012) (n 18). 
36 DCC Holdings (SC, 2010) (n 21). 
37 Expainaway Limited & Others v HMRC [2012] UKUT 362 (TCC), [2012] STC 2525. 
38 Fidex (CA, 2016) (n 22). 
39 Iliffe News & Media (FTT, 2012) (n 34). 
40 Travel Document Service and Another v HMRC [2017] UKUT 45 (TCC), [2017] STC 973. 
41 Versteegh (FTT, 2013) (n 28). 
42 MJP Media Services Limited v HMRC [2012] EWCA Civ 1558, [2013] STC 2218. 
43 BCM Cayman LP and Others v HMRC [2017] UKFTT 226 (TC). 






discussed in detail and could change prior to HMRC issuing closure notices. As a result, 
this case is currently not relevant to the topic of this dissertation, although this could 
change in the event that the substantive issues are brought before the FTT at a later 
date. 
With regard to the cases to be considered as part of the discussion of the Ramsay 
Principle, it was considered impractical to use those identified in the Westlaw ‘Case 
Analysis’. This is because the Ramsay case has been cited in a significant number of cases 
and the Case Analysis for Ramsay is 68 pages long and reviewing such a large number of 
cases was considered impractical. Instead, this dissertation considers the cases cited by 
two important recent cases, namely UBS44 and BMBF.45  Within these, the House of 
Lords and Supreme Courts cited the following cases in the discussion of the Ramsay 
Principle, at paragraphs [61] to [68] in UBS and [26] to [39] of BMBF (unless otherwise 
stated, the cases below were referred to in both): 
1. BMBF46 (cited by UBS) 
2. Carreras47  
3. Arrowtown48 
4. Burmah Oil49 
5. Furniss v Dawson50 
                                                     
44 UBS AG v HMRC & Deutsche Bank Group Services (UK) Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKSC 13, STC 934. 
45 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson (Inspector of Taxes) [2004] UKHL 51, [2005] STC 1. 
46 ibid. 
47 Carreras Group Ltd v Stamp Commissioner [2004] UKPC 16, [2004] STC 1377. 
48 Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Limited [2003] HKFCA 46, [2003] 6 ITLR 454. 
49 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Burmah Oil Co Limited [1982] STC 30 (UKHL). 
50 Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v Dawson [1984] STC 153 (UKHL). 






6. Scottish Providence51 (cited by UBS – the House of Lords gave their decision 
in this case on the same day as BMBF) 
7. MacNiven v Westmoreland52 
8. Ramsay53 
9. Tower MCashback54 (cited by UBS – case decided post BMBF) 
10. McGuckian55 (cited by UBS only) 
11. Snook56 (cited by UBS only) 
12. Aberdeen Construction57 (cited by UBS only) 
Three cases will be excluded from consideration for the following reasons. Snook 
concerns the concept of a sham, and therefore is not considered a Ramsay case. 
Arrowtown was not considered by a UK court and its main relevance to BMBF and UBS 
is Ribeiro PJ’s often quoted summation of the Ramsay Principle, which was affirmed by 
Lord Nicholls in BMBF. Finally, Aberdeen Construction pre-dates Ramsay, and therefore 
does not discuss the Ramsay Principle. For simplicity the remaining cases will, together 
with UBS, be referred to collectively as the ‘Relevant Ramsay Cases’, each of which will 
be discussed at V.2. 
                                                     
51 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident Institution [2004] UKHL 52, [2005] STC 15. 
52 MacNiven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Limited [2001] UKHL 6, [2001] STC 237. 
53 WT Ramsay Limited v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1981] STC 174 (UKHL). 
54 Tower MCashback LLP 1 and another v HMRC [2011] UKSC 19, [2011] STC 1143. 
55 Inland Revenue Commissioners v McGuckian [1997] STC 908 (UKHL). 
56 Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 1 All ER 518 (CA (Civ)). 
57 Aberdeen Construction Group Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1987] 1 All ER 962 (UKHL). 






II.3 Summary of key points 
 The analysis within this dissertation is based on a review of a number of 
historical tax cases, which have either involved loan relationship avoidance 
(the Relevant Cases) or the Ramsay Principle (the Relevant Ramsay Cases). 
 To explore how the GAAR and LR TAAR may have applied, this dissertation 
will compare them and consider how they may have applied to the 
schemes in the Relevant Cases.  
 Before looking at various measures relevant to this dissertation in detail, it 
is important to briefly discuss what is meant by the term ‘tax avoidance’. 
The next chapter seeks to do this. 






CHAPTER III: WHAT IS TAX AVOIDANCE? 
III.1 Introduction 
Although currently there is significant public attention being given to tax 
avoidance, there is much disagreement over the definition of the term itself58 There are 
a myriad of terms used to describe arranging one’s affairs to legally minimise one’s tax 
liability, including using terms such as ‘tax planning’, ‘tax mitigation’ and ‘unacceptable 
avoidance’.59 With the introduction of the GAAR, a new term has been introduced, 
namely ‘abusive’ tax avoidance. To be able to talk meaningfully about the role of the 
GAAR in preventing loan related avoidance, it is important to first consider the meaning 
of this term. However, this chapter will not seek to define the term ‘tax avoidance’, if 
that is even possible, but rather to give a broader context and meaning when it is used 
throughout this dissertation. 
III.2 Evasion, avoidance and mitigation   
Lord Templeman, writing extra-judicially, describes three ways that a person can 
reduce their tax liability.60 Firstly they could seek to evade tax completely. Secondly, 
they could seek to avoid a tax liability. Thirdly, they could seek to mitigate their tax 
liability. Tax evasion, which is illegal, takes place where a taxpayer hides or under-
declares the income they generate. Tax avoidance, which is legal, takes place where a 
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“taxpayer's advisers invent a scheme whereby he can hope to enjoy the benefit of a 
taxable event without becoming liable to pay the tax.”61 For instance, a taxpayer may 
undertake a scheme, which generates income, without giving rise to a tax charge. Such 
schemes involve artificial steps that do not have a commercial purpose. Tax mitigation, 
which is also legal, is where a taxpayer reduces their tax liability by incurring expenditure 
which Parliament intends to give relief for.  
Although others may use different terms and definitions, most commentators 
would agree, at least to some extent, with these three categories. The differences 
between each of them are discussed further below.    
III.2.1 Evasion versus avoidance 
According to Barker, although the difference between tax evasion and tax 
avoidance is a matter of legality, the emphasis when making this distinction should not 
be on whether the outcome of an activity is legal, it should be on the taxpayer’s 
conduct.62 He argues that tax evasion normally involves fraud or attempts to conceal a 
taxpayer’s true actions. Whereas, he notes that: [t]ax avoidance's domain is the shadow 
world that results from the incongruence between statutory language and the context, 
intent or purpose of the legislation.”63 Although some argue that those involved in tax 
avoidance are not concerned with the detection risk, that is to say, whether the relevant 
tax authorities identify their conduct, Barker considered that the latter is only true from 
a narrow perspective. Although taxpayers who undertake a tax avoidance scheme would 
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not be concerned with criminal persecution if their activities are found out, a tax 
authority can only challenge those schemes they know about. As Barker put it, 
“undiscovered tax avoidance is successful tax avoidance.”64  
Many of the themes noted by Barker are also noted by Prebble and Prebble. In 
particular, they note that secrecy is important for tax avoidance to be successful. They 
go as far as to say that “[a]voidance that can only succeed if not discovered is only 
contingently legal and is just short of tax evasion at the most serious end of the scale.”65 
Freedman, writing from a UK perspective, also agreed with many of these points. In 
respect of the disclosure point, she questions at what point the drive for secrecy 
becomes concealment.66 
III.2.2 Avoidance verses mitigation 
Unlike tax evasion and tax avoidance, where at least conceptually, there is a clear 
distinction between the two terms (i.e. legality), the boundary between tax avoidance 
and tax mitigation is both conceptually and practically problematic. Lord Hoffmann and 
others argue that unless the legislation under consideration uses these terms it is not in 
not useful to introduce them. Instead, in Westmoreland,67 Lord Hoffmann, citing his 
judgement in Norglen,68 argued tax avoidance schemes either work or not. With the 
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question of whether a tax avoidance scheme works depends on how the relevant 
legislation is constructed.  
As noted above Lord Templeman defined tax avoidance as the reduction of a 
person’s tax liability in a way that is contrary to the intention of Parliament. However, 
writing extra-judicially, Lord Hoffmann argues that this formulation “raises a logical 
difficulty”,69 namely, why was tax due in the first place. Although Lord Templeman 
would respond by suggesting that tax is due because Parliament intended it to be due, 
this, in Lord Hoffmann’s view merely raised the question of how the intention of 
Parliament should be determined. Furthermore, Lord Hoffman questions whether, post- 
Ramsay, it was possible for the court to interpret a tax statute in such a way that it 
agreed that although Parliament intended to levy a tax, no actual tax was due.70 Similar 
themes can be found in the academic literature. For instance, Weisbach argues that 
there “is no a priori way to distinguish [tax] shelters [broadly equivalent to tax 
avoidance71] from any other tax planning.”72  
Freedman argues that there is a spectrum of activities between tax evasion and 
tax planning of the sort that all people would find acceptable:  
Between these activities, difficult as they are to define, is the grey area 
of activity which some consider to be completely legitimate and even 
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desirable for the proper functioning of the tax system and others 
consider reprehensible.73 
For instance, some, such as Murphy see the term ‘tax avoidance’ as a broad term 
covering a range of activities,74 whilst others would view the same activities as sensible 
tax planning. Freedmen’s use of the word ‘reprehensible’ is interesting because it points 
to a question of morality and raised the question of what the role of morality is in 
differentiating between tax avoidance and tax mitigation.  
Honoré, writing on the interaction of morality and the law comments that, 
although people have a moral obligation to pay tax, “[a]part from the law, no one has a 
moral obligation to pay any particular amount of tax.”75 If Honoré is correct, then 
taxpayers do not have a moral obligation not avoid tax as tax avoidance schemes are 
designed to ensures that no tax that is legally due. This argument supports Lord 
Hofmann’s position that the key distinction is not between tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation; instead, it is between successful tax avoidance versus unsuccessful tax 
avoidance.  
Freedman, after reflecting on Honoré’s position, suggested another way by which 
morality can come into a discussion of tax avoidance, namely via social norms, which 
guide taxpayer’s decisions on whether to enter tax avoidance. However, she argues that 
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relying on such social norms to prevent tax avoidances in unlikely to be successful in the 
long term since “taxation is a topic where there will be genuine moral disagreements”.76  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that although most commentators 
acknowledge that there is a distinction between tax avoidance and tax mitigation, it is 
challenging to determine where to draw the line between the two terms. That said, 
Barker suggests that"[g]ood tax lawyers know when they are pushing hard at the edge 
of the envelope."77 This quote is probably also true for tax advisers in the UK. That is to 
say, although an experienced UK tax adviser may not be able to provide a detailed test 
to determine whether a scheme amounts to tax avoidance, they would be able to make 
a determination upon viewing such a scheme.   
III.3 Implications for this dissertation 
The previous section has explored the challenges of defining the term tax 
avoidance. Before moving on, it is important to consider what these discussions mean 
for the purposes of this dissertation. Although the literature highlights that the 
distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance may not be a clear as it first appears, 
this dissertation focuses on activities that fall outside of the scope of tax evasion. Many 
of the Relevant Cases were reported to HMRC under the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance 
Schemes (‘DOTAS’) regime, which would indicate that the taxpayers and their advisers 
were not attempting to avoid disclosing the nature of the schemes to HMRC. 
Furthermore, the GAAR is a legislative provision to prevent ‘abusive’ tax avoidance, as 
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opposed to tax evasion. Thus, this dissertation is concerned only with tax avoidance and 
not tax evasion. 
Once tax evasion is excluded, the question then becomes what is meant by the 
term tax avoidance? Although Lord Templeman, sought to distinguish tax avoidance 
from tax mitigation, it has been shown above that this distinction has been questioned. 
At the same time, it seems reasonable to distinguish between, say, an individual putting 
money into an ISA and a company buying of an off-the-self avoidance scheme. Between 
these two extremes there is a range of activities which some may label tax avoidance 
but others would label tax mitigation. 
Further investigation into the distinction between tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation is unlikely to assist in answering the question posed by this dissertation 
because the question of where the line should be drawn comes down to one’s own 
political and moral perspective. Therefore, this dissertation will use the term tax 
avoidance in a broad way to refer to any method used legally to reduce a person’s 
liabilities to tax. That said, we focus on activities towards the more aggressive end of the 
tax avoidance spectrum.  
Although it could be argued that the inclusion of the word aggressive adds an 
emotive edge and merely adds to the terminological quagmire, two points should be 
made. Firstly, the GAAR is intended only to apply to abusive tax avoidance 
arrangements, which are likely to at the more aggressive end of the tax avoidance 
spectrum. Secondly, although it may be difficult to specify a priori what makes a tax 
avoidance arrangement aggressive, in practice, an experienced tax practitioner knows 






when they are pushing the boundaries.78 From a practical perspective, given the method 
used within this dissertation relies on analysis of cases that have been considered by the 
courts, this would indicate that HMRC disagree with the taxpayer’s analysis. Although 
this does not necessary mean that schemes should be considered aggressive avoidance, 
HMRC are focused on challenging tax avoidance schemes through the courts.79 
Furthermore, not seeking to distinguish tax mitigation from tax avoidance is 
appropriate given the measures reviewed in this dissertation. This is because each of 
the measures contain a different criterion to determine whether it applies to the scheme 
in question. Thus, in order to explore the key question in our research we have taken a 
broad view of what tax avoidance is. This will enable us to analyse what type of 
avoidance each measure is designed to counteract.  
III.4 Summary of key points 
 The key difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance is legality, 
although the boundary can become blurred.  
 It is more challenging to distinguish between tax avoidance and tax 
mitigation. This dissertation will use the term ‘tax avoidance’ in a broad 
way to refer to any legal method used to reduce a person’s liabilities to tax. 
 The next chapter will introduce the GAAR, which, introduces a new term 
into the mix, namely ‘abusive tax avoidance’.  
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CHAPTER IV: INTRODUCTION TO THE GAAR 
IV.1 Introduction  
As the GAAR is central to this dissertation, this chapter provides an introduction 
to it and reviews the provisions within the context of the Aaronson Report.80 By 
contextualising the GAAR provisions in this way, a fuller exploration of its purpose and 
the safeguards contained within it should be possible. Given the question this 
dissertation seeks to answer; we only consider the parts of the legislation which affect 
whether the GAAR will apply to a tax avoidance scheme. A discussion of how tax 
advantages obtained in the schemes to which the GAAR applies are counteracted and 
the procedural issues related to the application of the GAAR are beyond the scope of 
this research.   
This chapter will begin by reviewing the GAAR legislation as enacted within FA 
2013, references being made to the Aaronson Report where relevant. Such references 
will enable the GAAR legislation to be contextualized and the purpose of certain key 
phrases to be explored. Following on from this, the safeguards recommend by the 
Aaronson Report will be discussed. As part of this discussion, this dissertation will 
consider how these safeguards were enacted within FA 2013. 
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IV.2 The GAAR as enacted in Finance Act 2013 
Following the Aaronson Report81 and subsequent consultation, the GAAR was 
enacted as Part 5 of FA 2013, which received Royal Assent on 17 July 2013.82 The GAAR 
applies to a broad range of taxes including corporation tax, income tax and inheritance 
tax.83 The main tax that the GAAR does not apply to is VAT. This is because VAT was 
already subject to an abuse of law doctrine, which has been developed by the European 
Court of Justice as a result of the Halifax case.84 
The GAAR seeks to counteract tax ‘arrangements’ that are considered ‘abusive.’ 85 
The term arrangement is broadly defined as including “any agreement, understanding, 
scheme, transaction or series of transactions (whether or not legally enforceable)”86 
which is a very common definition tax legislation.87  
A ‘tax arrangement’ is in turn defined as an arrangement “if, having regard to all 
the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a tax 
advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements.”88 
The phrase ‘main purpose, or one of the main purposes’ is used on a number of other 
occasions as part of Targeted Anti-Avoidance Rules (“TAARs”), for instance, the TAARs 
within the UK dividend exemption.89 Cooper highlights that this test looks at the purpose 
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of the arrangement, rather than the motives of the individual participants involved. 90 
That is to say, the purpose of an arrangement can only be determined with reference to 
the objective facts surrounding the implementation of that arrangement, rather than 
the subjective intentions of the participators or designers of those arrangements.  
A broad definition of a “tax advantage” is used for determining if the GAAR 
applies.91  A tax arrangement is considered abusive where those arrangements “cannot 
reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax 
provisions, having regard to all the circumstances including … [those listed at 
Subsections 207(2)(a)-(c)].” Broadly speaking, subsection (a) and (c) are concerned with 
whether the results of a tax arrangement are consistent with the purpose of the 
underlying tax provisions or exploit a shortcoming in them. Subsection (b) is concerned 
with whether the tax arrangements contain any artificial or contrived steps. The phrase 
‘all the circumstances including’ introducing subsections (a) to (c) indicates that the 
factors listed are not exhaustive and regard should be taken of all other relevant factors. 
Furthermore, Section 207(3) goes on to explicitly state that where a tax arrangement is 
part of other wider arrangements, regard should be taken of those other arrangements. 
The authors of the Aaronson Report considered that it was important to have a 
double reasonableness test as opposed to a single reasonableness test. The purpose of 
the double reasonableness test is to set a high hurdle by requiring the court to find in 
favour of the taxpayer in circumstances where, even if the court does not consider the 
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arrangement to be reasonable, they could accept that such a view might reasonably be 
held.92 As Aaronson explains, the double reasonableness test “asks not merely whether 
you think it is reasonable but also whether you regard it as reasonable that someone 
else could have a different view.”93 
Section 207(4) and (5), respectively, contain a list of factors which might indicate 
that a tax arrangement is abusive and a single factor which might indicate that an 
arrangement is not abusive. The lists in these two sections should not be considered 
exhaustive and other factors may be relevant.94 Broadly speaking, the indicators of 
abusiveness cover situations where either the result for tax purposes is significantly 
different from the economic result of that arrangement (in the taxpayer’s favour) or 
where there is a claim for a repayment or crediting of tax where the underlying tax has 
not been paid and is unlikely to be paid. However, there is an escape clause here as a 
result is only abusive “if it is reasonable to assume that such a result was not the 
anticipated result when the relevant tax provisions were enacted.”95 
The single indicator that a scheme might not be abusive is that the tax 
arrangement was standard practice and, at the time the arrangement had been entered 
into, HMRC had accepted the practice. This means that tax arrangements should not be 
subject to the GAAR where HMRC has not historically challenged similar arrangements. 
That said, HMRC’s GAAR guidance indicates that they would take a close look at the facts 
of the scheme and the context of their historical position before accepting that this 
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indication is present.96 As such, whether this indicator would prevent the GAAR from 
applying would require a close analysis of the facts. 
IV.3 Safeguards 
Within the Aaronson Report,97 the authors recommend six safeguards to ensure 
that the GAAR would not apply to acceptable tax planning. These safeguards are as 
follows: 
1) The GAAR should include “explicit protection for reasonable tax 
planning”.98 This safeguard is achieved within GAAR by the inclusion of the 
double reasonableness test at Section 27(2),99 as discussed in the previous 
section.  
2) The GAAR should not be used against schemes that are not tax motivated. 
This safeguard is achieved by the inclusion of a motive test at Section 
207(1). Again, this section has already been discussed. 
3) When seeking to apply the GAAR, the burden of proof should be on HMRC 
to show that an arrangement is abusive. This is achieved by the inclusion 
of Section 211(1)(a) and is discussed further at IV.3.1. 
4) There should be an advisory panel to advise HMRC on the application of 
the GAAR. Their role is twofold; firstly, to comment on the application of 
the GAAR in specific cases, with such advice being publically available in an 
                                                     
96 HMRC, ‘HMRC’s GAAR Guidance (Approved by the Advisory Panel with Effect from 28 March 2018)’ 
(2018). 
97 Aaronson (n 80). 
98 ibid 1.11(i). 
99 The precise wording of the double reasonable test at Section 207(2) is different from the wording 
proposed within the Aaronson Report, however, the revised working does not materially affect how the 
double reasonable test should apply. 






anonymised format; and secondly, to approve the GAAR guidance issued 
by HMRC. The roles of the panel are outlined in Schedule 43, FA 2013 and 
are discussed further at IV.3.2. 
5) When determining whether the GAAR is applicable, both HMRC and the 
taxpayer should be able to refer to any materials which are in the public 
domain, even if ordinarily, such materials would be inadmissible in court. 
This safeguard is achieved by Section 211(3) and discussed further below 
at IV.3.3. 
6) The GAAR should only be able to be applied with the authorisation of a 
senior HMRC official. This safeguard was legislated for within Schedule 43, 
FA 2013, which provides that only a ‘designated HMRC official’ can seek to 
invoke the GAAR. The role of the designated HMRC official will not be 
discussed further as it is considered a procedural safeguard and therefore 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
IV.3.1 Burden of proof 
Normally, where tax disputes are considered by the courts, the burden of proof is 
on the taxpayer to show that their interpretation of the relevant provision is correct, 
whereas in GAAR cases, the burden of proof rests with HMRC.100 Specifically, Section 
211(1) states that HMRC must show: firstly, there is a tax arrangement which is abusive; 
and secondly the proposed counteraction of the arrangement is just and reasonable. 
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The Aaronson Report101 recommended placing the burden of proof on HMRC for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the authors considered that if the burden of proof was placed 
on the taxpayer it would be difficult for a taxpayer to show that a tax arrangement is not 
abusive. Secondly, their review of how GAARs were implemented in other jurisdictions 
found that, where the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, judges are reluctant to 
override specific rules with a general rule given that “Parliament has laid down rules, and 
prima facie those rules ought to be capable of being followed without penalty.”102 
IV.3.2 The GAAR Advisory Panel 
As noted above, the GAAR Advisory Panel is comprised of a number of independent 
tax experts and is designed to advise HMRC on the application of the GAAR.103 The Panel has 
two primary functions. Firstly, before HMRC can apply the GAAR to a tax arrangement, it is 
required to refer the scheme to the Panel for its opinion on whether the taxpayer’s actions 
were reasonable104 (i.e. a single reasonableness test105). HMRC is not bound by the Panel’s 
opinion, however, the courts are required to take the Panel’s opinion into consideration as 
part of any subsequent appeal.106 HMRC states that anonymised versions of these opinions 
will be released shortly after the main opinion has been provided.107 The first set of opinions 
were published in July 2017,108 with a total of 6 sets of opinions published to date, although 
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a number of these appear to deal with similar subjects. Five relate to employee 
remuneration schemes and one relates to a scheme extracting cash from a company 
without triggering an income tax liability or a charge under Section 455, CTA 2010. Given 
that the subject matter of these opinions is not related to the loan relationship code, they 
are not directly relevant to the subject of this dissertation and therefore are not discussed 
further. 
The second function of the Panel is to approve HMRC’s GAAR guidance. Although this 
is not a statutory duty per se, the courts are only required to take into consideration HMRC’s 
GAAR guidance if it has been approved by the Panel (specifically, the version approved at 
the time the tax arrangement was entered into).109 The context of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance 
is discussed further as Section IV.4. 
With respect to GAAR guidance which HMRC has drafted but is not yet approved by 
the Panel, HMRC may still be able to use this as evidence in court under Section 211(3) 
providing it is in the public domain. The critical difference between these two situations is 
that the court must take into account the approved GAAR guidance whereas, it may take 
account of any other materials, such as unapproved guidance, in the public domain at the 
time of the transaction.  
IV.3.3 The source that can be used by the court 
Section 211(3)(a) allows the courts, when determining whether the GAAR applies, to 
take into account a broader range of materials than courts have traditionally been allowed 
under the principles set out in Pepper v Hart.110 Specifically, they may consider any other 
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material which was in the public domain at the time that arrangement was entered into. 
This section is very broadly drafted and the courts may take into account “guidance, 
statements or other material (whether of HMRC, a Minister of the Crown or anyone 
else).”111 As HMRC’S GAAR guidance notes, there “is no limit to the nature of this material, 
providing only it is relevant,” and it could include official documents, such as ministerial 
statements and non-official documents such as journal articles.112 
IV.4 HMRC’s GAAR guidance 
As noted above, part of the role of the GAAR advisory panel is to approve the GAAR 
guidance issued by HMRC. HMRC’s guidance was first published in 2013,113 then revised 
in 2015,114 2017115 and 2018.116  Although each iteration has introduced a number of 
small amendments, there have not been any major changes in the guidance between 
the different versions. HMRC’s website contains a list of the changes made between 
versions. 117  The GAAR Guidance contains five sections, the content of each is outlined 
below: 
 Part A is a short introduction to the purpose of the guidance and its legal 
status. Part A will not be considered further. 
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 Part B summarises how the GAAR is designed to apply and what types of 
tax avoidance schemes it is designed to target. Although this guidance is 
useful to understand the types of schemes that HMRC intends to use the 
GAAR to counteract, it is generally in line with what was proposed in the 
Aaronson Report. As such, it will not be considered further. 
 Part C contains a detailed discussion of the GAAR legislation and how 
HMRC considers each element of the GAAR legislation is designed to 
apply. HMRC’s comments in this regard will be noted, where relevant in 
Chapter VII.  
 Part D contains 32 examples of how the GAAR is likely to apply in specific 
cases (plus a further 4 schemes that straddle the implementation of the 
GAAR). A number of these examples are based on historical cases, 
including BMBF118 and Mayes.119. The relevant examples from Part D will 
be discussed in Section IV.4.1. 
 Part E details the procedural aspects of how the GAAR will apply and will 
not be considered further. 
IV.4.1 HMRC’s examples 
Of the 32 main examples which HMRC provides, 6 consider corporation tax 
matters. These examples cover schemes involving tax provisions ranging from capital 
allowances to unauthorized unit trusts. Of these examples, two concern schemes 
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involving the loan relationship regime, one likely to have been challenged by HMRC 
using the GAAR, and other not. 
The first example concerns a scheme designed to manipulate the late paid interest 
rules. Although these rules have since been repealed, the 2018 guidance still contains 
this example as HMRC considered it remains useful to show the principles of how the 
GAAR will apply. The scheme involves a company paying interest on a loan where the 
connected party lender is a tax resident in a country with a double tax treaty with the 
UK, thereby meaning that the interest payable is deductible on an accruals basis. As the 
company would like a deduction for interest payable on a paid basis, the company 
arranges for the lender to assign a small element of the interest to a connected party in 
a tax haven (‘Haven Co’), thereby causing the interest payable on the whole loan to be 
deductible on a paid basis. 
HMRC conclude that they would not seek to apply the GAAR against such a 
scheme. Although the assignment of a small element of the interest to Haven Co is a 
contrived step, HMRC consider it unclear whether the relevant legislation was designed 
to prevent such a scheme from being successful. Further, they note, that none of the 
indicators of abusiveness are present and historically HMRC granted clearance for such 
schemes. 
The second example involves a Company A acquiring Company B, in such a way 
that the shares of Company B are treated as if they were a debt instrument in the hands 
of Company A. This means that Company A would be taxable on the fair value gains or 
losses arising from the shares of Company B. After that acquisition, Company B then 






pays a large dividend to Company A, which results in a significant decrease in the fair 
value of Company B and prima facia, gives rise to a deductible fair value loss in Company 
A. This scheme has a number of similarities to Travel Document Services.120 HMRC 
indicates that they would use the GAAR against this type of scheme because they 
consider that all of the elements that indicate the GAAR would apply do exist. Namely, 
the scheme is contrived, it exploits a shortcoming in the relevant provisions, and it gives 
rise to tax deduction in Company A where no economic loss arose. 
Although these examples are useful to determine how one should perform a GAAR 
analysis (indeed the analyses contained within Appendix D are based on the structure 
of these examples), there is a question of how useful they are in understanding how the 
GAAR should apply. Some have gone so far as to say that they provide very little 
guidance on how the GAAR will apply because none of the examples give “consideration 
of borderline scenarios.”121 Indeed, the examples provided are either straightforward 
tax planning, or are clearly abusive. As such, although they provide an indication of how 
HMRC will approach GAAR cases, the conclusions reached in respect of the examples do 
not give much clarity over how the GAAR will apply in less clear-cut cases.  
IV.5 Summary of key points 
 The GAAR is designed to enable HMRC to counteract tax avoidance 
schemes that are considered abusive. A scheme is considered abusive if it 
“cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action”. 
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 The Aaronson Report recommended that the GAAR contain a number of 
safeguards to provide additional protection for taxpayers who undertake 
sensible tax planning, including the creation of an independent GAAR 
Advisory Panel to advise HMRC how the GAAR should apply. 
 HMRC have issued guidance on how the GAAR applies. This guidance has 
been approved by the GAAR Advisory Panel and includes examples of how 
the GAAR may apply in specific cases. 
 Prior to the introduction of the GAAR, HMRC sought to use the Ramsay 
Principle to defeat tax avoidance schemes. The Ramsay Principle will be 
the subject of the next chapter. 
 
 






CHAPTER V: INTRODUCTION TO THE RAMSAY 
PRINCIPLE 
V.1 Introduction  
Since the House of Lords decision in the Ramsay case,122 the Ramsay Principle has 
been one of the key tools that HMRC uses to prevent tax avoidance schemes from being 
successful. This principle developed over a number of years and the present form can 
be summarised in a quote from Ribeiro PJ: “The ultimate question is whether the 
relevant statutory provisions, construed purposively, were intended to apply to the 
transaction, viewed realistically.”123 This phrasing of the Ramsay Principle was affirmed 
by the House of Lords in the BMBF case.124 Although the Ramsay Principle is strictly 
speaking not a GAAR, some have seen it as equivalent to one. For instance, Prebble and 
Prebble commented in 2010 that although the UK did not have a statutory GAAR, “it 
does have a judicially developed anti-avoidance rule [i.e. the Ramsay Principle] that 
sometimes have roughly the same effect.”125 
The first section of this chapter will review the development of the Ramsay 
Principle from its initial formulation in Ramsay.126 As will be seen, although this principle 
continues to be referred to as the Ramsay Principle, its nature has shifted significantly 
over time and continues to be developed by the courts.  
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The second part of this chapter will consider the Mayes case.127 Although it 
concerns income tax rather than corporation tax, it highlights a key weakness in the 
Ramsay Principle. Indeed, this case was one of the key reasons that the GAAR was 
considered necessary over and above the Ramsay Principle.:128 That said, as will be 
discussed at VIII.3.2, the effectives of the GAAR in challenging schemes similar to the 
one is Mayes is open to question. 
V.2 Development of the Ramsay principle  
With the top rate of income tax on investment income in 1974/75 of 98%, the 
1970’s was a period, when many high earners looked to marketed tax avoidance 
schemes to reduce their tax liabilities. 129 In these cases, they often relied on the Duke 
of Westminster case130, which led the tax profession and courts to interpret tax statutes 
in a literal way.131 In the 80 years since the Duke of Westminster, Lord Tomlin’s 
judgement has often been quoted,132 specifically his dictum that: 
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. 
If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then however 
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow 
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taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an 
increased tax.133 
The approach to tax avoidance cases was changed after the House of Lords heard 
the appeal in the cases of Ramsay v IRC.134 The scheme in Ramsay involved the taxpayer 
investing £185k in Caithmead Limited (‘C Limited’) as well as making two loans to it. 
After various transactions, the taxpayer was able to extract its investment in C Limited 
by selling one of the loans at a profit, which resulted in the values of C Limited 
decreasing. The taxpayer then disposed of C Limited for its market value, which 
produced a loss. Although commercially the taxpayer did not make a net loss from the 
scheme (other than in respect of adviser fees), they sought to argue that a deductible 
capital loss arose. This was on the basis that although that the profit arising from the 
disposal of loan was non-taxable, the loss on disposal of C Limited was deductible. 
Within his judgement in, Lord Wilberforce outlined four principles that apply in tax 
avoidance cases. Firstly, taxpayers can only be taxed on ‘clear words.’ Secondly, 
taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs to reduce their tax liabilities, and as such, 
transactions “must be considered according to … [their] legal effect.”135 Thirdly, it is a 
matter of fact whether an arrangement is a sham and, as such, is a matter for the Special 
Commissioners (now the FTT) to determine. Fourthly, if the “transaction is genuine, the 
court cannot go behind it to some supposed underlying substance”.136 
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Although these four principles may seem, on first appearance, relatively 
unproblematic and perfectly consistent with the judgement in Duke of Westminster, 
Lord Wilberforce introduced important qualifications to the first and last principles. 
These jointly gave rise to a significant change in how the courts dealt with tax avoidance 
cases.  
With respect to the first principle, although a taxpayer could only be taxed on 
‘clear words,’ Lord Wilberforce made clear that this did “not confine the courts to literal 
interpretation” .137 Instead, the courts should interpret the provision within the broader 
legislative context and with regard to its purpose. In Ramsay, moving away from an 
overly literal interpretation of taxing statutes allowed the court to consider whether a 
‘real world’ loss arose as, in the words of Lord Wilberforce, “capital gains tax was 
constructed to operate in the real world, not that of make-belief.”138 
With regard to the fourth principle, although Lord Wilberforce confirmed the 
courts cannot tax a transaction in accordance with its underlying substance, this 
principle “does not compel the court to look at a document or a transaction in 
blinkers”.139 Rather, the court is required to consider the legal nature of the transaction 
when it is viewed as part of the wider scheme. The scheme in Ramsay would only 
produce a tax loss if each of the individual steps of the transaction were considered in 
isolation. When the scheme was considered as a whole, Lord Frazer viewed it as giving 
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rise to the “magic result of creating a tax loss that would not be a real loss” as the 
deductible loss was matched by a non-taxable gain.140 
Although Lord Wilberforce took care to ground these two principles in historical 
case law and to distinguish the Duke of Westminster case, Ramsay clearly changed the 
way that the courts viewed tax avoidance transactions. Indeed, in Burmah Oil,141 the 
second Relevant Ramsay case, Lord Diplock, in a short concurring judgement said that it 
“would be disingenuous to suggest … [that Ramsay] did not mark a significant change in 
the approach adopted by this House in its judicial role to a pre-ordained series of 
transactions … into which there are inserted steps that have not commercial 
purpose.”142   
The second case in the Ramsay series is Burmah Oil.143 This scheme involved the 
taxpayer subscribing for shares in one of its subsidiaries, which had no assets, to allow 
the subsidiary to repay a debt (which, if waived, would have been non-deductible owed 
to the taxpayer. Subsequently, the taxpayer placed the subsidiary into liquidation and 
claim a capital loss, with the cash used to subscribe for shares increasing the taxpayers 
base cost in its subsidiary, thereby increasing the capital loss available. Although Counsel 
for the taxpayer sought to distinguish this case from Ramsay, the House of Lords 
determined that the Ramsay Principle applied to deny relief for a capital loss. This was 
on the basis that, as Lord Frazer put it in the leading judgement, “when the scheme was 
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carried through to completion there was no real loss and no loss in the sense 
contemplated by the legislation.”144  
Prior to Furniss v Dawson,145 the Ramsay principle had only been considered in the 
context of self-cancelling transactions, which had no enduring legal consequences. 
According to Lord Templeton, writing extra-judicially, this led the ‘tax avoidance 
industry’ to consider that Ramsay did not apply to “tax avoidance schemes which 
produced enduring results.”146 In Furniss, the House of Lords clarified that the Ramsay 
principle did apply to linear transactions that leave the taxpayer in a different place from 
where they started. The scheme in this case involved the taxpayers’ sale of a trading 
company to a third party. Rather than selling their trading company directly, the 
taxpayers inserted an Isle of Man Holding company above the trading company, with 
the Isle of Man company selling the trading company to the third party. If successful, 
this scheme would have allowed the taxpayer to defer the gain arising if the trading 
company were sold directly to the third party.  
Lord Brightman in his leading opinion, reformulating Lord Diplock’s opinion in 
Burmah Oil, stated that for the Ramsay principle to apply two conditions needed to be 
satisfied. 147 Firstly, “there must be a preordained series of transactions; or, if one likes, 
one single composite transaction.”148 Secondly, “there must be steps inserted which 
have no commercial (business) purpose apart from the avoidance of tax.”149 Where both 
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conditions are satisfied, the Ramsay principle applies such that the steps which are 
inserted are to be ignored for tax purposes.  
In respect of the first condition, Lord Brightman explicitly restated two points 
regarding this condition, which were already evident in earlier judgements. 150 Firstly, an 
arrangement should be considered a composite transaction even if the taxpayer is not 
contractually obliged to complete the transaction once it has been started. This was 
already evident in the Ramsay judgement, where Lord Frazer opined that the “absence 
of [a] contractual obligation does not in my opinion make any material difference.”151 
Secondly, the Ramsay Principle may still apply where a composite transaction achieves 
a commercial end. This point was previously alluded to in Lord Diplock’s opinion in 
Burmah Oil, where he referred to “a pre-ordained series of transactions (whether or not 
they included the achievement of a legitimate commercial end)”.152 
The next Relevant Ramsay Case that came before the House of Lords was Craven 
v White,153 which was conjoined with two other appeals. In a number of key respects, 
the transaction ultimately undertaken in Craven v White was similar to the scheme in 
Furniss. The critical fact that distinguished Craven v White from Furniss was that when 
the taxpayer inserted the Isle of Man company into the structure, the taxpayer was 
considering an alternative transaction whereby the operations of the taxpayer’s 
company would be merged with another company, with the insertion of the Isle of Man 
Company being commercially necessary to facilitate such a merger. Counsel for White 
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sought to distinguish Furniss on the basis that the two transactions (i.e. the insertion of 
the Isle of Man company and the third party sale) were not carried out “simultaneously 
or contemporaneously.”154 
In a majority decision, the House of Lords found that the Ramsay Principle did not 
apply to the scheme in this case. The key question was how the precedent set by Furniss 
applied to the facts of this case. Lord Oliver, in his leading judgement, considered that 
there were two views of the precedent set by Furniss. The first view was that any 
transaction designed to avoid a tax charge arising from a second transaction should be 
ignored for tax purposes “because it has been planned to take place and therefore forms 
part of a scheme for the avoidance of tax’”.155 The other view is that Furniss confirmed 
that the Ramsay Principle can be applied to linear transitions as well as circular self-
cancelling transactions, but only where the transactions can be seen as “constituting a 
single composite and indivisible whole involving only a single disposal for tax 
purposes.”156 .  
Lord Oliver was of the view that the House of Lords should take a narrow view of 
the precedent set by Furniss, namely that for the Ramsay Principle to apply the 
transaction should be part of a composite transaction where are all the steps are pre-
planned and there is no practical likelihood it will not be undertaken as planned. On the 
facts of the case, Lord Oliver considered that, at the time the Isle of Man company was 
inserted into the structure, there was sufficient uncertainty over the final transaction to 
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prevent the two transactions being a considered single composite transaction to which 
the Ramsay Principle could be applied. 
Following Craven v White, the next Relevant Ramsay Case was Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v McGuckian.157 Although the fact that the Ramsay Principle applied in 
this case is not particularly noteworthy, Lord Steyn’s description of the state of tax law 
pre-Ramsay is cited by both BMBF158 and UBS.159 In McGuckian, Lord Steyn described 
tax law pre-Ramsay as an “island of literal interpretation.”160 This, combined with a step-
by-step analysis of composite transactions, “allowed tax avoidance schemes to flourish 
to the detriment of the general body of taxpayers”. 161 
The next case to consider, MacNiven v Westmoreland,162 is particularly relevant to 
this dissertation because its involved what would now be treated as a loan relationship. 
The facts of this case are relatively straight forward. Westmoreland Investment Limited 
(‘WIL’) was owned by a tax exempt pension scheme (the ‘Pension Scheme’). WIL owed 
the Pension Scheme £70m, including £40m in accrued interest. Although WIL was of 
limited value to the Pension Scheme, there was a market for a company with brought 
forward tax losses. As at the time, interest was only deductible on a paid basis (except 
for interest paid to banks), a tax deduction for the accrued interest needed to be 
crystallised so the value of WIL could be maximised. To facilitate this, the Pension 
Scheme lent WIL £20m, to allow some of the accrued interest to be paid, thereby 
                                                     
157 McGuckian (HL, 1997) (n 55). 
158 BMBF (HL, 2004) (n 45) at [28]. 
159 UBS & DB (SC, 2016) (n 44) at [61]. 
160 McGuckian (HL, 1997) (n 55) 915f. 
161 ibid 915g. 
162 Westmoreland (HL, 2001) (n 52). 






crystallising a deduction for the accrued interest. The process was repeated twice more 
with the same effect. When WIL paid the interest to the Pension Scheme, WIL accounted 
for the income tax due on the interest payment. However, as the Pension Scheme was 
exempt from tax, it was able to reclaim the income tax suffered. The Pension Scheme 
then sold WIL to a third party for nominal value and the outstanding debt at a significant 
discount, with the value of this debt arising from the fact that WIL had carried forward 
losses. 
HMRC sought to argue that that the Ramsay Principle applied to this scheme with 
the effect it should be disregarded for tax purposes. Lord Hoffmann gave the leading 
judgement in this case. He identified the “innovation in Ramsay was to give the statutory 
concepts of ‘disposal’ and ‘loss’ a commercial meaning.”163 Although in his judgement 
in Ramsay, Lord Wilberforce discussed ‘real world’ gains and losses, Lord Hoffmann 
considered it important to be careful when using such terms to avoid “unnecessary 
philosophical difficulties about the nature of reality”. 164 Instead, he opines that 
“something may be real for one purpose but not another.” 165 Thus, Lord Hoffman 
considered that the first step in applying a provision is to consider whether it is referring 
to a commercial or legal concept.  
In Westmoreland, the critical word in the relevant provision was ‘payment’, which 
meant the “transfer of money, which discharges a debt.” 166 In this case, given that WIL 
discharged its debt to the Pension Scheme in respect of the accrual interest, the transfer 
                                                     
163 ibid 22. 
164 ibid 40. 
165 ibid. 
166 ibid 67. 






of money to the Pension Scheme should be treated as a ‘payment’ for the purpose of 
the relevant legislation and therefore, a deduction should be available. As Lord Nicholls 
put it: “A genuine discharge of a debt cannot cease to qualify as a payment for the 
purpose of [the relevant provision] by reason only that it was made solely to secure a 
tax advantage.” 167 As will be seen when BMBF is considered, later decisions of the House 
of Lords moved away from distinguishing between those concepts which should be 
given their commercial meaning and those that should be given their legal meaning.168  
The next cases to consider is Carreras v Stamp Commissioners,169 which arose from 
an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica and was heard by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. The taxpayer sought to dispose of one its subsidiaries to a third 
party, however, instead of selling for cash, which would have attracted Transfer Tax, it 
did so in exchange for an issue of debentures, which were due to be redeemed a few 
weeks later, thereby avoiding Transfer Tax. Lord Hoffmann, who gave the sole 
judgement of the Judicial Committee considered that the key question to consider was 
whether the ‘transaction’ in this case included the subsequent redemption of the 
debentures. Lord Hoffmann considered that restricting the view of the transaction 
would give rise to a result that would could not have been intended by the legislator. As 
a result of viewing the transaction as a whole, it was determined that the relevant 
exemption did not apply and therefore, Transfer Tax was due.  
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The next Relevant Ramsay Case to be considered ins BMBF v Mawson.170. The facts 
of the scheme are highly complex, and involved BMBF entering into a sale and lease-
back arrangement with Bord Gais Eireann, (‘BGE’) over an oil pipeline with security 
arrangements being put in place to enable to the proceeds from the sale to be retained 
by a company in the Barclays group. Although BMBF did entered into sale and lease-
back agreements as part of its trade, the sole benefit of this scheme was to enable BMBF 
to claim capital allowance on the costs of this pipeline. The question that the House of 
Lords needed to consider was whether the Ramsay Principle applied such that BMBF 
was unable to claim capital allowances on the expenditure it incurred on the pipeline. 
Lord Nicholls, with whom the other Lords agreed, began by noting there was 
uncertainty about the nature of the Ramsay Principle, and although his judgment would 
not remove all the difficulties he aimed to “achieve some clarity about [its] basic 
principles.”171 Lord Nicholls describes the Ramsay Principle as involving two elements. 
Firstly, one needs to consider the nature of the relevant provision and what type of 
transactions that provision seeks to tax. Secondly, one needs to consider whether the 
transaction is of the type that the provision seeks to apply to. It is this process that Lord 
Nicholls saw as encapsulated by Ribeiro’s famous dictum in Arrowtown.172  
When taking the approach Lord Nicholls, drawing on Westmoreland, made it clear 
that one needs to “avoid sweeping generalisations about disregarding transactions 
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undertaken for the purposes of tax avoidance.” 173 In BMBF, Lord Nicholls found that the 
purpose of the capital allowance regime is to give tax relief to the person who suffers 
from the fact that assets reduce in value due to depreciation (in this case BMBF as 
lessor). As the relevant provision is not concerned with how the lessee used the asset or 
what they did with the proceeds from a sale and lease-back arrangement, these factors 
did not affect the nature of BMBF’s expenditure. Indeed, Lord Nicholls found that the 
circularity of the funding was ‘happenstance’ and was not necessary for the schemes 
effectiveness. As BMBF acquired the pipeline in the ordinary course of its business the 
Ramsay Principle could not be used to prevent them claiming capital allowance on the 
expenditure incurred. 
On the same day as Lord Nicholls gave his judgement in the BMBF case, he also 
gave the sole judgement in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Scottish Provident 
Institution174 (‘SPI’). The scheme in this case sought to take advantage of changes to the 
taxation of options and involved the following. Prior to the change SPI sold an option 
over gilts to a third party, creating non-taxable income, with the third party exercised 
their option after the change giving rise to an allowable loss for SPI. Arrangements were 
put in place to ensure that neither party made an overall gain or loss from the 
arrangements (except for fees payable for the facilitating the scheme) and securitisation 
arrangements were put in place such that no cash changed hands. The options were 
priced such that it could have been in the third party’s interest not to exercise the option 
granted to it by SPI. Lord Nicholls notes that the Special Commissioners found, as a 
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matter of fact, that although it was unlikely to be in the third parties’ interest not to 
exercise its option, the ‘no practical likelihood’ test set out by Lord Oliver was not 
satisfied.  
In order for this scheme to be successful, the third party needed to be entitled to 
gilts under the option. Although in isolation, the option gave the third party such an 
entitlement, if the broader arrangements were taken into consideration, no such 
entitlement would exist, leading the scheme to fail. Lord Nicholls found that although 
the ‘no practical likelihood’ test was not satisfied, this was because the options were 
deliberately structured so that there would remain a small chance they would be 
exercised. The sole reason for doing so was to ensure that there was no composite 
transaction, thereby preventing the Ramsay Principle from applying. Lord Nicholls 
opined that the value of the Ramsay Principle would be greatly diminished if it could not 
be applied to schemes that contained a “commercially irrelevant contingency”.175 This 
decision qualified the ‘no practical likelihood’ test set out by Lord Oliver in Craven v 
White, such that when applying the test, commercially irrelevant contingencies should 
be ignored. 
The boundaries of the precedent set in BMBF were tested in Tower MCashback 
LLP v HMRC.176  This scheme involved the individual taxpayers investing in Tower 
MCashback 2 LLP (the ‘LLP’), which borrowed additional funds on non-recourse terms177 
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from a company in the Tower Group PLC (‘Tower’) group and used all of its funds to 
purchase an element of the software owned by MCashback Limited. The loans made to 
the LLP were unlikely ever to be repaid and under the funding arrangements 82% of the 
software purchase price received by MCashback Limited had to be deposited with a 
named bank to act as security on the non-recourse loans. In addition, the purchase price 
of the software was greatly in excess of its market value The scheme was designed to 
allow the investors in the LLP to claim First Year Allowances on the software purchased, 
including the element which was debt funded, thereby creating a tax loss which the 
investors could use against their other income. The net effect was that investors were 
able to claim a loss equal to approximately four times the amount they had invested. 
HMRC sought to argue that the Ramsay Principle applied such that the amount the 
LLP spent on acquiring the software, was not all incurred in acquiring a capital asset and 
therefore did not qualify for First Year Allowances. The LLP sought to defend their 
position by relying on the precedent set by BMBF, such that the only question to be 
considered was whether the LLP had incurred the expenditure of acquiring the software 
without reference to the broader context of the transaction. 
Lord Walker SCJ, in his leading judgement, found that the precedent set by BMBF 
meant that the Ramsay Principle did not automatically apply to schemes where the 
financing was circular; instead an analysis of the facts was required. However, he 
distinguished the facts of BMBF from the current case. In particular, he noted that in 
BMBF the various transactions were undertaken on commercial terms, and although 
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BGE needed to deposit the purchase price as security, the arrangements benefited BGE. 
In contrast, MCashback did not receive most of the consideration paid, instead, it went 
directly into the security arrangements. Overall, Lord Walker concluded that, unlike in 
BMBF, the LLP “did not, on a realistic appraisal of the facts, meet the test laid down by 
the [Capital Allowances Act 2001], which requires real expenditure for the real purpose 
of acquiring plant for use in a trade.”178 That said, given that the LLP did incur some 
expenditure on acquiring the software, the court allowed the LLP to claim First Year 
Allowances that element. 179  
The final Ramsey case to be considered is the joint case of UBS v HMRC and 
Deutsche Bank v HMRC.180 Although these cases were heard together and the scheme 
in both cases were similar, both schemes operated independently. They were designed 
to allow these banks to pay their employees a bonus, which would be subject to capital 
gains tax, rather than income tax.181 As part of this scheme, the employees were given 
shares which were designed in such a way to ensure that they qualified as restricted 
securities. Ordinarily, when an employee is given a restricted security, where the 
restrictions are due to be lifted within five years, there is an option to defer the charge 
to income tax until the restrictions are lifted. Although this would normally only defer 
the tax charge, the scheme in this case was designed to prevent a tax charge from arising 
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by ensuring that the lifting of those restrictions qualified for a specific exemption 
applied. 
After a brief discussion of the Ramsay Principle, with a focus on the precedent set 
by BMBF, Lord Reed SCJ, with whom the other Supreme Justices agreed, went on to 
consider whether a purposive interpretation of the relevant provisions was possible. 
Counsel for UBS & DB sought to argue that a purposive interpretation was not possible 
because the relevant legislation contained no explanation of its purpose and the scheme 
was not prevented by any of the specific anti-avoidance provisions included. As a result 
of this, and the fact that the relevant legislation was “extensive and highly detailed, 
counsel [for UBS & DB] argued that it was impossible to attribute to Parliament an 
unexpressed intention to exclude schemes of the present kind from the ambit of [the 
relevant legislation].” 182 Although Lord Reed acknowledged that there were forceful 
arguments, he viewed the relevant provisions in their broader background and found 
that they were designed to operate within a commercial context and were not intended 
to apply where non-commercial terms were included to ensure an exemption applied.  
Based on this analysis, Lord Reed concluded that when determining whether a 
security is a restricted security, one should only take account of those restrictions which 
have a commercial purpose. Given the facts, Lord Reed found that the redeemable 
shares were not restricted securities and, therefore, a tax charge arose at the point the 
shares were allocated to employees.  
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HMRC proposed that the Supreme Court went one step further by treating the 
employees as having received cash bonuses instead of shares, however, Lord Reed 
found HMRC’s arguments in this regard unpersuasive  
V.3 Mayes 
Although Mayes183 is not referred to in UBS, and is an income tax case rather than 
a loan relationship case (or even corporation tax case), it is important to consider since 
it shows the limitations of the Ramsay Principle. Furthermore, the Aaronson Report 
pointed to the failure of HMRC to defeat this scheme as one of the reasons why the UK 
needed a GAAR. Whilst it is open to question whether the GAAR would prevent schemes 
of this type, a detailed discussion of this case is relevant to later considerations.184  
This scheme is highly complex, involving a number of life insurance policies being 
transferred between various individuals and corporate entities. Steps 3 and 4 of the 
scheme were critical to its success; these involved a Luxembourg company paying a 
‘topped-up’ premium on the scheme then partially surrendering the policies to obtain 
their ‘topped-up’ premium back. The last step was for the taxpayer to buy the policies 
for market value then surrender them in full. A literal application of the relevant 
provisions led to the conclusion that the taxpayer was able to claim a significant income 
tax loss that could be set against their other income. HMRC sought to challenge this 
position by invoking the Ramsay Principle to allow HMRC to disregard Steps 3 and 4 
when determining how the taxpayer should be taxed. According to HMRC, these steps 
should be disregarded on the basis that these “two steps were a single, wholly self-
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cancelling, pre-ordained transaction for tax avoidance purposes having no commercial 
purpose whatsoever.”185 
The taxpayer argued that the Ramsay Principle was not helpful to HMRC in this 
case due to the nature of the provision in question. In his preliminary comments, counsel 
for the taxpayer argued that the relevant provisions were capable of “producing results 
counter to commercial reality.” .186 Furthermore, counsel for the taxpayer describes the 
provisions “as a highly prescriptive way of exacting tax on the basis of a formulaic 
arithmetical approach to transactions.187  
Hollis described the operation of the relevant tax provisions thus:  
the statute permitted the offset of only a small proportion of the 
premiums paid where amounts were withdrawn early in the life of a 
policy, with a true-up on its final surrender. Where all the holders of 
the policy were U.K. residents, the legislation resulted in the right 
amount of tax being paid over the life of the policy, although not 
necessarily in the hands of the correct holders; i.e., there could be 
"phantom gains" and "phantom losses."188  
Using Hollis’s terminology, this scheme was designed to produce that a non-
taxable ‘phantom gain’ in the Luxembourg company with the matching ‘phantom loss’ 
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being realise by the taxpayer when he was a UK tax resident, thereby giving rise to a 
deductible income tax loss.  
In respect of the Ramsay Principle, counsel for the taxpayer sought to argue that 
the Ramsay Principle “does not allow legal events to be deprived of their legal or fiscal 
effects simply because they are inserted for a tax saving purpose.”189 Mummery LJ 
agreed with the taxpayer that the Ramsay Principle could not be used to prevent the 
scheme from obtaining the desired result. After noting that the relevant provisions “do 
not readily lend themselves to a purposive commercial construction”, 190 Mummery LJ 
found that: 
[Steps 3 and 4] were genuine legal events with real legal effects. The 
court cannot, as a matter of construction, deprive those events of their 
fiscal effects … because they were self-cancelling events that were 
commercially unreal and were inserted for a tax avoidance.191 
Both Thomas and Toulson LJJ ‘reluctantly’ concurred with Mummery LJ’s decision. 
Toulson LJ acknowledged that allowing this scheme to succeed “instinctively seems 
wrong, because [the result] bears no relation to commercial reality and results in a 
windfall which Parliament cannot have foreseen or intended.”192 He goes on to identify 
that: 
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The root problem in this case from the viewpoint of HMRC lies in the 
structure of the relevant statutory scheme. … Inherent in the 
[legislative] scheme is the possibility of a disconnection between what 
would be regarded as a gain on an ordinary commercial view and what 
is to be treated as a gain for the purposes of the statute.193 
V.4 Summary of key points 
 This chapter has shown how the Ramsay Principle has developed since the 
House of Lords handed down this judgement in Ramsay. 
 The authors of the Aaronson Report considered that the Ramsay Principle 
was not sufficient to prevent tax avoidance schemes from being successful. 
The outcome of the Mayes case was an important factor in arriving at this 
conclusion. 
 The primary challenge that HMRC faced when applying the Ramsay 
Principle in Mayes was that the relevant tax provisions were not designed 
to tax ‘real world’ gains and losses. Instead, it was designed to tax phantom 
gains and losses like those the scheme gave rise to. 
 Following these preliminary chapters, the next chapter will seek to 
introduces the Loan Relationship Regime, which is at the heart of this 
dissertation.  
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CHAPTER VI: INTRODUCTION TO THE LOAN 
RELATIONSHIP REGIME 
VI.1 Introduction  
The loan relationship regime was first introduced in Finance Act 1996 and as part 
of the Tax Law Rewrite Project became Part 5 of CTA 2009. The regime provides a holistic 
regime within which loan relationships held by companies are taxed. Given that this 
dissertation is focused on tax avoidance schemes involving loan relationships, it is 
important to understand how the regime works, including the relevant anti-avoidance 
provisions. The regime contains numerous sections dealing with a variety of issues 
concerning loan relationships and not all of the provisions can be discussed in detail 
within this chapter, however, those areas of particular relevance will be briefly 
introduced.  
Although there are similarities between the taxation of loan relationships and 
derivative contracts194 the dissertation focuses on provisions within the loan 
relationship regime. As such, it will not discuss the derivative contact rules although the 
conclusions may also apply to the derivative contract regime. 
This chapter begins by outlining the underlying principles of the loan relationship 
regime before moving on to consider a number of the key provisions within the regime, 
principally the group continuity rules. The purpose of this overview is to contextualise 
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the discussions of avoidance schemes in later chapters.  The group continuity rules are 
particularly important to introduce at this stage because a number of the tax avoidance 
schemes that will be considered involve intragroup loan relationship transfers which 
were designed to give rise to asymmetrical results. 195 
The second section of the chapter moves on to consider two of the main anti-
avoidance provisions contained within the loan relationship regime, namely Section 441 
and the LR TAAR at 455B-455D, CTA 2009. Although there are a significant number of 
other anti-avoidance provisions, Section 441 and the LR TAAR can apply in a range of 
situations. In contrast, many of the other provisions target specific schemes, for 
instance, Section 445A, which was designed to prevent schemes involving the 
derecognition of loan receivables,196 similar to the scheme in Fidex.197 Others are 
designed to address the manipulation of specific provisions, for instance, Section 363A 
is designed to prevent the manipulation of the deemed release rules. Furthermore, as 
will be seen, there is an argument that the LR TAAR is in effect a ‘mini-GAAR’. 
The final section will review a number of recent loan relationship related 
avoidance cases to understand how loan relationships are being used as part of tax 
avoidance schemes. As will be seen, although the courts were able to defeat most of 
these schemes, often this required a detailed review of how the scheme was accounted 
for and whether the accounts of the relevant companies were GAAP compliant. In 
addition, a number of cases sought to argue that the debits and credits from a scheme 
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did not ‘fairly represent’ the profit or loss accruing to a company from a loan relationship 
(for instance Stagecoach198 and Smith and Nephews199).  
VI.2 The Loan Relationship Regime 
The loan relationship regime provides a holistic framework under which all loan 
relationships that a company is party to are taxed and, subject to a small number of 
exceptions, takes priority over all other sections of the tax legislation.200 That is to say, 
debits and credits arising from loan relationships can only be subject to corporation tax 
in accordance with the loan relationship regime. The regime only applies to companies 
and other entities subject to corporation tax. 
A loan relationship is defined as a ‘money debt’ arising out of a transaction of the 
lending of money.201 Broadly speaking, a ‘money debt’ is a debt that falls to be settled 
by the payment of money, the issuance or transfer of shares, or the transfer of another 
money debt. In addition, a money debt not arising out of the lending of money is to be 
treated as a loan relationship if the debtor issued an instrument representing security 
for the debt or the creditors’ right in respect of the debt.202 
The general principle of the loan relationship regime is that debits and credits 
arising from loan relationships are taxable or deductible if they arise in a company’s 
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profit and loss account (‘P&L’).203 As such, the tax treatment of an item of income or 
expense should be determined by how that item is accounted for, unless the loan 
relationship regime explicitly requires an alternative treatment to be adopted.204  
Unlike other parts of the legislation, there “is no rigid divide between capital and 
income.”205 Furthermore, Section 320 provides that where a loan relationship debit or 
credit is capitalised as part of an asset or liability on a company’s balance sheet in 
accordance with GAAP, that debit or credit should be brought into account for tax 
purposes as if it were a P&L debit or credit. For instance, when a company borrows 
money to fund a construction project, GAAP may allow the company to capitalise that 
interest as part of the cost of that asset such that that interest does not give rise to a 
P&L expense. However, for tax purposes, relief for the expense can be obtained when 
the interest expense is incurred. Indeed, Self noted that the purpose of this section was 
to ensure such capitalised interest would remain deductible.206 
Before moving on, one final aspect of the loan relationship regime should be 
introduced, namely, the group continuity rules contained within Chapters 4 – 8 of Part 
5. Where there is an intragroup financing arrangement, both the creditor and debtor 
companies are required, for tax purposes, to account for that relationship using 
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amortised cost accounting.207 In addition, where there is a debt release between 
connected companies, although the debits arising in the creditor company are non-
deductible, the credits arising in the debtor company are not taxable.208 Broadly 
speaking, the purpose of these rules, is to ensure symmetry between the debits and 
credits arising in the creditor and debtor companies.209 
As will become evident in Section V.6 of this chapter, a significant number of the 
loan relationship avoidance schemes that have come before the courts have attempted 
to manipulate or side step the group continuity rules to ensure that an asymmetrical 
result arose from intra-group financing arrangements.  
VI.3 Section 441 
Section 441210 is designed to prevent companies from obtaining a tax deduction 
from a loan relationship debit where the company is party to it for an ‘unallowable 
purpose’. According to HMRC, the purpose of the loan relationship regime is to provide 
tax relief for costs arising from loan relationships “incurred in pursuit of genuine 
commercial objectives: it should not provide relief for amounts attributable to 
unallowable purposes.”211  
Section 442 defines an unallowable purpose as a one “which is not amongst the 
business or other commercial purposes of the company.”212 A company has an 
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unallowable purpose for being party to a loan relationship where either the company is 
party to it for the furtherance of activities not within the scope of corporation tax, or for 
a tax avoidance purpose. Specifically, a loan relationship has an unallowable purpose if 
the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the company being party to it is to 
secure a tax advantage for itself or another person.213 Where a company is party to a 
loan relationship for multiple purposes, then only those debits that are attributable, on 
a just and reasonable basis, to that unallowable purpose are disallowable.214  
On first appearance it may seem that this rule is straightforward to apply, 
however, in practice, it can be complicated, especially in group situations, as can be seen 
in a number of tax cases. One such complication is the vexing “question of whose 
purposes are relevant – the borrower’s, as the legislation would suggest or, as the FTT 
in A.H. Field would have it, those of ‘all the stakeholders’ in the borrower, including 
shareholders and advisers?”215 This is an important question because the fact that a 
group arranges for an intra-group loan to be entered into for tax avoidance purposes 
does not necessarily mean that the debtor company does not have a good commercial 
purpose for being party to the loan relationship. This question arose in Versteegh216 
where HMRC argued that Para 13 was applicable. Lane’s answer to his own question is 
that whilst one should ordinarily look at the borrower’s purpose, 
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in certain circumstances, such as where the borrower does not 
appropriately address its mind to the transactions at hand, I can see 
that it may be appropriate to treat the borrower as having adopted the 
purposes of the person proposing the transaction to it.217 
The importance of the unallowable purpose rule focusing on the motive of the 
company in which the debit arose will be seen later when a number of loan related 
avoidance cases will be considered. These examples will show that even when a 
transaction is entered into to enable the interest arising on an intra-group debt to be 
non-taxable in the hands of the recipient, but still deductible in the payer’s, it is not 
always possible for HMRC to challenge the deductibility of the debits using the 
unallowable purpose rule. For instance, in both the Greene King218 and Stagecoach219 
cases, taxpayers sought to prevent credits arising from an intra-group loan relationship 
from being taxable without limiting the debtor company’s ability to claim a tax 
deduction for the debits. 
Before moving on, it is interesting to note one point arising from Travel Document 
Services220. In that case, the Court of Appeal found that Section paragraph 13 can also 
be used to deny a deduction for debits arising from a deemed loan relationship. The 
Court of Appeal held that when considering whether a company had an unallowable 
purpose for being party to a deemed loan relationship, one needs to considered the 
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purpose of that company being party to the actual relationship, which is treated as a 
loan relationship. 
VI.4 The Loan Relationship TAAR 
In 2013, HMRC issued a consultation document regarding the modernisation of 
the loan relationship and derivative contract rules within which they proposed the 
introduction of a new regime TAAR for loan relationships.221 This consultation document 
was published as Finance Bill 2013, containing the GAAR, was making its way through 
Parliament222. Notwithstanding the imminent introduction of the GAAR, HMRC 
considered that combined the GAAR, Section 441 and the transfer pricing rules, were 
not sufficient to prevent taxpayers attempting to avoid tax using loan relationship. Such 
attempts “are to be expected in the absence of the deterrent and counteractive effects 
of fully functional and comprehensive anti-avoidance provisions.” 223 
In particular, HMRC considered that: 
The test of “abuse”, for the purposes of the GAAR, is a high threshold, 
and while the GAAR may apply to certain arrangements … it does not 
seek to encompass the full range of tax avoidance activity. …. The need 
for specific legislation to protect against manipulation of the regime 
and inappropriate relief in respect of corporate debt and derivatives 
therefore remains.224 
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The above passage is particularly important to the topic of this dissertation, as it 
shows that HMRC intended for the loan relationship TAAR to be able to counteract a 
broader range of loan relationship avoidance schemes than the GAAR could. Following 
on from the consultation document, the loan relationship TAAR was inserted into the 
loan relationship regime at Sections 455B-445D, CTA 2009 by FA (No 2) 2015. The LR 
TAAR applies to arrangements entered into on or after 18 November 2015.225  
The TAAR seeks to counteract ‘loan-related tax advantages’ that arise out of 
‘relevant avoidance arrangements’.226  The term loan-related tax advantage is defined 
by Section 455C(5) as including increasing the debits or decreasing the credits a 
company needs to bring into account. In addition, Subsection 455C(5)(e) allows HMRC 
to challenge schemes which are designed to manipulate the loan relationship regime to 
ensure that a debit or credit arises is in a particular period. For instance, a scheme may 
be designed to ensure a loan relationship credit arises in a specific period to enable that 
credit to be sheltered by a loss that would have otherwise gone unrelieved. 
The term ‘relevant avoidance arrangements’ is defined as an arrangement227 
which has as its “main purpose, or one of their main purposes, is to enable a company 
to obtain a loan-related tax advantage”.228 However, some arrangements are excluded 
from this definition by Section 455C(4), which states:  
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if the obtaining of any loan-related tax advantages that would (in the 
absence of section 455B) arise from them can reasonably be regarded 
as consistent with any principles on which the provisions of this Part 
that are relevant to the arrangements are based (whether expressed 
or implied) and the policy objectives of those provisions. 
Although this exclusion may appear similar to the wording used in the GAAR 
legislation, there are a number of subtle differences which have the potential to allow 
the TAAR to apply in a broader range of circumstances. These differences are discussed 
further at Section VII.2.4. 
Section 455D moves on to provide some examples of outcomes which would 
indicate that the exclusion that Section 455C(4) provides would not apply. The 
indications of non-exclusion are as follows: 
 Section 455(4)(a): The arrangement results in a profit being brought into 
accounts which is less than the company’s economic profit. 
 Section 455(4)(b): The arrangement results in a loss or expense being 
brought into accounts which is greater than the company’s economic loss 
or expense. 
 Section 455(4)(c): The arrangement prevents or delays a loan relationship 
item being recognised in a company’s P&L. 
  Section 455(4)(d): The arrangement causes a loan relationship to be 
accounted for in a different way than it would have been, absent of that 
arrangement.  








  Section 455(4)(e): The arrangement allows a company to bring into 
account a debit for an exchange loss where a corresponding gain would 
not have been taxable (or a smaller amount of that gain would have been 
taxable).  
  Section 455(4)(f): The arrangement allows a company to bring into 
account a debit for a fair value loss where a corresponding gain would not 
have been taxable (or a smaller amount of that gain would have been 
taxable).  
 Section 455(4)(g): The arrangement causes the group continuity rules to 
apply in such a way that results in an overall reduction in the credits or 
increase in debits being brought into account. 
 Section 455(4)(h): The arrangement allows a company to bring into 
account a debit in respect of the release or impairment of a connected 
party debit where, absent of the arrangement, Chapter 6 would have 
applied to prevent a deduction being obtained. 
The indicators listed at Section 455D(1) are subject to subsection (2), which states 
that these examples are only indicators of non-exclusion, “if it is reasonable to assume 
that such a result was not the anticipated result when the provisions of this Part that are 
relevant to the arrangements were enacted.”229 
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VI.5 The ‘fairly represents’ requirement 
Reading the Relevant Cases, one can see that HMRC have attempted to use the 
‘fairly represents’ requirement230 in a number of loan relationship avoidance cases. 
Although HMRC have been relatively successful using the ‘fairly represents’ requirement 
in a number of recent tax avoidance cases, with the notable exception of Smith & 
Nephew, the ‘fairly represents requirement’ was repealed by FA (No.2) 2015231 with 
effect from 1 January 2016. Given HMRC’s success it could be seen as somewhat 
surprising that HMRC decided to repeal this provision. Before exploring HMRC’s reasons 
for this decision, the development of the ‘fairly represent’ requirement briefly consider. 
When the loan relationship regime was first introduced within FA 1996, Section 
84(1) read:  
The credits and debits to be brought into account in the case of any 
company in respect of its loan relationships shall be the sums which, in 
accordance with an authorised accounting method and when taken 
together, fairly represent, for the accounting period in question— 
(a) all profits, gains and losses of the company, ... and 
(b) all interest under the company’s loan relationship and all charges 
and expenses incurred by the company.232 
As part of the Tax Law Rewrite Project, Section 84(1) was included in CTA 2009 as 
Section 307(2) and (3) and, broadly speaking, the language of Section 307(2) and (3) 
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mirrors the language of Section 84(1). Most importantly for current purposes, during 
the rewrite, the phrase ‘… when taken together, fairly represent, for the …’ was 
retained.  Section 307 was not subsequently amended until the fairly represents rule 
was repealed as part of FA (No.2) 2015.  
The leading case on the interpretation of the fairly represents requirement is DCC 
Holdings,233 with the Supreme Court handing down its judgement in 2010. As this has 
been identified as one of the Relevant Cases, the facts of this scheme are outlined at 
Appendix D.4. In summary, the taxpayer sought to rely on an inconsistency in how sale 
and repurchase agreements are taxed. Specifically, when the taxpayer received interest 
income on the gilts it purchased as part of the scheme, they argued that whilst the entire 
amount of interest received gave rise to a deductible deemed manufactured payment, 
only a small proportion of the interest received was required to be brought into account 
as taxable income because they only had beneficial ownership of the gilts for a short 
period of time. 
When the case came before the Court of Appeal, Moses LJ (with whom Rix LJ 
agreed) in his leading judgement explained that the fairly represents requirements; 
poses a second statutory question, namely whether any particular sum 
when taken together with the other sums which fall to be brought into 
account fairly represents all the interest including that which is the 
mere product of a statutory fiction. That question is different and 
                                                     
233 DCC Holdings (SC, 2010) (n 21). 








additional to the first question, whether the sums are in accordance 
with an accruals basis of accounting.234 
Moses LJ goes on to reason that the essential function of deeming a manufactured 
payment to arise is to cancel out the income arising in the hands of the interim holder 
of the security, which is DCC Holdings in this case. Thus, although using an accruals basis 
of accounting, DCC Holdings was only required to recognise an element of the interest 
it received, but section 84(1) required DCC Holding to bring into account all the interest.  
Rimer LJ dissented from the view of Moses and Rix LJJ. Although Rimer LJ’s 
reasoning in this regard is not strictly relevant to the topic under discussion, as the 
Supreme Court also found in favour of HMRC, his reasoning does highlight an area of 
tension present in other cases, such as Mayes.235 Rimer LJ commented although he 
would like to of agreed with Moses LJ as his reasoning ”clothes the relevant legislation 
with a garb of commercial sanity” he was did not do so as “Moses LJ’s reasoning appears 
to me, with respect, to load on to the emphasised words a function that they cannot 
naturally bear and whose effect is promptly to deprive the opening provisions of the 
subsection of virtually all sense”.236 
When it came before the Supreme Court, although Lord Walker SCJ, who gave the 
courts sole judgement, agreed “that the majority of the Court of Appeal were right to 
see the overwhelming need for a symmetrical solution”237 he was of the view that the 
correct approach was to treat only a proportion of the deemed manufactured payment 
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as arising, rather than requiring DCC Holdings to bring into tax all the interest it received. 
Thus, the judgements of the Court of Appeal produced the same net result, where DCC 
Holdings was taxed on its commercial gain, albeit, the Supreme Court disagreed with the 
Court of Appeal over the way to achieve that result.  
One further aspect of Lord Walker’s judgement is of note. In Moses LJ’s 
explanation of the fairly represents requirements, the key passage of which has been 
quoted above, Moses LJ opined that this requirement “poses a second statutory 
question”. 238 However, Lord Walker “respectfully doubts Moses LJ’s analysis … [instead] 
the crucial words in s 84(1) must be constructed as a composite whole.”239 
The ‘fairly represents requirement’ was discussed in a number of the Relevant 
Cases, including Suez Teesside and Stagecoach, which are discussed further in section 
VI.6 and VI.6.2, respectively. At this point it is sufficient to note that this requirement 
applied (or would have applied) to prevent the schemes in these cases from being 
successful.  
One notable exception was Smith & Nephew, where the FTT found in favour of the 
taxpayer on the ‘fairly represents’ requirement. The FTT based their reasoning on Sir 
Terence Etherton C judgement in the Greene King case, where counsel for the taxpayer 
was seeking to rely on the ‘fairly represents requirement’ applying to prevent a taxable 
credit arising in the taxpayer. Given the FTT’s reasoning is relatively short240 and the FTT 
cannot create binding precedent, the author suggests that little weight is given to the 
                                                     
238 DCC Holdings (CA, 2009) (n 234) [63]. 
239 DCC Holdings (SC, 2010) (n 21) [35]. 
240 Just over one page in the Simon’s First-tier Tax Decisions case report, of which slightly under half is 
taken up by a quote from Greene King. 








taxpayer’s success in this case. Furthermore, HMRC have appealed the FTT’s decision.241 
Self also noted that the FTT’s decision was published a week before the UT issued its 
decision in Suez Teesside, which, in her view, improved HMRC’s changes of succession 
in front of the UT.242 
With this in mind, it appears that by repealing the fairly represents requirement, 
HMRC discarded a useful tool in preventing loan relationship avoidance schemes from 
being successful. To understand HMRC’s, it is necessary to go back to the consultation 
document HMRC prepared in 2013 on modernising the loan relationship code, in which 
HMRC gave a number of reasons why they considered was considering repealing the 
fairly represents requirement. Firstly, HMRC noted that the requirement was “an area 
of disagreement between HMRC and taxpayers; nor has it provided definitive guidance 
to the courts.”243 This comment was made with particular reference to the DCC Holdings 
case where, as noted above, although the decisions of Court of Appeal244 and Supreme 
Court245 gave rise to similar outcomes, they arrived at that outcome in very different 
ways. Secondly, HMRC noted the difficulties in interpreting the concept of the word ‘fair’ 
in this context, particularly given a company’s auditors are required to report on 
whether a company’s financial statements give a ‘true and fair’ view of a company’s 
financial position. Thus, HMRC was concerned that “a concept of ‘fairness’ in the tax 
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legislation may not provide a clear basis for an alternative outcome, where that is 
intended for tax purpose.” 246 
It should be noted that at the time HMRC issued this consultation document, the 
FTT had yet to hear either Suez Teesside or Stagecoach, with the FTT issuing its decisions 
in these cases in August 2015 and February 2016, respectively. Indeed, by the time the 
FTT issued its decision in Suez Teesside, the bill that became FA (No.2) 2015 had already 
had its second reading.247Thus, although the fairly represents requirement appears now 
to have been useful in defeating loan relationship avoidance schemes, a substantial part 
of the evidence for this position only arose after HMRC had committed to its repeal and, 
therefore, HMRC decision should be viewed in light of the uncertainly created by DCC 
Holdings, rather than HMRC’s success in Suez Teesside and Stagecoach. Furthermore, 
even two years after its repeal it had yet to be determined whether the UT’s 
interpretation of the ‘fairly represents requirement’ will be upheld by the Court of 
Appeal.248 
VI.6 Review of recent loan related avoidance activity 
As Watson notes, the “loan relationship code has proved to be a fertile ground for 
tax planners, principally because accounting principles will not necessarily produce the 
‘right’ answer from a tax perspective.”249 The truth of this comment is evidenced by 
numerous recent cases that have involved loan relationships, such as Suez Teesside and 
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Fidex. In addition, this quote points towards a number of further insights that can be 
drawn from the Relevant Cases. Firstly, although instinctively most of these cases have 
given rise to the ‘right’ answer, the way those results have been achieved could be 
criticised. Secondly, although the loan relationship regime seeks to tax the loan 
relationship debits and credits arising in a company’s accounts, HMRC are willing to 
challenge schemes where they consider those accounting debits and credits do not give 
rise to the ‘correct’ amount of taxable income. A case that exemplifies these two insights 
is Suez Teesside.250  
In Suez Teesside, the taxpayer company, GDF Suez Teesside Limited (‘Teesside’) 
had various claims (the ‘Claims’) against companies within the former Enron group, 
which were subject to tax as loan relationships. The scheme involved Teesside 
incorporating a wholly owned subsidiary in Jersey called Teesside Recoveries and 
Investments Limited (‘TRAIL’) and then transferring the Claims to it. At the time of the 
transfer, because the Enron group was in a variety of insolvency proceedings, the 
taxpayer was unlikely to receive the full value of its Claims, instead a valuation of these 
claims indicated that their fair value was c.£200m. However, for accounting purposes, 
these Claims were treated as contingent assets and, as such, they were not recognised 
on Teesside’s balance sheet. Teesside transferred the Claims to TRAIL in exchange for 
an issue of new shares, which were held on Teesside’s balance sheet at the carrying 
value of the Claims prior to the transfer (that is to say nil). The transfer did not give rise 
to a gain as these Claims were treated as being disposed of at their carrying value, not 
                                                     
250 Suez Teesside (UT, 2016) (n 23). 








their fair value. This was justified on the basis that the value of the shares of TRAIL was 
wholly dependent on the value of the Claims and therefore, accounting for the disposal 
at fair value would have in effect, required Teesside to recognise a contingent asset at 
its fair value, which would be contrary to GAAP.  When TRAIL received the claims they 
accounted for those Claims at their fair value of c.£200m but this did not give rise to a 
gain in TRAIL. 
HMRC sought to bring into account the c.£200m gain that Teesside would have 
recognised if it had accounted for the disposal of the claims at fair value. The FTT251 was 
asked to opine on four issues, which can be summarised by two questions: firstly, were 
Teesside’s accounts GAAP compliant? and secondly, notwithstanding the answer to the 
first question, was Teesside required to bring into account a credit of c.£200m to ensure 
that Teesside’s taxable profits fairly represented their profits? The FTT found that 
although Teesside’s accounts were GAAP compliant, they were required to bring into 
account a credit of c.£200m to ensure that Teesside’s taxable profits fairly represented 
their profits. On appeal, the UT upheld the substance of FTT’s decision.  
Referring back to the two insights outlined above, both clearly visible in this case. 
Firstly, there is an argument that the relevant accounting standards did not give rise to 
a ‘fair’ tax result, as it would appear fair that Teesside should be taxed on the c.£200m. 
That said, as discussed in Chapter III, there is a question over the role of ‘fairness’ in 
determining a person’s liability to tax. Indeed, arguably, the concept of ‘fairness’ should 
be irrelevant to determining a person’s liability to tax, for they should be taxed in 
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accordance with the law, rather than any subjective notion of what is ‘fair’. It is 
interesting to note that although the UT found that the “FTT’s error was to superimpose 
some vague and unarticulated concept of fairness, for which there is no warrant,”252 
they were still able to find technical grounds to bring the £200m into account. 
This leads on to the secondly point raised above, namely, that although the loan 
relationship regime is designed to tax a company in accordance with debits and credits 
arising in their GAAP compliant accounts, HMRC are willing to challenge schemes where 
that correct accounting treatment does not give rise to the ‘correct’ tax result, in their 
view. In Suez Teesside, in addition to arguing that Teesside’s accounts were not GAAP 
compliant, they also sought to argue that, notwithstanding whether the accounts were 
GAAP compliant, the c.£200m unrealised gain needed to be brought into account as a 
result of the ‘fairly represents’ requirement. Specifically, HMRC sought to override the 
accounting rules to bring into tax additional credits representing the unrealised gain 
arising from a contingent asset. As Boneham notes (commenting on the FTT’s decision), 
“[s]trictly, the loan relationships were monetised only in the hands of TRAIL after the 
transfer: they were not ‘monetised’ by the transfer for shares”.253 This position could 
lead to HMRC having a privileged position in judging what is fair as one cannot see HMRC 
allowing a company to bring into account an unrealised loss in a similar situation. As 
noted above at IV.5, the ‘fairly represents’ rule was repealed by FA (No 2) 2015.  
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The Suez Teesside case exhibits another common feature of loan relationship 
cases, namely that when HMRC identifies a new loan relationship avoidance scheme, in 
addition to challenging the effectiveness of the scheme in court, it also seeks to bring in 
new legislation to prevent similar schemes from being effective, thereby putting the 
issue beyond doubt going forward.254 For instance, in 2008 Para 11B was inserted into 
Schedule 9 of FA 1996 (now Section 455, CTA 2009) to prevent the type of scheme used 
in Suez Teesside from being successful.255 In addition, in other situations HMRC, through 
the relevant Minister, will announce changes to prevent a particular type of scheme 
from being effective, with the subsequent legislation applying retrospectively from the 
date of that announcement. An example of such a change is the introduction of Section 
455A,256 which was designed to prevent schemes similar to the one in the Fidex.257  
VI.6.1 A tale of two cases: Part 1 – Greene King 
Before moving on, it is useful to consider a couple of Relevant Cases in detail as it 
will illustrate the lengths that HMRC will go in order to defeat tax avoidance schemes. 
Furthermore, through considering these cases, it can be seen how complex and difficult 
it can be to challenge loan relationship related tax avoidance schemes. The two schemes 
that will be discussed, Stagecoach and Greene King, are both highly complex and were 
designed by one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms. Although HMRC were ultimately able 
                                                     
254 For completeness, this is not unique to loan relationships. For instance, the employment related 
securities rules were updated to prevent them being used as part of tax avoidance schemes, such as the  
type considered in the UBS case (cf. UBS & DB (SC, 2016) [n 44] [19]). 
255 David Boneham, ‘Suez Teesside and the “fairly Represent” Rule’ Tax Journal (18 September 2015) 12. 
256 HC Deb 6 December 2010, Vol 52, Col 1WS (n 196). 
257 Fidex (CA, 2016) (n 22). 








to prevent the schemes from achieving the desired result, they were required to use 
multiple technical arguments to challenge them. 
The scheme in Greene King involved three companies within the Greene King 
group, Greene King PLC (‘PLC’), Greene King Brewing and Retailing Limited (‘GKBR’, a 
direct subsidiary of PLC) and Greene King Acquisitions Limited (‘GKA‘, an indirect 
subsidiary of PLC). In summary, this scheme involve PLC assigned the right to receive the 
interest payable on a loan receivable (the debtor being GKBR) to GKA in exchange for an 
issue of preference shares. GKA recognised the right to receive the interest as an asset 
on its balance sheet. The group sought to argue that when GKBR made payments to GKA 
in respect of the assigned interest it should be treated as a repayment of the balance 
sheet asset and therefore non-taxable. 258 
HMRC sought to challenge this scheme on multiple grounds. In respect of PLC, 
HMRC argued that PLC should have partially derecognised the loan receivable it held to 
reflect its net present value (‘NPV’) at the time of the assignment. HMRC argued that 
this derecognition did not give rise to a deductible debit as the debit should have 
increased PLC’s investment in GKA, rather than being treated as a P&L debit.259 The 
subsequent increase in NPV of the Loan over its remaining life would have given rise to 
taxable income in PLC. The net effect of the debit arising from the derecognition of the 
loan going to balance sheet and credits arising for the increase in NPV going to the P&L 
was that PLC would have realised a profit from the loan. 
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In respect of GKA tax position, there was a question of whether the debits and 
credits arising as a result of its right to receive interest arose from a loan relationship 
and therefore fell to be taxed under the loan relationship regime (GKA argued there was 
a loan relationship, HMRC disagreed). Given this uncertainty, HMRC prepared two 
strains of argument to challenge the effectiveness of the scheme. HMRC’s primary 
position was that there was no loan relationship, and therefore the sum payable to GKA 
should be brought into account in accordance with normal tax principles. HMRC’s 
secondary position was that, even if there were a loan relationship, upon issue of the 
preference shares, GKA was not required to recognise the whole value of the interest it 
was due to receive as share premium.260 Had HMRC successfully made this argument 
then the difference between the interest due to be received and the amount correctly 
recognised as share premium would have been taxable.  
As HMRC’s positions in respect of the correct tax treatment of the assignment in 
both PLC and GKA were largely independent, if they were successful in all their 
arguments, rather than avoiding paying tax on the interest assigned to GKA, a tax charge 
would have arisen in both PLC and GKA, thereby giving rise to double tax. As would be 
expected, HMRC was not sympathetic to this argument and argued that such a result 
would be “a consequence of the artificial transaction in which the Greene King group 
indulged.”261 Although FTT,262 the UT263 and the Court of Appeal264 all found that the 
scheme did not produce the desired tax savings, unlike in the decision of the FTT and 
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UT, the Court of Appeal’s decision did not give rise to the same income being taxable in 
both PLC and GKA. 
In respect of PLC, the UT found that it should have partially de-recognised the 
Loan, to reflect the NPV at the time of the assignment.  Although counsel for PLC sought 
to assert various arguments that a partial derecognition of the loan was not required, 
these were dismissed by Mann J. The Court of Appeal agreed that PLC should have 
partially de-recognised the Loan.  
Of particular note in this regard is counsel for PLC’s argument that Paragraph 14 
of Schedule 9,265 allows the balance sheet debit arising from the derecognition to be 
treated as a deductible P&L debit. Counsel for HMRC rejected this position on two 
grounds: firstly, the debit arising on the derecognition was not ‘in respect of a loan 
relationship’; and secondly, even if it were treated as a P&L debit, Paragraph 13, denied 
PLC a deduction for this debit. In relation to the question of whether the debit arising 
on the derecognition was ‘in respect of a loan relationship’, Mann J, found that it should 
be treated as arising from a relationship between PLC and GKA and therefore, as there 
is no loan relationship between PLC and GKA, the debit arising from the derecognition 
cannot be ‘in respect of a loan relationship’. Instead, the de-recognising “is an entry in 
the books which reflects the consequences of the transaction that was carried out with 
GKA in relation to the interest; but it is not ‘in respect of’ the loan relationship with 
GKBR.”266  
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From an accounting perspective, this argument seems counter-intuitive as the 
debit in question arose as a result of needing to de-recognise part of the loan. In effect, 
this argument requires one to deconstruct journal entries to determine what the nature 
of each element represents rather than viewing it in a holistic way. In this case, the court 
considered the credit as arising from the derecognition of the loan and the debit arising 
from a capital contribution, rather than viewing both the credit and the debit being 
necessary to properly reflect the derecognition of the loan. The Court of Appeal upheld 
Mann J’s judgement in this regard. Furthermore, Sir Terence Etherton C, in his lead 
judgement in the Court of Appeal, cited a second reason for finding that Paragraph 14 
was not applicable, namely that Paragraph 14 only applies where GAAP allows a debit 
to be capitalised, as opposed to where GAAP requires it, as was the case for PLC. Both 
points were considered in Stagecoach, which will be discussed shortly. 
In relation to Paragraph 13, Mann J agreed with counsel for PLC, who argued that 
as HMRC did not assert this argument before the FTT and no evidence on this point was 
submitted to the FTT, it would be prejudicial to PLC for HMRC to assert this argument 
before the UT. The HMRC did not seek to challenge this finding in the Court of Appeal.  
In respect of the tax position of GKA, Mann J found that as there was no loan 
relationship between GKA and GKBR, the right to receive the interest from GKBR did not 
arise from a loan relationship and therefore did not fall to be taxed under the loan 
relationship regime.267 Mann J consider that although a literal interpretation of Section 
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81 may support GKA’s argument that there was a loan relationship, the “relationship 
between GKA and GKBR is one which involves a debt, but as a relationship it does not, 
in any meaningful sense, involve a transaction for the lending of money as between the 
two of them”. 268 
On this point, the Court of Appeal allowed GKA’s appeal, holding that there was a 
loan relationship between GKA and GKBR. Although Counsel for HMRC sought to 
advance a number of arguments to support HMRC’s positon that there was no loan 
relationship, in his leading judgement, Sir Terence Etherton C rejected these arguments. 
In his discussion, he noted that that the “loan relationship code embraced a wide 
category of corporate debt, which would not in ordinary legal or trade terms be 
categorised as a loan.”269 Furthermore, Sir Terence Etherton C rejected Mann J’s 
attempt to distinguish between the situation where a company becomes the creditor 
(or debtor) to existing debt which includes the interest and principle elements, from a 
situation where the creditor obtains the rights to receive the interest arising from a debt 
but not the principle. This is on the basis the wording of does not support a distinction 
and “neither Mann J nor Mr Milne [Counsel for HMRC] identified any legislative purpose 
or policy which would justify such a deviation from the literal meaning of s 81(1)(b).”270 
It was noted above that HMRC also put forward an argument regarding whether 
on receipt of the right to receive the interest, GKA was required to credit the whole 
amount of the NPV of the interest to share premium, or whether GKA was only required 
                                                     
268 Greene King (UT, 2014) (n 259) [140]. 
269 Greene King (CA, 2016) (n 24) [46]. 
270 ibid 48. 








to credit the ‘minimum premium value’, as defined by Section 132 of the Companies Act 
1985, with the balance going to the P&L account. Mann J found that although GKA was 
only required to credit share premium by the ‘minimum premium value’, given that he 
had previously found that PLC should have partially de-recognised the Loan, the 
‘minimum premium value’ in this instance was equal to the NPV of the interest 
receivable. 
VI.6.2 A tale of two cases: Part 2 – Stagecoach 
A second high profile loan relationship avoidance case was the Stagecoach case, 
which has a number of similarities with Greene King. At the time the scheme was 
entered into, one company within the group, Stagecoach Holdings Limited (“Holdings”), 
was technically insolvent. At that time Stagecoach Group PLC (“Group”) held a loan 
receivable from another group company, The Integrated Transport Company Limited 
(‘ITCO’). Group sought to recapitalise Holding using a Forward Subscription Agreement 
(‘FSA’), whereby, Group agreed to contribute a proportion of the cash it would receive 
when ITCO repaid the amount due to Group. Upon entering into the FSA, under the 
relevant accounting standards, Group was required to de-recognise the element of loan 
due to be contributed to Holdings. This gave rise to a debit going to investments,271 
which Group sought to argue was deductible as a result of Section 320, CTA 2009. 272 
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HMRC sought to challenge the deductibility of the debit arising in Group for two 
main reasons. Firstly, HMRC argued that the debit arising from the derecognition of the 
Loan did not arise ‘in respect’ of a loan relationship within the scope of Section 320, CTA 
2009 and therefore did not fall to be taxed in accordance with the loan relationship 
regime. Secondly, they argued that even if the debit fell to be taxed under the loan 
relationship regime, Section 320 was subject to the ‘fairly represent’ rule at Section 
307(3) and therefore, as the debit did not ‘fairly represent’ a loss accruing to Group from 
its loan relationship, it should not be considered deductible. 273 
Considering HMRC’s first argument, that the debit in question was not ‘in respect’ 
of a loan relationship that is within the scope of Section 320, CTA 2009, the FTT began 
by asking the question “do the basic facts, realistically assessed, fall within the scope of 
the statutory provisions, purposely construed?”274.  Although the FTT do not cite 
Arrowtown,275 this question closely mirrored Ribeiro PJ’s statement of the Ramsay 
Principle, which was affirmed by Lord Nicholls in BMBF.276 The FTT considered that the 
“debit is not a loss from loan relationships”,277 instead, “[p]roperly analysed, the debit 
to investments enhances the assets of the subsidiaries”278.  Noting that the FSA did not 
have an impact on the group’s consolidated accounts, the FTT considered that: 
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It would be wrong in principle to recognise such re-arrangements as 
creating a tax allowable loss or debit without any corresponding 
charge to tax. This has been described as an unusual intra group 
transaction and there is no obvious reason to conclude that Parliament 
intended that the general principle of tax symmetry should be violated 
which would be the result if the appeal were to be allowed.279 
In support of the final sentence, the FTT referred to BMBF and DCC Holdings. In 
respect of Section 320 the FTT sought to draw a distinction between where the relevant 
accounting standards allows an expense to be capitalised and where it is required. The 
FTT found that Section 320 is only relevant where accounting standards allow an 
expense to be capitalised but does not require it. As such, where an item is required to 
be recognised on the balance sheet and therefore “would never appear in the profit and 
loss account as an item of relievable expense, s320 cannot magically transform it into a 
relievable expense.” 280  
In addition to considering the purpose of Section 320, the FTT also considered if 
the debit in question arises in respect of a loan relationship. Whilst they acknowledged 
that as part of double entry book keeping “a single event is recorded twice in the 
accounts” 281 the FTT consider that the key question is what that event was, rather than 
what is the effect of the event. The FTT found that the event in Stagecoach was the 
recapitalisation of the subsidiaries rather that the derecognition of the loan (and 
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therefore, the debit was not ‘in respect’ of a loan relationship). Although the taxpayer 
sought to argue that the relevant debit was in respect of both the derecognition of the 
loan and the recognition of the subsidiaries, the FTT considered “that in respect of will 
not bear such duality.”282 This position seems counter-intuitive from an accounting 
perspective, given that, as Self notes, any loan relationship credit will necessarily give 
rise to a matching debit.283  
In respect of the ‘fairly represents requirement’ FTT considered three questions. 
Firstly, whether a debit within the scope of Section 320 is only deductible to the extent 
it fairly represents a profit or loss arising to the company from its loan relationships. 
Secondly, whether it “requires … debits and credits to be tested to establish their 
nature.” 284 Thirdly, whether the relevant debits in this scheme fairly represent a loss 
arising to Group. 
The FTT found, on the basis the inclusion of the phrase “the credit or debit is to be 
brought into accounts … in the same way [as other loan relationship credit or debit],”285 
that credits and debits arising under Section 320 are subject to the ‘fairly represents’ 
requirement. With respect to the second question, the taxpayer argued that Section 
307(3) should not be read as a: 
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broad anti-avoidance rule applying a generalised notion of fairness; 
rather, it should not be read in isolation at all but as an element in the 
process of identifying the relevant accounting debits and credits.286 
Although the FTT rejected the effect of accepting such a position would have, it 
side-stepped the issues by noting that, given the answer to the third question, the 
precise interpretation of the fairly represents rules was not relevant. 
With respect to the third question, of whether the relevant debit ‘fairly represents’ 
a loss to the Group, the FTT found that there was “no loss to Group in any real sense” 287  
as it gave rise to Group’s investment in its subsidiaries increasing. Indeed, the FTT 
commented that is was counter-intuitive to say a loss arose given that the debt was 
repaid in full. 
VI.7 Summary of key points 
 Part 5 of CTA 2009 provides a holistic regime for the taxation of loan 
relationships help by companies. The starting point of the regime is that a 
company is subject to tax with reference to the loan relationship debits 
and credits which appear in their accounts. 
 The loan relationship regime contains a number of anti-avoidance 
provisions, including the unallowable purpose rule at Section 441. In 
addition, the courts have taken to use ‘fairly represents requirement’ in 
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Section 307 as an anti-avoidance measure, although this provision has 
been repealed effective from 1 January 2016. 
 FA (No.2) 2015 introduced the LR TAAR (at Section 455B-D) to counteract 
tax avoidance using loan relationships. Broadly speaking, the LR TAAR is 
designed to counteract loan relationship avoidance that results in an 
outcome which is inconsistent with the purposes of the relevant 
provisions. 
 Although the GAAR had already been enacted when the LR TAAR was 
introduced, HMRC considered it to be required because they considered 
the LR TAAR necessary to counteract a broader range of loan relationship 
related avoidance schemes.   
 As can been seen from a review of the discussion of three of the Relevant 
Cases, a number of the loan relationship schemes that companies have 
recently entered into are highly complex and HMRC has needed to use 
multiple argument to ensure that they are defeated. 
 In this chapter and the two previous ones, the dissertation has considered 
the GAAR, Ramsay Principle and the LR TAAR in insolation. The next 
chapter will move on to consider how they interact. 








CHAPTER VII: APPLICATION TO LOAN 
RELATIONSHIP AVOIDANCE SCHEMES  
VII.1 Introduction 
Chapters IV - VI considered the provisions relevant to this dissertation in isolation. 
This chapter will compare and contrast how they apply to loan relationship avoidance 
schemes, drawing on examples from the Relevant Cases. The purpose of doing so is to 
gain a greater understanding of how these different provisions may apply to tax 
avoidance schemes. Particular focus will be given to considering whether, and to what 
extent, one provision may apply but another may not; for instance, would it be possible 
for the GAAR to apply to a loan related avoidance scheme but not the loan relationship 
TAAR (or vice versa)?  
This chapter begins with a close comparison of the LR TAAR and GAAR legislation. 
They have a very similar structure and it is possible to compare them side-by-side, 
thereby highlighting the key differences between them. As will be seen, a number of the 
differences relate to issues raised within the Aaronson Report288 and have been 
discussed in Chapter IV. Some differences point to more conceptual questions, which 
will be discussed further at Chapter VIII. 
Following this, consideration will be given to the Ramsay Principle and will seek to 
argue that the Ramsay Principle has a limited role in preventing loan related avoidance. 
The main justification is that the loan relationship regime is based on accounting 
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principles and therefore it would be challenging to purposefully interpret it in a way that 
allows the courts to look beyond the debit and credit arising in a company, to consider 
the ‘real world’ income and expenses arising. Furthermore, as accounting standards take 
a substance over form approach, there is unlikely to be a significant divergence between 
the ‘real world’ gain or loss arising from a transaction and the account gain or loss 
reported. 
The final part of this chapter will consider the role of Section 411 in preventing 
loan related avoidance. Although it is clear that Section 441 is necessary to prevent 
relatively simplistic tax avoidance (for instance, a group leveraging a company to obtain 
interest deductions, without the debt having a commercial purpose, such as was 
attempted in A.H. Field289), its role in preventing complex tax avoidance schemes is open 
to question. 
As previously mentioned, references will be made to the Relevant Cases. The 
purpose of these references is to gain an understanding of how the relevant provisions 
may apply in practice, by drawing on the insights gained from considering how they may 
apply to actual loan relationship avoidance schemes. 
VII.2 A close reading of the TAAR and GAAR 
VII.2.1 Step one: Is there an arrangement? 
As noted above at IV.2, the definition of an ‘arrangement’ for the purposes of the 
GAAR, as defined at Section 214, is the same as is used in a number of other places in 
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the legislation. The term ‘arrangement’ is also defined in the same way in the LR TAAR, 
at Section 455(2). 
Given that the same definition is used in both sets of legislation, if there is an 
arrangement for the purposes of the GAAR, it should also be an arrangement for LR 
TAAR and vice versa. Furthermore, given the broad nature of this definition, all the 
schemes in the Relevant Cases should be considered ‘arrangements’. 
VII.2.2 Step two: Is there a tax advantage? 
The second step required to determine if the GAAR or the LR TAAR applies, is to 
assess whether there is a relevant tax advantage. The term ‘tax advantage’ is defined 
within the GAAR legislation at Section 208 as ‘including’ 
(a) relief or increased relief from tax, 
(b) repayment or increased repayment of tax, 
(c) avoidance or reduction of a charge to tax or an assessment to tax, 
(d) avoidance of a possible assessment to tax, 
(e) deferral of a payment of tax or advancement of a repayment of tax, 
and 
(f) avoidance of an obligation to deduct or account for tax. 
The use of the word ‘including’ implies that the list set out in Section 208 is not 
exhaustive and other types of tax advantage may fall within the definition of that term 
for the purposes of the GAAR. The GAAR Guidance states that when determining if a tax 








advantage has arisen, the tax result of the scheme should be compared with the result 
of the scheme that would have been undertaken in the absence of a tax motivation.290  
Looking at the definition within the LR TAAR legislation, two differences are 
immediately apparent. Firstly, the LR TAAR only applies to ‘loan-related tax advantages’ 
and secondly, the use of the word ‘if’ in Section 445C(5) means that the list that follows 
at (a) to (e) is an exhaustive list of potential ‘loan-related tax advantage’.  
Section 455C(5) reads: 
A company obtains a “loan-related tax advantage” if— 
(a) it brings into account a debit to which it would not otherwise be 
entitled, 
(b) it brings into account a debit which exceeds that to which it would 
otherwise be entitled, 
(c) it avoids having to bring a credit into account, 
(d) the amount of any credit brought into account by the company is 
less than it would otherwise be, or 
(e) it brings a debit or credit into account earlier or later than it 
otherwise would. 
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(6) In subsection (5), references to bringing a debit or credit into 
account are references to bringing a debit or credit into account for the 
purposes of this Part. 
As one may expect the definition within the GAAR legislation is relatively broad, 
whereas the one within the LR TAAR is more specific. Specifically, subsection (6) makes 
it clear that the only types of tax advantages that fall within this definition are those 
which arise within the loan relationship regime.  
These two definitions give rise to a number of interesting questions that should be 
considered. Firstly, would the LR TAAR apply to those schemes which are designed to 
prevent the loan relationship regime from applying? The answer to this question would 
appear to depend on whether that potential loan relationship gives rise to debits or 
credits. If the relationship gives rise to credits, which would be taxed outside the loan 
relationship regime, then there would be a loan-related tax advantage. As this scheme 
aimed to ensure that the company avoided being required to bring into account a loan 
relationship credit subsection (c) is likely to apply. However, if the potential loan 
relationship gives rise to debits which fell to be taxed outside of the regime, then it 
would appear unlikely that the LR TAAR could apply because there would not be a loan-
related tax advantage per the above definition. This may be beneficial if, for instance, 
the taxpayer was concerned that a deduction for that debit would have been denied 
under the loan relationship regime. 
This position can be contrasted with the definition of ‘tax advantage’, where the 
focus has shifted from how debits and credits are brought into account for the purposes 








of one particular regime, to whether the scheme as a whole gives rise to the company 
paying less tax. As such, the GAAR would only apply to a scheme which was designed to 
prevent a potential loan relationship being taxed in accordance with the loan 
relationship regime, if the scheme as a whole gave rise to a company paying less tax. 
That said, it would only make sense for a company to implement such a scheme, if that 
gave rise to an overall tax advantage for the company and, although this difference is 
interesting to note, it is likely that the GAAR would apply to those schemes designed to 
prevent debits being taxed in accordance with the loan relationship regime. The ability 
of the GAAR to challenge such a scheme is important otherwise a tax planner may seek 
to design such schemes that bypass specific anti-avoidance provisions contained within 
the loan relationship regime (such as Section 441, CTA 2009).  
This also points to a further difference between the GAAR and LR TAAR. The LR 
TAAR is focused on the debits and credits brought into account for tax purposes, 
whereas the GAAR appears to be more focused on whether the company pays more or 
less tax. That is not to say that the GAAR could not apply to those schemes designed, for 
instance, to give rise to losses, but rather there appears to be a focus on whether the 
scheme allows the taxpayer to pay less tax than it otherwise would have. Evidence for 
this argument can be seen in the language of the legislation, particularly the use of terms 
such as ‘relief from tax,’ ‘increased repayment of tax’ and ‘deferral of a payment of tax’. 
One potential explanation for this difference is that the loan relationship regime is 
primarily concerned with the amount of debits and credits brought into account for tax 
purposes, and therefore the LR TAAR’s focus is on debits and credits brought in account, 
rather than the tax charge they produce. 








One question that arises from this discussion is how would the GAAR and LR TAAR 
apply to schemes designed to increase relief for foreign taxes incurred? Given the 
reference to foreign tax in Section 207(4)(c), it would appear reasonable to assume that 
schemes designed to increase the amount of double tax relief available would give rise 
to a ‘tax advantage’ for the purposes of Section 208. Even if a taxpayer was to argue that 
a scheme does not fall within any of the subsections (a) to (f), the use of the term 
‘including’ implies that the list is not an exhaustive one and, therefore, HMRC would not 
need to argue that such an advantage fell within the strict wordings to be treated as a 
tax advantage for the purposes of the GAAR. This can be contrasted with the LR TAAR, 
which would appear not to apply to some schemes designed to increase the amount of 
double tax relief available. This is because the effectiveness of such schemes is not 
dependent on bringing more debits or less credits into account, but rather the ability to 
credit foreign taxes paid against the tax payable as a result of a company’s loan 
relationship income.  
That said, the LR TAAR could be applied to other such schemes which involve the 
manipulation of the debits and credits reported in a company’s accounts. For instance, 
the LR TAAR could apply where the effectiveness of a scheme depends on credits arising 
from a loan relationship recognised in an earlier period than they would otherwise have 
been. The fact that the LR TAAR is likely to only apply to some schemes designed to 
increase the amount of double tax relief available may be justified from a policy 
perspective on the basis that the rules concerning double tax relief on loan relationships 
are not contained within Part 5 of CTA 2009, but rather the Taxation (International and 
Other Provisions) Act 2010. 








Similarly, schemes designed to allow a company to pay interest without 
withholding tax (‘WHT’) do not give rise to a ‘loan-related tax advantage’ for the 
purposes of the LR TAAR, whereas Section 208(1)(e) specifically includes such avoidance 
within the definition of a ‘tax advantage’ for the purposes of the GAAR. Again, this 
difference can be justified by the fact that WHT is a form of income tax rather than 
corporation tax, and therefore the WHT legislation is contained within the Income Tax 
Act 2007 rather than Part 5 of CTA 2009. 
With respect to the Relevant Cases, it is clear that the schemes in question gave 
rise to a tax advantage for the purposes of both the GAAR and LR TAAR. Indeed, had 
they not been so designed, there would have been no incentive for the taxpayers to 
enter into these schemes and less incentive for HMRC to challenge them. However, this 
step does raise two interesting questions. Firstly, is a tax advantage obtained when a 
scheme is designed to prevent a tax disadvantage arising, for instance by preventing the 
same income from being taxed twice? Secondly, could the application of the LR TAAR be 
limited by the ‘in respect of’ argument that the FTT developed in Stagecoach? Each of 
these questions is considered further below. 
VII.2.2.1 Discussion of tax disadvantages  
Taking a step back, a more conceptual question which is asked of both definitions 
of ‘tax advantage’ is whether a scheme designed to avoid a tax disadvantage arising 
would give rise to a ‘tax advantage’ for the purposes of the TAAR or the GAAR. In this 
context, a tax ‘disadvantage’ arises where a commercial transaction gives rise to a 
disproportionate amount of tax or that transaction is caught by a specific provision 








which it is not designed to do. A good example is Joost Lobler.291 Lobler purchased a 
number of life insurance policies as investments and when he sought to withdraw his 
investment, rather than surrendering a number of policies in full, he partially 
surrendered all his policies. As a result of partially surrendering, Lobler was subject to 
tax on the majority of the cash he withdrew, even though he made no commercial profit, 
which the FTT considered an “outrageously unfair result.”292 Although in this case, had 
Lobler taken tax advice, it would have been relatively simple to avoid the tax charge, in 
other situations it could have been more complex to ensure that a commercial 
transaction did not give rise to an ‘outrageously unfair tax result’. 
It could be argued that the scheme in Smith & Nephew293 was, at least partially, 
designed to prevent a tax disadvantage from arising. The group’s original purpose was 
to help simplify their tax compliance affairs by ensuring that three otherwise dormant 
companies did not need to file tax returns to impute interest income on interest-free 
loans. The barrier to simply releasing the loans was that HMRC declined to give clearance 
that the proposed transaction would not give rise to adverse capital gains 
consequences.294. Had the group designed a scheme to prevent these CGT 
consequences applying, would it have given rise to a ‘tax advantage’ for the purposes of 
the GAAR? Given this was a CGT ‘disadvantage’ the LR TAAR would not have been 
relevant, although a taxpayer could, conceivably, be in a similar position with respect to 
a loan relationship credit. A strict reading of the underlying legislation would appear to 
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suggest that the removal of a tax ‘disadvantage’ would give rise to a ‘tax advantage’ per 
the above definitions.  This is because the relevant test is applied with reference to what 
would have been the case, had the scheme not been implemented, without reference 
to whether that outcome was fair or consistent with the purpose of the relevant 
provisions. That said, it does not necessarily follow that the GAAR or the LR TAAR would 
have applied to counteract that ‘tax advantage.’ Specifically, in respect of the GAAR, it 
may be possible to argue that implementing a scheme to avoid a ‘tax disadvantage’ 
could be ‘reasonably regarded as a reasonable course of action.’ 
The concept of a tax ‘disadvantage’ could be contested both from a theoretical 
perspective and a practical one. From a theoretical perspective, it could be argued that 
taxation is merely a mechanism of transferring property to the state which rightly 
belongs to it,295 thereby making it logically impossible for a tax ‘disadvantage’ from 
arising. Had a negative CGT result arisen for the taxpayer in Smith & Nephew, it would 
be due to the wording of the relevant legislation and therefore could not give rise to a 
tax ‘disadvantage.’ From a practical perspective, HMRC could seek to argue that the 
legislation was designed to apply in specific situations and, therefore, in that particular 
instance the tax charge arising was legitimate. 
VII.2.2.2 ‘in respect of’ argument 
As discussed above at VI.6.2, in Stagecoach and Greene King, the courts have 
considered whether certain accounting entries are ‘in respect of’ loan relationships. For 
instance, in Stagecoach, the critical journal entry arising out of the scheme gave rise to 
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a debit to investments in respect of the recapitalisation of a subsidiary and a credit to 
loan receivables in respect of the derecognition of a loan. The FTT found that the “debit 
reflected by the anticipated price payable for the shares to be issued under the FSA, 
cannot in any sense be properly described as being in respect of the pre-existing loan 
relationship.”296 Although the FTT cannot create binding precedent, in his leading 
judgement in Greene King, Sir Terence Etherton C noted that he finds the analysis of the 
FTT in Stagecoach on this point “compelling.”297 
Although in both Stagecoach and Greene King this argument was used to challenge 
the effectiveness of a tax avoidance scheme, if this logic is upheld, then it may affect 
how the LR TAAR applies. For instance, if a scheme gives rise to a debit, the taxpayer 
could argue that the relevant debit is not ‘in respect of’ a loan relationship and therefore 
the LR TAAR cannot be used to prevent the scheme from being effective (albeit, the 
GAAR would remain relevant). Although this line of reasoning would not have assisted 
the taxpayer in either Stagecoach or Greene King, as the schemes in these cases relied 
on the debits being brought into tax under the loan relationship regime, it is conceivable 
that the argument could be used to ensure a debit falls to be taxed outside of a loan 
relationship regime.  
In the event that a scheme involves using this argument to ensure that a credit 
falls to be taxed outside of the loan relationship regime the LR TAAR analysis is more 
complex as a result of Section 455C(5)(c), which allows the LR TAAR to apply to schemes 
designed to avoid bringing into account a loan relationship credit. Specifically, if a 
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scheme is designed to ensure a credit is not ‘in respect of’ a loan relationship, then the 
LR TAAR may be applicable. However, if the scheme merely relies on a credit not being 
‘in respect of’ a loan relationship without any specific steps being implemented to 
ensure that outcome, then it may be the case that the LR TAAR cannot apply. The reason 
for this is that the credit would not be subject to the loan relationship regime in any case 
and, therefore, the scheme would not be designed to prevent a loan relationship credit 
arising. 
VII.2.3 Step three: Is the arrangement a tax avoidance arrangement? 
Both the GAAR and the LR TAAR contain motive tests whereby they can only apply 
when the arrangements were designed to create a tax advantage. As such, neither 
should apply where an arrangement was undertaken solely for commercial reasons. The 
motive test, in both pieces of legislation is broadly similar, except that the GAAR test 
requires one to have “regard to all the circumstances” and draw a reasonable 
conclusion. The full wording of Section 207(1) is: 
Arrangements are “tax arrangements” if, having regard to all the 
circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining 
of a tax advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, 
of the arrangements. [Emphasis added] 
This can be compared to the wording of Section 455C(3), which reads thus:  
[Subject to Section 455C(4),] Arrangements are “relevant avoidance 
arrangements” if their main purpose, or one of their main purposes, is 
to enable a company to obtain a loan-related tax advantage. 








There is a question of whether the additional words in the motive test for the 
GAAR make a significant difference to how these provisions will be applied in practice. 
In order to argue that these additional words modify this test, one would need to show 
that when applying the motive test contained within the LR TAAR only a limited list of 
circumstances needed to be considered in determining the purpose of an arrangement 
or to apply the motive test with reference to a different standard of proof. With respect 
to the first point, that Section 455C(3) does not explicitly state what should be taken 
into account in determining the purpose of the arrangement, it appears reasonable to 
conclude that one would need to look at all the circumstances rather than merely a 
limited but undefined range of circumstances.  
With respect to the second point, given that the standard of proof in civil cases, 
including tax cases, is on the balance of probabilities, adding the phrase “it would be 
reasonable to conclude” would seem unlikely to change the standard of proof when 
applying the motive test. To put it another way, it would appear that adding this phrase 
makes explicit what is already implicit in the LR TAAR’s motive test. 
Turning to the Relevant Cases, a number of the taxpayers had some level of 
commercial purpose for undertaking the transactions that formed part of the schemes. 
That said, in most of these cases it could be argued that tax avoidance was a key driver, 
or became a key driver, for the scheme. The GAAR Guidance makes it clear that for a 
scheme to have tax avoidance as one of its main purposes, it is not necessary for it to be 








altered in an obvious way. Instead, simple and subtle tax driven changes to a scheme 
could give rise to tax avoidance being one of its main purposes.298 
The question of whether tax avoidance is the main purpose, or one of the main 
purposes, of the transactions in the Relevant Cases tends only to be fully considered by 
the courts where Section 441 is potentially applicable. In non-Section 441 cases, the 
question of purpose, although sometimes mentioned, is not fully explored. For instance, 
in Suez Teesside, the judgements do not explore the purpose of the transaction, other 
than noting that it was disclosable under the DOTAS regime.  
Part of the reason for this is that HMRC’s arguments in these cases do not rely on 
the purpose of the taxpayer undertaking the transaction, but instead rely on technical 
arguments that apply regardless of the purpose of the scheme. A notable exception to 
this rule is the Stagecoach case in which the issue of purpose was discussed in some 
depth as HMRC also sought to challenge the effectiveness of the scheme using the UK 
anti-arbitrage rules which do contain a purpose test. 299  
Although many of the schemes in the Relevant Cases appear primarily tax driven, 
the taxpayers had limited reason to elaborate on the commercial purposes of the 
transaction or to present relevant facts to support their position. As such, it is not 
possible to reach a definitive conclusion regarding whether tax avoidance was the main 
purpose, or one of the main purposes of the transactions in the Relevant Cases. It would 
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seem reasonable to assume that the anticipated tax savings were one of the key drivers 
behind the schemes.  
One interesting observation is that although a scheme may begin with a genuine 
commercial purpose, as the design evolves an anticipated tax saving can subsequently 
become an important feature and can drive the design of the scheme. For instance, in 
Stagecoach, the initial commercial driver was to recapitalise a trading subsidiary, which 
was technically insolvent. However, after advice had been obtained from KPMG, "the 
possible tax savings had become a significant feature of the whole exercise."300 In other 
cases, the commercial purposes of undertaking a transaction are less clearly defined. In 
A.H. Field, the taxpayer argued that the purpose of paying a leveraged dividend with a 
loan from its shareholders was to improve the certainty of cash flows to its shareholders 
and to improve the company's return on capital employed. However, the FTT found that 
there was a lack of evidence to support the existence of these purposes and neither was 
actually achieved.  
These two examples show that when determining whether the purpose, or one of 
the main purposes, of a scheme is tax avoidance, one not only needs to show that the 
transaction had commercial drivers but also that the anticipated tax savings remained 
of a secondary concern. The FTT A.H. Field cited Lightman J's comment in Serna Pension 
that "[o]bviously if the tax advantage is mere 'icing on the cake' it will not constitute a 
main object," 301 before commenting that in A.H. Field, the tax advantages gained were 
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"more than mere icing and that in fact this transaction produced a preponderance of 
icing and very little cake."302 Continuing with this analogy, a scheme with commercial 
drivers needs to ensure that any tax benefits obtained can be seen as merely 'icing on 
the cake' in order to avoid the risk that obtaining a tax advantage is considered one of 
the main purposes of this scheme. 
In addition to looking at whether a scheme gives rise to a tax advantage, the courts 
also consider the specifics of the design of the scheme to determine whether tax 
avoidance was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes of the scheme. Iliffe303 is 
a good example of this point. In this case, when Iliffe News and Media Limited (‘INML’) 
licenced some IP back to its subsidiary for a 5-year period, it did so for an up-front lump 
sum, rather than for a yearly royalty (this design feature was critical to achieving the 
desired tax result). The FTT considered that the schemes commercial objectives would 
have been more effectively achieved had INML charged a yearly royalty. In this regard, 
the FTT distinguished Brebner,304 in which the House of Lords found that where there 
are two ways of carrying out a transaction, choosing the lower tax option did not 
necessarily mean that tax avoidance was one of the main purposes of the transaction. 
It could be argued that Stagecoach also exemplifies this point. Although the FTT 
found that the transaction achieved a commercial purpose, there were other ways it 
could achieve that purpose. The FTT appears to emphasise that they viewed it as 
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important that the sole reason for linking the amount recovered from a loan to the 
amount to be used to subscribe for shares was to obtain a tax advantage. 
VII.2.4 Step four: Is the arrangement ‘abusive’ or a ‘relevant avoidance 
arrangement’? 
Both the GAAR and the LR TAAR, seek to distinguish normal tax planning from 
aggressive tax avoidance arrangements and both seek to apply principle to more 
aggressive arrangements. Specifically, the GAAR is only intended to apply to 
arrangements that are ‘abusive’ whereas the LR TAAR seeks to distinguish the more 
aggressive tax avoidance schemes by defining the term ‘relevant avoidance 
arrangements’. There are a number of similarities between the test applied by the GAAR 
and the LR TAAR to determine if a scheme is abusive or relevant, respectively. At the 
centre of both tests is consideration of the relevant tax provisions which the scheme 
relied upon and a consideration of their purpose. The following discussion will 
presuppose that one can talk meaningfully about the purpose of a piece of legislation). 
Although there are similarities between the tests used by the GAAR and the LR 
TAAR, there are also a number of key differences. The most important difference is that, 
when applying the GAAR, HMRC is required to show that a tax arrangement is ‘abusive’ 
whereas when applying the LR TAAR, all tax arrangements are considered ‘relevant’ 
unless the taxpayer is able to show that they are not relevant.305 This can be seen by 
looking at the wording of the relevant sections. 
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Sections 207(2) provides: 
Tax arrangements are “abusive” if they are arrangements the entering 
into or carrying out of which cannot reasonably be regarded as a 
reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions, 
having regard to all the circumstances including— 
(a) whether the substantive results of the arrangements are consistent 
with any principles on which those provisions are based (whether 
express or implied) and the policy objectives of those provisions, 
(b) whether the means of achieving those results involves one or 
more contrived or abnormal steps, and 
(c) whether the arrangements are intended to exploit any 
shortcomings in those provisions. [emphasis added] 
This can be contrasted with Section 455C(4): 
But arrangements are not “relevant avoidance arrangements” if the 
obtaining of any loan-related tax advantages that would (in the 
absence of section 455B) arise from them can reasonably be regarded 
as consistent with any principles on which the provisions of this Part 
that are relevant to the arrangements are based (whether expressed 
or implied) and the policy objectives of those provisions. [emphasis 
added] 








As previously discussed at Section IV.2 the double reasonable test contained 
within the GAAR (“which cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of 
action in relation”) is seen as an important safeguard. The authors of the Aaronson 
Report considered that in the event that there is a dispute over whether the GAAR 
applies:  
the Tax Tribunal will decide in the taxpayer’s favour not only if the 
judge himself regards the arrangement as a reasonable exercise of 
choices of conduct but also, where he does not himself take that view, 
he nonetheless considers that such a view may reasonably be held.306 
Although final GAAR legislation does not employ the concept of a ‘choices of 
conduct,’ the double reasonableness test still applies like this.307 In this regard, HMRC’s 
Guidance states that just because a tax practitioner considers a course of action to be 
reasonable, it does not necessarily mean that the GAAR cannot apply, as the practitioner 
may have an extreme view. 308 Furthermore, HMRC considers that this principle would 
still apply if that extreme view was commonly held. The lack of the double reasonable 
test in the LR TAAR means that the courts should only find in favour of the taxpayer 
when the judge considers the results of the scheme can reasonably be regarded as 
consistent with principles underlying the relevant provisions. 
A review of the Relevant Cases show that the courts tend to view avoidance in a 
relatively negative way and, therefore, it may be challenging for a taxpayer to 
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successfully argue that their scheme results in an outcome that can be reasonably 
regarded as being consistent with the principles of the underlying legislation. In contrast, 
within the GAAR, HMRC would need to show that the relevant outcome in not consistent 
with the relevant provisions. There is an argument that the lack of a double 
reasonableness will make the LR TAAR easier to apply compared to the GAAR because 
the burden of proof is shifted towards the taxpayer.  
Some, such as Watson, consider that the lack of the double reasonable test in the 
LR TAAR is a positive development, as it allows the LR TAAR to “avoid the great weakness 
of the GAAR – the hopelessly vague ‘reasonable course of action’.”309 Furthermore, as 
well as being vague, one could also question whether the double reasonableness test 
will have any effect in practice. Although Aaronson’s hypothetical Judge is sufficiently 
reflective to acknowledge that although he does not consider an arrangement as a 
reasonable choice of conduct, that position can be reasonably held, there is a question 
over how likely, in practice, a judge will be able to come to such a conclusion, particularly 
if his own perspective and frame of reference is likely to feature uppermost in his 
deliberations. 
When considering whether the schemes in the Relevant Cases are consistent 
with the purpose of the underlying provisions, although some cases clearly are designed 
to give rise to an inconsistent result, others require a more nuanced analysis. An 
example of the former category would be Greene King, where it would be hard to argue 
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that the relevant provisions applied in a way that was consistent with the purpose of 
those provisions. This can be contrasted with Suez Teesside310 and Iliffe.311 
Beginning with Suez Teesside, the scheme relied on the ability of the taxpayer to 
transfer a valuable asset offshore at a time when, for tax purposes, it had a limited value. 
Although, from HMRC's perspective, this did not give rise to the 'correct' tax result, given 
that the loan relationship code is based on an accounting principle, it would appear 
consistent with the relevant provisions that the value of the asset being transferred 
offshore is determined in accordance with accounting principles. Arguably, for HMRC to 
suggest otherwise, they would need to disregard the central tenets of the loan 
relationship regime. This argument would seem to apply equally to both the TAAR and 
the GAAR. For a case such as Suez Teesside, it would appear that, for the first part of the 
test, the LR TAAR and GAAR legislation apply in the same way. 
Iliffe gives rise to an interesting question, namely, to what extent it is allowed to 
choose between two different courses of actions on the basis of the tax implications of 
each? Given the principle set out in Brebner312 it could be argued, by analogy, that where 
a taxpayer has two options for carrying out a transaction, choosing the option that 
produces a tax advantage should not give rise to a result which is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the relevant provisions. Such a principle would naturally fit within the GAAR 
as choosing the lower tax option should be considered a reasonable course of action. 
Whether such a principle would apply when applying the LR TAAR is more complex to 
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determine as the key question is whether obtaining the tax advantage is consistent with 
the relevant tax provisions and is likely to depend on the wording of the relevant 
provision. 
In addition to the GAAR containing the double reasonableness test, there are 
also three other differences between the GAAR legislation and the LR TAAR legislation. 
Firstly, when considering whether the GAAR applies, one needs to have regard to 
whether the scheme involves one or more abnormal or contrived steps313and whether 
it exploits a 'shortcoming' in the relevant provision.314 Secondly, the GAAR is primarily 
concerned with whether a course of action is reasonable, whereas the LR TAAR is 
concerned whether the obtaining of the loan-related tax advantage is reasonable (i.e. 
focusing on the outcome). Thirdly, when considering whether a scheme is considered 
abusive, Section 207(3) requires that where a tax arrangement forms part of a broader 
arrangement, "regard must also be had to those other arrangements." The first two 
points will be considered further below. However, before doing so, the third point is 
considered briefly.  
One could question whether the requirement to have regard to the broader 
arrangements a scheme is part of will have any practical impact on the application of 
the GAAR. The only way it could have a practical impact is if it was normal practice for 
the courts to look at a scheme in isolation, without considering its wider context, which 
is not the case. Thus, the inclusion of this language within the GAAR legislation may 
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merely make explicit a requirement which is implicit.315 Given this, the lack of the same 
phrase in the LR TAAR legislation is unlikely to have a practical impact on how the LR 
TAAR will apply because the courts will naturally have regard to the broader context of 
a scheme.  
VII.2.4.1 Contrived steps 
Although the GAAR legislation requires one to take account of whether a scheme 
includes one or more contrived steps and whether it attempts to exploit shortcomings 
in the relevant legislation, it could be argued that these tests are implicit in the LR TAAR 
legislation. This argument is straightforward in respect of the latter, for it would appear 
extremely unlikely that a scheme could exploit a shortcoming in a piece of legislation 
and, at the same time, the outcome of the scheme, if successful, would be consistent 
with the principles on which the legislation is based.  
It could be argued that a number of these schemes are clearly designed to exploit 
a shortcoming in a provision. The two best examples of this are Bank of Ireland316 and 
Cater Allen,317 both of which concerned the taxation of repos. In Bank of Ireland, Collins 
LJ commented that: "It is true in this case a tripartite scheme has been devised which 
takes advantage of a mismatch between the two sets of provisions."318 Although Collins 
LJ refers here to two sets of provisions, it should be noted that both dealt with the same 
subject matter and therefore this mismatch can be described as a shortcoming in the 
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taxation of repos. That is to say, the mismatch was not caused by how two sets of 
unrelated provisions interact, but rather an inconsistency in how the underlying regime 
worked. 
Although the taxpayers in Bank of Ireland and Cater Allen were clearly seeking to 
rely on a shortcoming in the relevant tax provision, one could question whether other 
schemes were also seeking to exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provision, as 
opposed to merely relying on how those provisions applied.319  
The argument in respect of whether a scheme involves one or more abnormal or 
contrived steps when determining if the LR TAAR applies is slightly more complex. Given 
that the LR TAAR is focused on the outcome of a scheme, the question is whether that 
outcome is consistent with the purpose of relevant legislation. In the event that the 
designed tax outcome is only able to be achieved by the use of contrived or abnormal 
steps, then that would indicate that the outcome is not consistent with the purpose of 
the relevant legislation. Had those abnormal or contrived steps been omitted then the 
relevant provisions would have applied as intended and would have given rise to a 
different result. 
This argument is exemplified by the scheme in Versteegh.320 Given that the 
Borrower has a commercial need for the funding, in the absence of a tax avoidance 
motive, the lender could lend the necessary funds to the borrower, leading to a 
symmetrical result with the interest expense being deductible in the borrower and the 
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interest income taxable in the lender. Alternatively, the lender could have equity funded 
the borrower, which again would have given rise to a symmetrical result as neither 
taxable credits nor debits would have arisen in either the borrower or lender. Both 
results would have been consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions. 
However, in an attempt to obtain a tax advantage, an abnormal and contrived step was 
inserted into the scheme whereby instead of paying interest to the lender, the borrower 
issued preference shares to the third company. It is reasonable to assume that the 
insertion of this additional step was designed to give rise to a result which was not 
consistent with the relevant provision. As such, the fact that this scheme contains an 
abnormal and contrived step helps to show that the result of scheme in not consistent 
with the relevant provisions. 
This logic may work well where the inserted step significantly changes the nature 
of the transaction and there is a clear alternative transaction. However, this is not always 
the case, particularly in a complex transaction. In such cases, it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify a definitive alternative transaction which would allow the 
taxpayer to achieve its commercial objectives, without obtaining a tax advantage. 
Furthermore, it could be the case that although a complex transaction is being 
undertaken for commercial purposes, aspects of that transaction may be modified 
slightly to enable a favourable tax treatment to be obtained. The question then becomes 
whether those modifications are so significant that they are treated as giving rise to a 
contrived step. This question would arise in a scheme similar to the ones in Stagecoach 
and Iliffe where certain elements were modified to ensure an advantageous tax result 
was obtained. 








VII.2.4.2 Action or outcome 
As noted above, when determining whether the GAAR applies, the main focus is 
whether a course of action is reasonable, whereas when determining whether the LR 
TAAR applies, it is whether the outcome of the scheme is consistent with the purpose of 
the relevant provisions. The existence of this linguistic difference gives rise to the 
question of whether it will have a practical impact on how the GAAR and LR TAAR apply. 
This difference may seem relatively minor given the close relationship between a course 
of action and the end result, however such a change in focus could have an impact on 
how a scheme is viewed. 
For example, in Suez Teesside, the scheme relied on the fact that the taxpayer 
could transfer a commercially valuable asset overseas at a time when, for tax purposes, 
it had a negligible value. There would be a good argument to say that it is a reasonable 
course of action, especially given that the taxpayer did not artificially create a situation 
where there was a significant difference between the assets commercial value and its 
tax value. However, from an outcome perspective, given the scheme enabled the 
taxpayer to transfer an asset worth c.£200m out of the UK without giving rise to a tax 
charge, it is straight forward to argue that this outcome cannot be consistent with the 
relevant provision. 
Although Section 207(1) requires one to consider whether a course of action is 
reasonable, the focus of Sections 207(2) and (3) is on the outcome of the arrangement. 
As such, one is required to take account of the result of the arrangement. Furthermore, 
to argue that this difference is significant, one would need to assume that judges are 








able to consider whether a course of action is reasonable in isolation, without reference 
to the outcome; it seems unlikely that in practice that a judge can do so. 
VII.2.4.3 Application to simple schemes 
One further question arises when considering whether a scheme is abusive or 
relevant, namely, are some schemes so simple that the GAAR or LR TAAR cannot apply 
to them? When reviewing the facts of the Relevant Cases, the analysis proceeds on the 
assumption that the courts had determined that the relevant technical provisions had 
not applied. In a subset of cases, this assumption leads to difficulties because the 
scheme in question can only be considered a tax avoidance scheme by virtue of the 
application of the relevant provision.  
This point can be best illustrated by the scheme in A.H. Fields. The taxpayer sought 
to claim a deduction for interest arising on a shareholder loan where the main purpose 
of putting a loan in place was to create a deductible loan relationship debit. Based on 
the finding of facts made by the FTT, Section 441 clearly applied to prevent a deduction 
being obtained for loan relationship debits. However, had Section 441 not existed, it 
would be difficult to argue that claiming a deduction for the loan relationship debits 
arising was not consistent with the loan relationship regime and therefore the GAAR or 
LR TAAR could not apply. Indeed, arguably, if Section 441 did not exist the scheme in 
A.H. Fields should not be described as a tax avoidance scheme, instead, is was merely 
sensible and legitimate tax planning.  
One way to resolve this issue is simply to accept that the GAAR and LR TAAR are 
not designed to prevent simple schemes, such as in A.H. Fields, from being successful. 








Instead, both are designed to catch complex schemes. As such, where the 
straightforward application of a set of tax provisions allow a deduction for a certain type 
of expense, in the event that HMRC do not wish taxpayers to be able to claim a 
deduction, then the most appropriate way for them to rectify the situation is for them 
to introduce legislation, similar to Section 441, to deny taxpayers a deduction for that 
type of expense. The role of Section 441 in preventing loan related avoidance is 
discussed further at VII.4. 
VII.2.5 Step five: Is an indicator of abusiveness or non-exclusion present? 
Both the GAAR and LR TAAR legislation list a number of indicators321, which if 
present, would show that a scheme is abusive for GAAR purposes, or non-excluded from 
the scope of the LR TAAR. The factors have previously been discussed at IV.2 and VI.4 in 
respect of the GAAR and the LR TAAR. As would be expected, the list contained within 
Section 455D is tailored to particular features of the loan relationship regime and 
highlights areas where HMRC considers avoidance possible. For instance, the indicator 
listed at Section 455D(1)(g) is concerned with the manipulation of the group continuity 
rules to allow a company to obtain an impairment loss for an intra-group debt. These 
additional indicators within Section 455D(1) should provide additional certainty when 
considering whether the LR TAAR applies, as it makes explicit a number of applicable 
situations. Given that the GAAR is designed to apply to a range of tax matters, the list of 
indicators at Section 207(4) are necessarily more generic. 
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Section 207(6) states that the list of indicators at subsection (4) is not exhaustive.  
As such, in the event that HMRC seeks to use the GAAR to counteract a loan relationship 
scheme, HMRC should to be able to strengthen their position by showing that one of 
the indicators at Section 455D(1) is present and support the argument that the 
arrangement is abusive.  
Although two of the three factors listed at Section 207(4), namely subsection (a) 
and (b), are replicated within Section 455D(1), subsection (c) is not replicated. Section 
207(4)(c) reads: 
the arrangements result in a claim for the repayment or crediting of 
tax (including foreign tax) that has not been, and is unlikely to be, paid 
As previously noted, the LR TAAR is primarily concerned with the calculation of a 
company’s taxable profit rather than the resulting UK tax payable on that profit, 
whereas the focus of the GAAR is the tax actually payable by the company. The inclusion 
of this subsection with the GAAR legislation and not within the LR TAAR legislation 
further supports this thesis. 
With regard to the indicators listed within both pieces of legislation, they only 
indicate abusiveness or non-exclusion if the result was not that which was reasonably 
anticipated when the provisions were enacted. The wording of this overriding provision 
within LR TAAR mirrors the corresponding provision within GAAR and it is only modified 
for context. This can be seen by comparing the two provisions side-by-side, as shown 
below with the differences in bold: 








[Section 207(4): …] but in each case only if it is reasonable to assume 
that such a result was not the anticipated result when the relevant tax 
provisions were enacted. 
[Section 455D(2):] But in each case the result concerned is only 
capable of indicating that section 455C(4) is not available if it is 
reasonable to assume that such a result was not the anticipated result 
when the provisions of this Part that are relevant to the 
arrangements were enacted. 
One distinctive feature of the GAAR legislation compared to the LR TAAR is that 
Section 207(5) states that, if at the time that the scheme was entered into it accorded 
with standard practice, and HMRC had accepted that practice, it may indicate that the 
scheme should not be considered abusive. This means that the GAAR should not apply 
to schemes which have been used for a number of years without them being challenged 
by HMRC. A similar provision is not contained within the LR TAAR legislation. 
VII.3 How does the Ramsay Principle apply to Loan Relationships? 
None of the Relevant Ramsay Cases discussed at V.2, concerned the loan 
relationship regime, although Westmoreland would have done so if the scheme had 
been undertaken after the introduction of the regime. In order to consider to what 
extent the Ramsay Principle has applied to the Relevant Cases, this dissertation has 
reviewed the cases cited and the judgements of each. Specifically, each Relevant Case 
was reviewed to identify whether it either cited Ramsay or BMBF. BMBF was included 








as it is considered a key recent case on the Ramsay Principle.  The results of this analysis 
can be found in Appendix C. 
As can be seen from this analysis, there are limited references to either Ramsay 
or BMBF. In addition, in none of these cases did HMRC explicitly use the Ramsay Principle 
as a primary argument to defeat it. The closest that the courts came to using the Ramsay 
Principle was when the UT in Vocalspruce noted that it was accepted by HMRC and the 
taxpayer that the relevant provisions should be construed purposively in accordance 
with the guidance set out by BMBF.322 Although, arguably Vocalspruce is an example of 
the Ramsay Principle being used against a loan relationship avoidance scheme, HMRC 
did not seek to rely on the fact that this was a marketed avoidance scheme to support 
its arguments. 323 Given that the Ramsay Principle is concerned with tax avoidance 
schemes, it would appear that HMRC were seeking to rely on the normal principles of 
statutory construction, rather than relying on a Ramsay type argument.  
References to the Ramsay Principle also appear in the FTT’s decision in Fidex and 
Iliffe. In Fidex, it was used to support the proposition that the FTT needed to apply 
“orthodox methods of statutory construction to a realistic view of the facts. “324 In Iliffe, 
counsel for the taxpayer cited the limitations on the Ramsay Principle to re-characterise 
transactions following the precedent set by Westmoreland. The final case to briefly 
consider is Stagecoach. Although the FTT does not explicitly cite the Ramsay Principle, it 
looks at the purpose of Section 320, CTA 2009 when determining whether the debit 
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arising for the derecognition of the loan arose ‘in respect’ of a loan relationship. 
Furthermore, the FTT cited BMBF to support the position that Parliament did not intend 
to enable tax avoidance schemes to succeed where they give rise to an asymmetrical 
result. 
The fact that HMRC has not used the Ramsay Principle to explicitly defeat a loan 
relationship related tax avoidance scheme gives rise to the question of why this may be 
the case. It seems unlikely that it was because HMRC considered that their other 
arguments were sufficiently strong that seeking to apply the Ramsay Principle was 
considered superfluous, particularly given that the Ramsay Principle has been applied in 
conjunction with other technical arguments and HMRC normally use multiple arguments 
when seeking to defeat a tax avoidance scheme. As such, an alternate answer needs to 
be found. One potential alternative is that there is weakness in the Ramsay Principle 
which limited its role in defeating loan relationship avoidance schemes. 
The Ramsay Principle does not allow courts to completely disregard the language 
of the legislation; instead, it requires the court to interpret the legislation purposively to 
the facts when viewed realistically. Although this principle in its original formulation 
allowed the House of Lords to interpret the capital gains legislation in a way that only 
gave relief to ‘real world’ losses, as Lord Hoffmann notes in Westmoreland, “something 
may be real for one purpose but not another.”325 As such, the question is what is ‘real’ 
for the loan relationship regime. As the LR regime is based on accounting principles, it 
would seem logical to assume the reality for loan relationship purposes is the world of 
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accounting principles. If this is the case, it would be difficult to argue that the Ramsay 
Principle could apply in a way the relevant provisions could be interpreted purposively 
such that taxes transactions in accordance with their ‘real world’ substance where the 
relevant accounting standards require an alternative treatment.  
Given the tax treatment of a transaction is driven by the accounting treatment 
adopted, and that treatment is usually determined by a substance over form approach, 
by default the taxation of a transaction is determined with reference to facts viewed 
realistically. Of course, a taxpayer could still enter into a convoluted transaction which 
enabled an item to be accounted for in a different way, however, it may be difficult to 
determine what it would mean in such cases to view the relevant facts realistically. This 
is particularly challenging given, as noted above, reality for these purposes is the world 
of accounting standards. 
Although none of the Relevant Ramsay Cases concern the loan relationship 
regime, as noted above, had the scheme in Westmoreland been implemented after the 
introduction of the loan relationship regime, it would have concerned loan relationships, 
which raises the question is: how would the application of the Ramsay Principle affect 
the above analysis? This is a challenging question to answer because the introduction of 
the loan relationship regime significantly changed how interest payable would be taxed. 
Assuming that interest payable to the pension scheme would still only be deductible on 
a paid basis, the analysis set out by Lord Hoffmann is likely to be unaffected. That is 
because, although the loan relationship regime is based on accounting standards, only 
providing a deduction on an accruals basis would be a deviation from the normal rules. 








That would in turn require one to consider the type of transactions designed to fall 
within the exception. In Westmoreland, it was found that the exemption was designed 
to apply with reference to a legal concept. Although the Ramsay Principle could have 
applied if the House of Lords determined the term ‘payment’ should be given its 
commercial meaning (albeit, Lord Hoffmann expressed scepticism this would be 
possible), it is highly unlikely that the loan relationship regime would contain many 
exemptions which, although they did not rely on the normal accounting rules, sought to 
tax a transaction in accordance with its commercial reality.  
Formerly two notable exceptions to this rules were Section 455 and the ‘fairly 
represent requirement’. 326 Section 455 sought to bring into account the consideration 
a company received from the disposal of a receivable, where that consideration was not 
required to be fully recognised under GAAP. Although both sought to ensure that a 
company’s economic profits are brought into tax even if those profits were not 
recognised for accounting purposes, the cases involving the ‘fairly represents 
requirement’ demonstrated the complexities of doing so. It is significant to note that 
the leading case on the fairly represents requirement, DCC Holdings,327 involved a piece 
of legislation which did not seek to tax the debits and credits arising in taxpayer 
accounts. Indeed, the result of the application of the ‘fairly represents requirement’ in 
this case gave rise to the taxpayer being able to claim a deduction equal to the 
accounting loss it recognised. 
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Since the DCC Holdings case, the fairly represents requirement has been used in 
cases where the underlying legislation seeks to tax a taxpayer on the profits arising on 
its accounts, most notable in Suez Teesside.328 However, as already discussed at VI.6 the 
UT’s decision in this case has been questioned by some329 and is subject to appeal.330  
Given the above arguments and the fact that HMRC has not attempted to use the 
Ramsay principle to defeat the schemes in the Relevant Cases, it would appear 
reasonable to conclude that going forward, the Ramsay Principle is unlikely to play a 
significant role in defeating loan relationship avoidance schemes.     
VII.4 What is the role of Section 441 in preventing loan related avoidance? 
Of the 13 Relevant Cases, only 7 referred to Section 441. This fact alone would 
appear to indicate that it is not, by itself, sufficient to prevent loan related avoidance. 
One reason why Section 441 was only relevant in about half the cases is that it can only 
be used to challenge the deductibility of debits rather than bringing into tax credits that 
would otherwise fall outside the scope of tax. Many of the schemes in the Relevant 
Cases, sought to ensure that otherwise taxable credit would not need to be brought into 
account, rather than seeking to bring into account a larger debit than they would have 
otherwise been entitled. 
Furthermore, a comparison of the schemes where a Section 441 argument was 
asserted with the others, indicates that the schemes tended to be less complex. Of 
course, the schemes in the Section 441 cases vary in complexity, ranging from the 
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straight forward, such as A.H. Field or Fidex, to the complex and convoluted, such as 
Travel Document Services. However, the schemes in the other 6 cases tend to be further 
towards the complex and convoluted end of the spectrum. In some of the non-Section 
441 cases, although the schemes involved an inter-group debt, Section 441 could not be 
used to deny the debtor company a deduction for the interest payable because the 
debtor company borrowed the money for good commercial reasons. Indeed, the 
schemes in Greene King and Stagecoach both used pre-existing debts within their 
schemes. Furthermore, in Versteegh, the FTT found that even if a debt is specifically 
designed to enable a tax avoidance scheme, it does necessarily mean that the debtor 
has an unallowable purpose for being party to the debt.331 
Although Section 441 may not, by itself be sufficient to prevent loan relationship 
related avoidance, it is likely that it is necessary in order to prevent loan related tax 
avoidance. As discussed above at VII.2.4.3, the GAAR and LR TAAR together are unlikely 
alone to allow HMRC to challenge schemes such as the one in A.H. Field. That is because, 
without Section 441, there would be nothing within the loan relationship regime to 
indicate that interest payable on some forms of debt are non-deductible. It is also 
interesting to note that the definition of an ‘unallowable purpose’ is broader than a ‘tax 
avoidance purpose’ since a debt is held for an unallowable purpose if it is used to fund 
activities not within the scope of corporation tax.332  
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It could be argued that the role of Section 441 is more akin to the ‘wholly and 
exclusively’ rule333 than either the GAAR or LR TAAR as its purpose is more about 
determining what counts as a legitimate business expense than attempting to prevent 
complex tax avoidance schemes. Conceptualised in this way, although Section 441 is 
necessary to prevent loan relationship related tax avoidance schemes from being 
successful, it is not sufficient to enable HMRC to defeat all the tax avoidance schemes 
that they would like to challenge. 
VII.5 Summary of key points 
 Although the GAAR and LR TAAR are structured in similar ways, there are 
a number of differences between them. Most notable, for the GAAR to 
apply, HMRC needs to prove that a scheme is abusive, whereas, the LR 
TAAR applies to a scheme, unless the taxpayer can prove that the result of 
the scheme is consistent with the relevant provisions. 
 The Ramsay Principle has not been used as a major argument in any of the 
Relevant Cases. This dissertation has posited there is limited scope for the 
Ramsay Principle to be used to purposively interpret the loan relationship 
regime as seeking to tax anything other than the accounting gain or loss 
arising out of a transaction. Furthermore, given accounting standards 
tending to take a substance over form approach, when determining 
accounting treatment of a transaction, the facts of that transaction by 
default viewed realistically. 
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 Although Section 441 is necessary, by itself, it is not sufficient to prevent 
loan relationships being used to avoid tax. 
 Picking up some of the issues and themes raised in this chapter, the next 
chapter will consider a number of thematic issues arising in respect of the 
GAAR and LR TAAR.  






CHAPTER VIII: THEMATIC DISCUSSION 
VIII.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous detailed technical considerations, this chapter will 
take a step back and consider some of the issues arising from the GAAR and LR TAAR in 
a more thematic way. Even before a GAAR was proposed, there were a number of 
articles regarding the appropriateness of its introduction into the UK tax system.334 
Specifically, at that point, the literature debated the appropriateness of a General Anti-
Avoidance Rule (‘GAAvoidR’), although these arguments remain relevant when 
considering the GAAR as introduced. The commissioning and publication of the 
Aaronson Report brought fresh discussions and criticism of the GAAR from a wide range 
of perspectives, including those who do not think that the GAAR goes far enough and 
instead advocate a GAAvoidR. The prime example of the latter is Murphy, who drafted 
the Trade Union Conference’s (‘TUC’) response to the GAAR.335 
Given that the LR TAAR is more specialist, it is not surprising that it has gained less 
attention within the literature than the GAAR. However, a number of the points raised 
in respect of the GAAR are also relevant to the LR TAAR. Indeed, in some respects, 
contrasting how these questions and criticisms will affect the LR TAAR will further 
illuminate them. For instance, this dissertation considers the relative importance of the 
word ‘abusive’ within the GAAR legislation by contrasting with its absence from the LR 
TAAR legislation. 
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In terms of structure, the following section will consider a number of criticisms of 
the GAAR, including those earlier criticisms in respect of the GAAvoidR.336 When doing 
so, it will consider how and to what extent these criticisms may also apply to the LR 
TAAR. To ensure this analysis is grounded in practice rather than being purely theoretical 
in nature, where relevant, links will be made to the Relevant Cases.  
VIII.2 Is the GAAR appropriately targeted? 
The authors of the Aaronson Report did not consider that a GAAvoidR was 
appropriate because such a rule could undermine the ability of taxpayers to undertake 
“sensible and reasonable tax planning … [which is an] entirely appropriate response to 
the complexity of a tax system such as the UK.”337  This can be contrasted with one of 
the criticisms raised by Murphy in his TUC paper. Murphy argued that the UK needs a 
rule (although his preference would be to have a principle) that targets tax 
arrangements which give rise to tax ‘avoidance,’ rather than solely tax arrangements 
that are considered ‘abusive.’ 338   
Contrasting these two positions, a couple of interesting questions arise: firstly, 
should the UK GAAR attempt to counteract a broader range of tax avoidance activities; 
and secondly, what is the practical impact of having a GAAR as opposed to a GAAvoidR 
- that is to say will it affect how the GAAR is applied? The first of these questions, 
although interesting concerns politics and ideology and is considered beyond the scope 
of this dissertation.  
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With respect to the second question, as discussed in Chapter II, the courts have 
previously tried to draw a distinction between tax avoidance and tax mitigation, 
however such distinctions have been rejected by some as being unhelpful.339 Given this, 
one could question whether the introduction of the term ‘abusive’ is helpful as, in effect, 
it simply requires the courts to draw a distinction between acceptable tax planning and 
abusive tax planning which may be as difficult as drawing a distinction between tax 
avoidance and tax mitigation. Indeed, it could be argued that the same question is being 
asked in both cases, namely, is the tax planning in question considered acceptable or 
not? If this logic is accepted, although using the term ‘abuse’ may have a role in signalling 
to taxpayers the types of arrangement HMRC will attempt to use the GAAR to 
counteract, it is unlikely to have a practical impact on how the GAAR will apply. 
HMRC appear to be concerned that the use of the word ‘abusive’ will limit the 
situations in which the GAAR will apply.340 As already noted at VI.4, HMRC consider that 
the “test of ‘abuse’, for the purposes of the GAAR, is a high threshold”. 341 While the 
concern may be justified at a policy level, the practical impact of this linguistic difference 
is dependent on the approach taken by the courts.  
Looking at the Relevant Cases, one can see that the courts try, where possible, to 
ensure that tax avoidance schemes are not successful. This can be evidenced by the fact 
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that in a 10 out of 13 of the Relevant Cases342 the courts found in favour of HMRC.343 
Looking more broadly, according to a report by the National Audit Office into the 
effectiveness of the DOTAS regime, HMRC’s success rate in tax avoidance cases in 2011-
12 was 86%.344 The Law Society question, given HMRC success (other than in Mayes), 
“whether, ignoring the febrile political environment even at the time (and that had only 
worsened since that time) there was a real need for a GAAR.”345 
Furthermore, Way questions how the term ‘abusive’ interacts with the double 
reasonableness test. He writes that he: 
understands that those driving the GAAR consider that the purpose of 
the double reasonable test is to find out, if you like, what the 
“reasonable man” considers is abusive. … The difficulty with that is that 
this moves us away from the pejorative expression, “abusive” to some 
extent, to the more benign word “reasonable”346 
In the event that Way is correct in this regard, it would further suggest that the 
use of the word ‘abusive’ in the GAAR legislation is not as significant as it first appears 
since the emphasis is shifted onto what is ‘reasonable’ rather than what is ‘abusive’.   
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Evidence arising from outside of the UK further supports this argument, for in most 
countries with a GAAvoidR there is a level of uncertainty about which transactions fall 
within its scope. This uncertainty “stems from the fine line that separates unacceptable 
tax avoidance from acceptable tax mitigation.”347 Although UK courts do not need to 
draw this distinction when applying the GAAR (or the LR TAAR), it could be argued that 
they still need to draw the distinction between what is acceptable tax planning, and 
what is considered ‘unacceptable’. As such, using the term ‘abusive’ to describe 
‘unacceptable’ tax planning may not make a significant difference to how the courts 
interpret the GAAR, compared to if there were a GAAvoidR in place. 
Further support for this argument can be found in the International Monetary 
Fund’s note on introduction of a GAAvoidR, which states that they should be designed 
to “strike down blatant, artificial or contrived arrangements which are tax driven” 
without catching “ordinary commercial transactions in respect of which taxpayers can 
legitimately take advantage of opportunities.” 348 
This statement would also appear to summarise the policy intent behind the UK 
GAAR. It further supports the argument that the use of the word ‘abuse’ in the GAAR 
legislation may not be as significant as it first appears when it comes to how the GAAR 
will actually be applied. This is not to say that the use of the term ‘abuse’ serves no 
purpose. As the Chartered Institute of Taxation pointed out in its evidence to the 
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Economic Affair Committee “framing the GAAR as an anti-abuse rule is correct as that 
should signal its target (itself an important feature).”349 
Applying a similar logic to the LR TAAR, by not using the word ‘abusive’ within the 
legislation, HMRC is intending to send the signal that they are particularly concerned 
with loan relationship related avoidance and are intending to aggressively challenge any 
schemes they consider to be in scope. Furthermore, HMRC could also be concerned that 
the courts will interpret the GAAR in a way that will limit the GAAR’s applicability, in 
which case, the Loan Relationship TAAR may become more relevant. Although it is 
possible that the courts would also seek to interpret the LR TAAR narrowly, given their 
attitude towards the schemes and taxpayers in the Relevant Cases, this appears unlikely.  
Given the above, there appears to be plenty of support for the argument that the 
use of the word ‘abusive’ in the GAAR legislation is less significant than it first appears. 
If this is the case, then this linguistic difference between the GAAR and the LR TAAR is 
likely less important than at first it appears. Ultimately, however, this thesis can only be 
truly tested once cases involving the GAAR and the LR TAAR have been considered by 
the courts. 
VIII.3 Determining the intention of Parliament 
Although neither the GAAR nor the LR TAAR refer explicitly to ‘the intention of 
Parliament’, a close reading of legislation indicates that this concept is being referred to 
in both. Specifically, there are three instances in the GAAR legislation and two instances 
in the LR TAAR where it refers implicitly or explicitly to the purpose of the relevant 
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legislation, which can only be determined with reference to the intention of Parliament 
in enacting that legislation.  
The first potential reference in the GAAR legislation is at Section 207(2)(a), which 
states that when considering whether an arrangement is abusive, regard needs to be 
had to “whether the substantive results of the arrangements are consistent with any 
principles on which those provisions are based (whether express or implied) and the 
policy objectives of those provisions.” Similar wording can be found within the LR TAAR 
legislation at Section 455D(4). In order to determine whether an arrangement is 
consistent with the principles and policy objectives of a particular provision, it is 
necessary to first to determine what those purposes are. 
The second reference within the GAAR legislation follows shortly after the first at 
s207(2)(c), which states that regard needs to be given to “whether the arrangements 
are intended to exploit any shortcoming” in the relevant provisions.  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the definition of ‘shortcoming’ is either 
a “[f]ailure to come up to a standard of excellence or to fulfil a duty; a defect” or 
“[f]ailure to reach the required or expected amount, a deficiency.”350 Both of these 
definitions imply that there is an expected standard which has not been met. For the 
term ‘shortcoming’ to be meaningful in s207(2)(c), the underlying provision must have 
an identifiable purpose. So to say that an arrangement exploits a shortcoming in the 
relevant provision, the arrangement in question must be designed to manipulate the 
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provision so it does not achieve its intended purpose. As discussed at VII.2.4, a similar 
reference to shortcomings is not included within the LR TAAR legislation. 
The third reference is at s207(4), which lists the tax results which might indicate 
that a tax arrangement is abusive. However, these results are only indicators of 
abusiveness “if it is reasonable to assume that such a result was not the anticipated 
result when the relevant tax provisions were enacted.” Again, similar wording can be 
found within the LR TAAR legislation at Section 455D(2). The use of the term 
‘anticipated’ implies that the relevant provision has a purpose, as it indicates that the 
provision was intended to give rise to a particular result. Otherwise it would be 
meaningless to discuss whether an outcome is the anticipated result of a provision.  
Although it appears relatively uncontroversial to say that a piece of legislation has 
a specific purpose (albeit some provisions may have a more complex purpose than 
others), the identification of that purpose can be problematic, both from theoretical and 
practical perspectives. From a theoretical perspective, the question is: how can the 
purpose of a piece of legislation be identified, given the complex process of drafting, 
debating and enacting it?351 From a practical perspective, the question is: what happens 
if the purposes of a particular piece of legislation is unclear or appears arbitrary? Each 
of these are considered further below. 
VIII.3.1 Purpose – a theoretical problem 
As a starting point, it is important to understand the “role of legislation as an 
expression of the intention of Parliament as an institution rather than as a collection of 
                                                     
351 Freedman, ‘Interpreting Tax Statutes’ (n 339); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1998). 






individuals.”352 As such, the question arises of how to determine the purpose of a piece 
of legislation independently from those purposes which specific actors had in mind 
when proposing and enacting that legislation. As Dworkin points out, legislators may 
have a range of reasons for voting for a piece of legislation.353 Within a tax context, the 
most important actors in introducing tax provisions are HMRC and HM Treasury, who 
draft the finance bills. Thus the question is: how should the purposes of a specific 
provision be identified given they should be considered separate and distinct from the 
purposes HMRC and HM Treasury had in mind when drafted the legislation? 
Freedman,354 drawing on Waldron,355 argued that the fact that the intention of 
Parliament should be considered as separate and distinct from the actors involved 
supports the authoritative nature of the text of the legislation itself. That is to say, that 
the purpose of a particular provision should be determined by reference to what the 
legislation actually says. However, Freedman goes on to argue that this position does 
not prevent other statements made by individual members of the legislative being used 
to help guide the court’s interpretation of Parliament, providing that those statements 
are intended for that purpose. For instance, following the decision in Pepper v Hart,356 
Ministerial statements can be used to aid constructing legislation where the text of the 
relevant legislation is ambiguous.  Freedman argued that this position is constitutionally 
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justifiable as such statements may become “recognised as acts of the legislature, as a 
matter of policy.”357 
Although the GAAR legislation allows the courts to use a broader range of 
materials when determining whether it applies, it could be argued that similar principles 
should apply to these additional materials, that is to say, the courts should only take into 
account such statements where they clearly set out the purpose of a particular 
provision. For instance, an announcement from HMRC which states that they are going 
to bring before Parliament provision X to prevent tax scheme Y could be used to prevent 
provision Z from being manipulated to facilitate tax scheme Y. This position would be 
consistent with Freedman’s opinion because HMRC is instrumental in drafting tax 
legislation and, therefore, when Parliament enacts a piece of legislation which has been 
drafted by HMRC, Parliament can be seen as implicitly accepting HMRC’s rationale of its 
introduction. To take the previous example, if Parliament enacts provision Z on the 
recommendation of HMRC, Parliament can be taken as implicitly accepting and adopting 
HMRC’s intention that provision Z is used to prevent scheme Y from being effective. 
Although the GAAR legislation permits a broader range of materials, such as 
journal articles, to be used to determine if it should apply, one could question the role 
of such materials in determining the purpose of a piece of legislation, if they do not 
satisfy the above criteria. That is to say, those other materials need to be sufficiently 
clear and authoritative to be useful in determining the intention of Parliament in 
enacting a particular provision. It is conceivable that such materials could be useful, but 
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this may be relatively rare in practice given how far removed they are likely to be from 
the original intention of Parliament, except to the extent they show that HMRC accepted 
a practice when the scheme was entered into or they provide context to other material. 
Given that Section 211, FA 2013 is not replicated within the LR TAAR legislation, 
when seeking to determine if it applies, the courts are constrained by Pepper v Hart.358 
This difference has the potential to give rise to some peculiar results in the event that 
the purpose of the relevant legislation can only be obtained from materials that fall 
outside of the scope of the Pepper v Hart principle. 
As noted above, both the GAAR and LR TAAR legislation contain the term 
‘anticipated result’.359 Although it is meaningful to say that an individual can anticipate 
a result, it could be questioned whether it is meaningful to talk about an institution 
anticipating a result, particularly if Freedmen is correct when she cites Waldron as saying 
that “an institution has no occurrent thought.”360 Dworkin may help resolve the 
apparent problems raised by this question.361 
Dworkin described three potential ways to conceptualise “the role intention 
should play in constructing statutes.”362 The strong position is that a “statue can have 
no consequences the legislators did not have in mind,” 363 with the weak position being 
“that a statute can contain nothing that the legislators intended that it did not contain.” 
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364 Between these two positions is what Dworkin calls the intermediary position, which 
is that a “statute does not have any consequence the legislator would have rejected if 
they had contemplated it.” 365  
Interpreting the phrase ‘anticipated result’ in light of the Dworkin’s intermediary 
position, would mean that, rather than considering what individual actors (including 
HMRC) anticipated when enacting a provision, one should consider whether, had 
Parliament as an institution known that the provision would have produced a particular 
outcome, they would have accepted that outcome. Conceptualising the phrase 
‘anticipated result’ in this way should allow a meaningful discussion of whether an 
outcome is consistent with the anticipated results of a specific provision. Although this 
position may help relieve some of the conceptual issues raised, the question then 
becomes: how should one determine whether a provision has produced an outcome 
which Parliament would have accepted? 
Extending Freedman’s argument, what Parliament anticipated when enacting a 
piece of legislation must be determined with reference to the wording of the relevant 
legislation and any clear statements which function to indicate its intended purpose. 
The logical consequence of this argument is that when considering s207(4) it is irrelevant 
to consider what specific stakeholders (including HMRC and HM Treasury) anticipated 
the results of a particular provision would be, unless there was a clear statement to that 
effect during the legislative process.  
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In the context of tax avoidance, such considerations are important because tax 
avoidance schemes often rely on specific provisions applying in a way not originally 
considered by the drafter of those provisions. However, just because a provision is used 
in a way not intended by the drafter, it does not necessarily mean that it is being used 
in a way that is not consistent with the intention of Parliament. This situation could arise 
as a result of the legislation being poorly drafted or HMRC failing to fully work through 
the consequences of a provision. For example, Finance Act 2018, contained a number of 
amendments to the anti-hybrid rules inserted into the Taxation (International and Other 
Provisions) Act 2010 by Finance Act 2016 in order to ensure that the original provisions 
operated as intended.366 Although in this instance, HMRC identified potential defects in 
the legislation and acted accordingly, in other situations HMRC may have either not 
noticed that the legislation did not apply as they intended or decided that the deficits 
were not sufficiently significant to warrant correcting them. In this regard it should be 
noted that the Pepper v Hart principle can only be used where the underlying legislation 
is ambiguous, and is not of assistance where the text of the legislation is clear but fails 
in its intended purpose. 
VIII.3.2 Purpose – a practical problem 
The second situation where application of the GAAR could be problematic is when 
the underlying purpose of the legislation is unclear or does not seek to tax commercial 
gains or losses arising from an arrangement. Although historically, the Ramsay Principle 
                                                     
366 KPMG, ‘Budget: Amendments to the Hybrids and Other Mismatch Rules’ (26 November 2017) 
<https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/insights/2017/11/tmd-budget-amendments-to-the-hybrids-and-
other-mismatch-rules.html> accessed 6 January 2018. 






has been used to defeat tax avoidance schemes, it can be challenging to apply when the 
purpose of a piece of legislation is unclear, or the legislation does not seek to tax 
commercial gains and losses. This is important to discuss because a major reason for the 
Aaronson Report367 considered that a GAAR was required in the UK was that HMRC was 
unsuccessful in challenging the SHIPS 2 scheme in the Mayes case368. Indeed, Aaronson 
states that the SHIPS 2 scheme, “and other schemes like it, provides the answer to the 
question ‘does the UK need a GAAR?’”369  
As discussed in detail at V.3, the key reason why HMRC was unsuccessful in that 
case was that the provisions in question did not seek to tax commercial gains and losses 
and therefore, purposive interpretation could not be used to deny relief for a loss that 
did not give rise to commercial loss for the taxpayer. To use Hollis’s terminology, 
although the taxpayer in the Mayes case claimed a deduction for a ‘phantom loss,’ the 
relevant legislative provisions were designed in such a way to give rise to taxable 
‘phantom gains’ and deductible ‘phantom losses’.370  
Although the authors of the Aaronson Report believed that the GAAR could be 
used to counteract schemes like SHIPS 2, this case raises the question of whether the 
GAAR could be effective where the relevant provision lacks a clear purpose or where the 
tax treatment is driven by legal analysis. As Freedman points out, a “GAAR cannot 
rewrite the law where there is no clear objective because the essence of a GAAR is there 
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to prevent abuse of the underlying legislation.”371 In this regard, it is illuminating to note 
the comment Mummery LJ made at the beginning of his discussion of the Ramsay 
Principle in his leading judgement in the Mayes case, which reads: 
The reaction to SHIPS 2 noted by Proudman J [i.e. it should not 
succeed372] was instinctive and initial. Instinct informed by experience 
plays a role in decision-making, but does not relieve the court of the 
duty to reach a decision that is based on a proper understanding of the 
meaning of the legislation and of the facts that make up the 
transaction. Instinct has to be checked by the processes of construing 
the scope of the [relevant] provisions and analysing SHIPS 2.373 
Although instinct may suggest that a tax avoidance scheme should not be allowed 
to succeed, it may still be challenging for HMRC to prove that instinct is correct as a 
matter of law. The GAAR and the LR TAAR should give HMRC further tools to prevent 
such schemes from being successful, but those tools will have limited effectiveness 
where the relevant provisions are not effectively drafted. This is important because, as 
Freedman notes, “it is not the function of a GAAR, any more that of the judiciary, to fill 
gaps left by the failure to set out parliamentary intention.”374 A similar point could be 
made in respect of the LR TAAR. 
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Considering the Relevant Cases, this point can also be illustrated by the Bank of 
Ireland case in which, although the Court of Appeal accepted that the scheme in 
question was designed to take advantage of how two sections interact, Lawrence LJ 
concluded that there is no “legitimate process of interpretation which would solve the 
Revenue’s problem. … [HMRC’s proposed solution] would amount to an unprincipled 
process of legislation gloss.”375  
One could seek to challenge this argument by pointing out that the above 
discussion assumes a narrow view of purpose; that is to say, focusing at the purpose of 
the provision being considered. Some may argue that the UK tax system has a broader 
overriding purpose of raising money to fund HM Government. In the event that a 
broader purpose exists, it could be argued that all tax provisions have this as an 
underlying purpose, and therefore, use of any tax provision to lessen a person’s tax 
liability is always contrary to its purpose unless it explicitly provides for that reduction 
in tax liability. The challenge with taking this position is that the HM Government does 
not just use the tax system to raise revenue, it also uses the tax system to incentivise 
and disincentivise certain behaviours.376  
VIII.4 The problem of closely articulated provisions 
Although prima facia, it would seem clear that the GAAR and LR TAAR should be 
able to defeat schemes that are designed to manipulate the relevant provisions, there 
is a question over how the GAAR or LR TAAR should apply when the relevant provision 
contains a number of precise conditions. For instance, it may be easier to apply the GAAR 
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or LR TAAR to a scheme similar to the one in the Travel Document Services case than the 
one in the Bank of Ireland case. Whereas the scheme in Travel Document Services sought 
to create a deemed loan relationship to exploit the fact that, on the taxpayer’s 
argument, Paragraph 13 could not apply to deemed loan relationships, in Bank of 
Ireland, the scheme sought to exploit an inconsistency between a number of closely 
articulated provisions. Thus, whereas in Travel Document Services, the taxpayer was 
seeking to rely on an inherit limitation in Paragraph 13, in Bank of Ireland, the taxpayer 
merely created a situation where applying the rules gave rise to an advantageous result.  
Within UK tax legislation there are a large number of provisions whose application 
is dependent on a number of detailed conditions, and these provisions tend to apply 
mechanically. Examples include the UK statutory residency test or the anti-hybrid rules 
(although specific anti-avoidance rules may be included in these types of regimes). 
Within the loan relationship regime, there are a number of provisions that contain 
closely articulated conditions, such as the deemed released rules. 377 These rules also 
contain a specific targeted anti-avoidance rule at 363A, CTA 2009.  
The question of how the GAAR and LR TAAR apply to counteract tax schemes that 
rely on closely articulated provisions is an important point to consider because, as the 
Law Society notes:  
HMRC persist in using very detailed legislation which provides little or 
no scope for a purposive interpretation, there is more risk of a 
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“scheme” being effective than if HMRC were prepared to introduce 
shorter legislation not seeking to cover every eventuality. 378 
In respect of the GAAR, the GAAR guidance state that: 
If the statute specifies a particular period or set of conditions quite 
precisely, then taxpayers are entitled to assume that they are on the 
right side of the line if they have satisfied the statutory condition and 
there is no contrivance about what they have done. 379 
That said Gammie, who argues that the GAAR goes no further than the normal 
rules of purposive construction, raises the question: “when is satisfaction of the 
conditions sufficiently contrived to deny their satisfaction notwithstanding that on a 
purposive construction you satisfy the requirements for the particular tax 
treatment”?380  
Although a similar point could be made in respect of the LR TAAR, as already 
mentioned at VII.2.4.1, the LR TAAR legislation does not refer to contrived steps. As 
previously noted this may make sense, given that for the purpose of the TAAR all tax 
avoidance arrangements are considered ‘relevant’ unless shown to be otherwise. Thus, 
its impact may be more limited in practice, given that it is likely to be difficult to argue 
that a tax avoidance scheme containing contrived steps gives rise to a result which 
would be consistent with the relevant legislation. 
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VIII.5 Certainty for the taxpayer 
When the GAAR was being proposed, two of the key themes that were discussed 
were: the need to give taxpayers a level of certainty on how the GAAR will apply; and 
whether a clearance system should be included as part of the GAAR legislation. The 
Aaronson Report discussed these themes and when designing the GAAR the 
requirement to give the taxpayer as much certainly as possible was taken into 
consideration. The authors sought to do this is two ways. Firstly, they considered that 
putting the burden of proof onto HMRC to show that an arrangement is abusive should 
“reduce the scope for doubt as to whether an arrangement falls within the intended 
target area of the GAAR”.381. Secondly, they considered that it was “desirable for there 
to be some mechanism to enable doubts [about the scope of the GAAR] to be addressed 
as quickly as possible,” 382 and they proposed the introduction of the GAAR Advisory 
Panel. As noted above at IV.3.2, part of the role of the Panel is to review schemes that 
HMRC wishes to use the GAAR against, to determine, in the panel’s opinion, a 
‘reasonable’ course of action.  
The Aaronson Report considered that there would be two main advantages of the 
GAAR Advisory Panel. Firstly, since the majority of its members would not work for 
HMRC,383 it would provide impartial oversight on how HMRC seeks to apply the GAAR. 
Secondly, if the Panel’s decisions are published in a suitably anonymised format,384 they 
would form a “body of guidance which would be used to calibrate their understanding 
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of where the dividing line falls between responsible tax planning and abusive tax 
schemes.” 385   
In light of the fact that the burden of proof is on HMRC and the role of the GAAR 
Advisory Panel, the Aaronson Report considered that a general clearance system would 
be unnecessary, although it did consider it would be ‘sensible’ if clearance granted under 
other arrangements would include a comment on the inapplicability of the GAAR. These 
recommendations were accepted by HMRC, although the GAAR guidance states that if 
clearance is granted in respect of one aspect of a scheme, HMRC may use the GAAR 
against other aspects.386 
The safeguards in place in respect of the GAAR have not been replicated in the LR 
TAAR legislation. In contrast to the GAAR, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show 
that the outcome of a scheme is consistent with the purpose of the relevant provisions 
and there is no independent panel which HMRC need to refer cases to. Furthermore, 
there is no formal clearance procedure which taxpayers use to seek confirmation 
whether the LR TAAR would apply to a transaction. 387 
Comparing many of the comments of the Aaronson Report quote above with the 
situation within the LR TAAR, the contrasts between the GAAR and the LR TAAR are 
highly visible. To take a couple of examples, the authors of the Aaronson Report thought 
that it was advantageous for the GAAR to contain a mechanism for disputes regarding 
its scope to be quickly resolved and within Schedule 43, FA 2013 there are strict time 
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limits for potential GAAR cases to be referred to the GAAR Advisory Panel. Although the 
Panel’s decision is not binding, it provides the taxpayer and HMRC with an independent 
view on whether a scheme is potentially within the scope of the GAAR in a relatively 
short period of time. This compares to a number of the Relevant Cases which took years 
to come before the FTT and over a decade before they are finally resolved. For instance, 
the FTT’s decision in Greene King, concerned the accounting period ending 30 April 2003 
and 30 April 2004, was only released in 2012.388 The first independent determination of 
whether a scheme is within the scope of the LR TAAR will not be until the case is heard 
by the FTT. 
A second example is that, whereas the anonymised past opinions of the GAAR 
Advisory Panel can be used to work out where the dividing line falls between acceptable 
tax planning and abusive tax avoidance, a similar resource is not available to allow a 
taxpayer to work out where the line is drawn in respect of the LR TAAR. Although, cases 
involving the LR TAAR will be useful in this regard, it will take some time for the creation 
of such precedent. Furthermore, given that such precedent would also be available with 
respect to the GAAR, the fact that the Aaronson Report considered that the publication 
of the Panel’s decisions is important would suggest their publication would provide 
additional guidance over and above judicial precedent. 
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Looking at it from a different perspective, there is an argument that the 
introduction of the GAAR will increase overall level of certainty in the UK tax system. As 
the Aaronson Report noted, currently in tax avoidance cases: 
Judges inevitably are faced with the temptation to stretch the 
interpretation, so far as possible, to achieve a sensible result; and this 
is widely regarded as producing considerable uncertainty in predicting 
the outcome of such disputes.389 
A review of the Relevant Cases showed that judges face these challenges and seek 
to ensure that tax avoidance schemes are defeated. These cases show that the courts 
have placed emphasis on certain words and phrases in the tax legislation in order to 
defeat tax avoidance cases. For instance, in DCC Holdings, the courts placed particular 
emphasis on the term ‘fairly represents’ in order to prevent a tax avoidance scheme 
from being successful. Although, as noted above at VI.5 this phrase had been in the 
legislation for a number of years without any focus being placed on it, that case lead to 
the development of what has been used by the FTT “as a proxy for an anti-avoidance 
rule”.390 It could be argued that this is not an example of the court ‘stretching’ the 
meaning of the legislation, but rather focusing on under-explored area of the legislation, 
and such developments give rise to uncertainty for taxpayers and HMRC.391   
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Drawing on the insight in the Aaronson Report cited above, Freedman goes on to 
argue that where there is a “carefully formulated GAAR” in place, the courts “will be 
more inclined to interpret the legislation more narrowly but then look to the GAAR for 
guidance as to whether it should be subject to that anti-avoidance rule.” 392 Although 
there is merit in this argument, the key phrase here is ‘carefully formulated GAAR’. To 
the extent that the scope of the GAAR is clear and taxpayers have a level of certainty 
over its application, there could be more overall certainty within the tax system.  
A similar argument could be made in respect the LR TAAR. Although HMRC has 
been successful in challenging most of the schemes in the Relevant Cases, there has 
been a level of uncertainty, perhaps inevitably, over whether a scheme will succeed. 
Furthermore, the courts’ attempts to ensure that tax avoidance schemes are not 
successful have led to ‘stretching’ the interpretation of a word or a phrase to give it a 
significance which, arguably, it was not intended to have. For instance, with respect to 
the ‘fairly represents requirement’, part of the reason that Rimer LJ dissented from 
Moses LJ’s leading judgement was that Moses LJ’s reasoning appeared to “load on to 
the emphasised words a function that they cannot naturally bear”.393 A similar argument 
could be made in relation to the FTT’s focus in Stagecoach on the expression ‘in respect 
of’ a company’s loan relationships, particularly given that a fundamental tenet of 
accounting is that any accounting debits must be offset be a matching credit. However, 
others disagree, for instance Sir Terence Etherton C found the FTT’s argument 
                                                     
392 Freedman, ‘Designing a General Anti-Abuse Rule’ (n 371) 168. 
393 DCC Holdings (CA, 2009) (n 234) [85]. 






‘compelling’.394 In the event that the LR TAAR gives the courts less incentive to stretch 
such interpretations, this is likely to reduce the level of uncertainty regarding the 
application of the loan relationship rules.  
One objection to Freedman’s argument that the introduction of a GAAR will cause 
the courts to interpret statutes more narrowly is that this is only likely to happen if the 
courts have complete confidence where the GAAR will apply. If they are uncertain how 
the GAAR would apply, then they may continue to ‘stretch’ interpretation to ensure that 
the scheme in question is defeated. Again, this logic is likely to apply equally to the LR 
TAAR.  
Although the authors of the Aaronson Report considered that their 
recommendations would lead to increased certainty regarding how the GAAR should 
apply, however, they note two further points. Firstly, they considered that ‘inevitably’ 
there would be cases that “test the outer limits of the centre ground [of acceptable tax 
planning], giving rise to uncertainty as to whether the GAAR applies.” 395 As has been 
explored a number of times within this dissertation, whatever form of language is used, 
any broad anti-avoidance rule is required to draw a distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable tax planning. Whenever such a distinction is drawn, it is indeed ‘inevitable’ 
that ‘hard cases’396 will arise where it is difficult to determine which side of the line a 
scheme falls. In response to this, the authors suggested that in such cases there would 
already be a degree of technical uncertainty over whether the scheme would have 
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succeeded even in the absence of the GAAR. The introduction of the GAAR would not 
increase the uncertainly that the taxpayer would need to accept when considering 
whether to enter into a tax avoidance scheme.  
The second point they note is that there are some parts of the tax system “where 
the present statutory rules are extremely complex and can give rise to anomalous 
consequence”.397 The authors considered that this is not a reason against introducing a 
GAAR, but instead “calls for rationalisation of these rules”. 398 Again, this theme has been 
explored on a number of occasions, with the obvious example being Mayes.  
Thus, the question of certainty for the taxpayer has been factored into design of 
the GAAR. Although theoretically, Freedman’s argument that the GAAR could provide 
more certainly to the taxpayer may have merit, there is a question of whether in practice 
the courts will start to interpret legislation more narrowly, particularly in the short term. 
Overall, it is probably fair to say that although the mechanisms put in place to provide 
taxpayers with certainty over the application of the GAAR should help, there will remain 
a level of uncertainty, particularly in the short run whilst the body of case law and GAAR 
Advisory Panel opinions are being built up. 
In contrast there is a great deal of uncertainty over how the LR TAAR will apply, 
given the absence of similar mechanisms to assist taxpayers. Whether this uncertainty 
will materially decrease going forward is dependent on the extent to which the courts 
give comprehensive guidance on how the LR TAAR should be interpreted. 
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VIII.6 Summary of key points 
 Although the use of the word ‘abuse’ is useful in signifying the type of 
scheme that HMRC will seek to use the GAAR against, it may not have a 
practical effect. Similarly, will the lack of the word ‘abusive’ in the LR TAAR 
legislation make it easier to apply. 
 Both the GAAR and the LR TAAR require the purpose of the relevant 
provisions to be determined. Determining the purpose of a particular 
provision can be challenging both from a theoretical and a practical 
perspective. Although the ability of the courts to take into account a 
broader range of material when determining if the GAAR applies may help, 
it still relies of provisions having an identifiable purpose. As the Mayes case 
shows, provisions lacking a clear purposes gives rise to challenges to HMRC 
 Similarly, there is a question over how the GAAR and LR TAAR will apply to 
areas which contain a number of closely articulated provisions. 
 The requirement for taxpayers to be given as much certainty as possible 
over the application of the GAAR was a key concern from the authors of 
the Aaronson Report. Although some uncertainly remains with respect to 
how the GAAR will apply in practice, the safeguards introduced as part of 
the GAAR help to limit the uncertainly. The same cannot be said of the LR 
TAAR, which lack similar safeguards.  
 The next and final chapter of this dissertation will seek to draw these 
arguments to a conclusion. 






CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSIONS 
IX.1 Introduction 
In an article just three years after the introduction of the GAAR, Self asked 
whether, in light of HMRC’s recent victories in tax avoidance cases, the GAAR would still 
be necessary to counteract tax avoidance schemes.399 The same could be said of the LR 
TAAR today. Of the 13 Relevant Cases considered,400 the courts found in favour of HMRC 
in 10 of them, with one further case giving rise to a mixed result.401 That leaves two 
victories for the taxpayer, namely Bank of Ireland402 and Smith & Nephew,403 with the 
latter currently being appealed. Thus, it appears HMRC is relatively successful in 
defeating loan relationship avoidance even without the GAAR or LR TAAR, albeit, we do 
not know how many cases HMRC decided not to pursue because they are less confident 
in being able to challenge them.  
That is not to say that either piece of legalisation is redundant, for they may have 
other roles. Firstly, it shows that HMRC are committed to prevent loan relationship 
related tax avoidance. This is an important signal to both taxpayers contemplating 
entering into a loan relationship related avoidance scheme and others who see large 
companies using such schemes to avoid tax. Secondly, as can be seen from the Relevant 
Cases, HMRC is currently required to assert a range of technical arguments to challenge 
loan relationship avoidance schemes, which may not be necessary going forward. 
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Thirdly, the GAAR and LR TAAR may give HMRC increased confidence in their ability to 
challenge loan related avoidance schemes, leading them to pursue more such schemes 
through the courts.   
Before concluding on the specific questions posed, this dissertation will briefly 
discuss each of the anti-avoidance measures reviewed. 
IX.2 Conclusions in respect of other measures 
IX.2.1 Section 441 
It was found that although Section 441 is a necessary part to defeat certain types 
of loan relationship avoidance, by itself, it is not sufficient. Its primary limitation is that 
it does not apply to schemes designed to prevent a company being required to bring 
into account a loan relationship credit. However, Section 441 is necessary to define what 
is legitimate business expenditure for loan relationship purposes, in a similar manner to 
the wholly and exclusively rule. Referring to the Relevant Cases, although Section 441 
may not have a role in preventing the type of schemes in Greene King404 or 
Stagecoach,405 it is vital to defeat schemes similar to the one in A.H. Field.406   
IX.2.2 The Ramsay principle 
Although the Ramsay Principle has been used to counteract a broad range of tax 
avoidance schemes, it has not been raised as a main argument in any of the Relevant 
Cases. There are two explanations for this, neither of which are mutually exclusive. 
Firstly, although. the House of Lords found in Ramsay407 that the capital gains regime 
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sought to tax real world gains and losses, the loan relationship code seeks to address tax 
accounting credits and debits. As such, it would be challenging to argue using the 
Ramsay Principle that a provision should be construed purposively such that the 
accounting gains or losses arising out of a transaction should be disregarded and instead 
should be taxed in accordance with the real world gains or losses arising. Secondly, 
generally under accounting standards, a transaction is required to be accounted for in 
accordance with its economic substance and, therefore, it seems unlikely that the real 
world gain or loss arising from a transaction could be significantly different from the 
accounting gain or loss arising as a result of viewing the facts of a case realistically. One 
notable exception to this rule is where the transaction involves accounting for a 
contingent asset where, although it may have a commercial value, accounting standards 
prevent the company from assigning a value to that asset (such a situation arose in Suez 
Teesside408). However, even this position is open to question.409 
Thus, the role of the Ramsay Principle in counteracting loan related avoidance is 
likely to be limited in the future. 
IX.2.3 LR TAAR 
Given HMRC’s rationale for the introduction of the GAAR, going forward, it is likely 
that they will seek to apply the LR TAAR against loan relationship avoidance schemes. 
This may not necessarily mean that HMRC is more successful in defeating such schemes, 
for already HMRC have a high success rate in challenging them. However, the LR TAAR 
will give HMRC more certainty over their ability to challenge, which could lead to a 
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greater number of loan relationship related schemes going through the courts. them. 
Furthermore, HMRC intend the LR TAAR to act as a deterrent,410 thereby making it less 
likely that taxpayers will enter into loan relationship avoidance schemes in the first 
place. 
Although HMRC may hope that the LR TAAR will be an effective measure, a 
number of challenges and criticisms raised in respect of the GAAR are likely also to apply 
to the LR TAAR. In particular, as discussed in Sections VIII.3 and VIII.4, the LR TAAR may 
be challenging to apply where the relevant provisions lack a clear purpose or they are 
closely articulated (or both), albeit there may be fewer of these types of provision in the 
loan relationship regime compared to other areas of the corporation tax legislation.  
IX.3 Conclusions in respect of the GAAR 
Given the likely role of the LR TAAR in defeating loan relationship avoidance 
schemes going forward, what role will the GAAR have for such schemes? At the time of 
proposing the LR TAAR in 2013, HMRC considered that the GAAR would not provide 
sufficient protection to prevent loan relationship avoidance schemes from being 
successful.411 This suggests that the LR TAAR is a tougher measure that the GAAR, but 
how do they compare? 
As can been seen from Section VII.2, both the GAAR and LR TAAR are structured 
in similar ways. Some of the differences between them could be described as purely 
                                                     
410 HMRC, ‘Modernising the Taxation of Corporate Debt and Derivative Contracts’ (n 194). 
411 ibid. 






linguistic or merely arising from the different contexts. However, others are more 
relevant, such as the shift in the burden of proof.  
Within the GAAR legislation, the burden of proof is on HMRC, whereas in the LR 
TAAR legislation, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer (like in other areas of tax). This 
shift can be seen in two respects. Firstly, when applying the GAAR, one starts from the 
presumption that a tax avoidance scheme is acceptable, unless HMRC can show that it 
is abusive. In contrast, when applying the LR TAAR, one starts from the presumption that 
a tax avoidance scheme is relevant (i.e. the LR TAAR applies to it), unless the taxpayer 
can show that it is acceptable. Secondly, when considering the purpose of the relevant 
legislation, it is for the taxpayer to show that the result of the scheme is consistent with 
relevant provisions to prevent the LR TAAR from applying. Under the GAAR, it is for 
HMRC to show that the scheme cannot be reasonably regarded as a reasonable course 
of action.  
In a similar vein, when applying the ‘double reasonableness test’, the taxpayer gets 
the benefit of the doubt as to which side of the line a scheme falls, which is not the case 
in respect of the LR TAAR. When considering the GAAR, if a court considers that a 
scheme is abusive, but acknowledges that it can be reasonably held that the scheme is 
not abusive, it must find that the GAAR does not apply. In contrast, when considering 
whether the LR TAAR applies, for the court to find in favour of the taxpayer, they need 
to find that the results of the scheme are positively consistent with the purpose of 
relevant provisions. 






A final point to note is the role of the term abusive in the GAAR legislation which 
may not have a significant effect on how the GAAR applies in practice. Although the use 
of this term gives a flavour of the type of scheme the GAAR is designed to counteract, 
as Way pointed out, it is weakened by the ‘double reasonableness test.’412 Furthermore, 
as can be seen from Chapter III, there is uncertainty over the boundary between 
acceptable and unacceptable tax planning and the addition of the new term of ‘abusive 
tax avoidance’ only adds to the confusion. 
The shifting of the burden of proof onto the taxpayer in LR TAAR cases should 
make it easier for HMRC to successfully argue that the LR TAAR applies to loan 
relationship avoidance schemes. However, HMRC may seek to use both the GAAR and 
the LR TAAR simultaneously to enable them to increase their chances of success. At least 
initially, the main benefit for HMRC to argue that the LR TAAR applies, but not the GAAR, 
is to prevent delays arising as a result of needing to obtain the opinion of the GAAR 
Advisory Panel. 
IX.4 Broader implications for other corporation tax matters 
The final section of this dissertation will seek to extend the conclusions drawn in 
respect of loan relationships to other corporation tax matters. Given the structural 
differences between the loan relationship code and other areas of the corporation tax, 
these conclusions are indicative only. 
Firstly, the Relevant Cases show that HMRC aggressively pursues avoidance 
thorough the courts, with the courts viewing tax avoidance cases relatively 
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unsympathetically. Even in cases, such as Mayes,413 where the taxpayer wins, the court 
makes it clear that instinctively it was the wrong result. Lord Reed, writing extra-
judicially, commented that the GAAR’s “practical importance depends on the extent to 
which the courts, applying ordinary legal principles, are otherwise tolerant of tax 
avoidance”414. Self makes a similar point, highlighting that in 2015 HMRC won 23 of 26 
tax avoidance cases it took to court.415 
Secondly, as the introduction of the LR TAAR shows, HMRC are unlikely to rely 
solely on the GAAR to counteract tax avoidance particularly where they perceive there 
to be substantial amounts of avoidance activity taking place. This goes against the 
original aims of the authors of the Aaronson Report, who hoped that the introduction 
of the GAAR would eventually lead to the simplification of current anti-avoidance 
rules.416 
Thirdly, the GAAR does not solve one of the historical challenges that HMRC has 
faced in defeating complex tax avoidance scheme, namely, provisions which lack a clear 
purpose. Mayes417 is the classic example of this. Although the Aaronson Report418 
considered that Mayes was one of the reasons why the UK needs a GAAR, it only 
provides half the solution in this regard. The other half is to ensure that the tax 
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provisions have a clear purpose so that the GAAR and other measures are effective 
against such cases. Freedman has been advocating for this for a number of years.419 
These comments have provided some insight into how the GAAR may apply to 
other areas of corporation tax, however, the ability to draw such insights has been 
limited by the following factors: 
 Although the GAAR has been implemented for almost 5 years, there are a 
limited number of GAAR Advisory Panel opinions that can be considered 
(most of which have limited relevance to corporation tax matters) and 
there is no precedent on how the GAAR may apply. Until a body of relevant 
opinions and precedents have been created, there is significant 
uncertainty over how the GAAR will apply in practice.  
 The introduction of LR TAAR means that the role of the GAAR in respect of 
loan relationship avoidance schemes is likely to be different to other areas 
of corporation tax. Going forward, it may be the case that there becomes 
a practical or political need to introduce regime TAARs in other areas of 
corporation tax, in which case, the conclusions drawn may become 
relevant to these areas.   
 As the loan relationship regime is driven by accounting standards, 
arguably, there is less of divergence between the economic result of an 
arrangement and its tax result. This makes it easier to determine the 
‘correct’ result of an arrangement (i.e. in the absence of a tax avoidance 
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motivation). As such, the insights suggested by this dissertation may be less 
relevant to other areas of corporation tax which are driven by legal 
concepts rather than accounting standards.  
 Although this dissertation has mentioned the role of the Ramsay Principle 
in defeating loan relationship avoidance schemes, given the role of 
accounting principles in the loan relationship, it has concluded that the 
Ramsay Principle is of limited relevance to them. This is not the case in 
other areas of corporation tax and therefore, the interaction between the 
GAAR and the Ramsay Principle remains more relevant outside of loan 
relationships. 
Given these limitations, to further develop and test the insights gained within the 
dissertation, the following further research could be undertaken:  
a) Consideration of how the GAAR may apply in areas of corporation tax 
which are not primarily driven by accounting standards. In this regard, the 
chargeable gains regime could be profitably studied, especially given that 
there are a number of areas which contain closely articulated provisions, 
for instance the company reconstruction provisions at Section 135, 
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, et sec. 
b) A detailed consideration of how the Ramsay Principle and the GAAR might 
interact. In this regard, the Capital Allowance regime may be usefully 
studied as there are two important Ramsay principle cases that deal with 






the capital allowance regime, namely, BMBF420 and Tower MCashback,421 
and HMRC’s GAAR Guidance422 contains a GAAR analysis of the facts of the 
BMBF case. 
c) Review of whether internationally there may be lessons the UK could learn 
from other nations that could test or strengthen further our own approach 
to tax avoidance.  
As Self noted, given how long it takes for tax cases to proceed through the courts, 
it may not be until the mid-2020’s that the true impact of the GAAR is known. 423 This is 
likely also to be the case in respect of the LR TAAR. As such, the conclusions and insights 
developed within this dissertation, whilst helpful, will remain provisional until such time 
that sufficient judicial precedents are created against which they can be validated. 
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APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS OF WESTLAW SEARCH 
A.1 List of results 
Case name Citations identified Included 
Abbey National Treasury 
Services Plc v HMRC 
FTT: [2015] UKFTT 341 (TC), 
[2015] SFTD 929 
No 
A.H. Field (Holdings) 
Limited v HMRC 
FTT: [2012] UKFTT 104 (TC) Yes 
Autoclenz v Belcher and 
Others 
SC: [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] STC 745 No 
Bank of Ireland v HMRC CA: [2008] EWCA Civ 58, [2008] STC 398 Yes 
Bowring and another v 
HMRC 
UT: [2015] UKUT 550 (TCC), [2016] 816; No 
Cater Allen International 
Limited and another v 
HMRC 
FTT: [2015] UKFTT 232 (TC), [2015] SFTD 765 Yes 
Chappell v HMRC FTT: [2013] UKFTT 98 (TC), [2013] SFTD 733 
UT: [2014] UKUT 344 (TCC), [2015] STC 271 
CA: [2016] EWCA Civ 809, [2016] STC 1980 
No 
Charlton v HMRC FTT: [2011] UKFTT 467(TC), [2011] SFTD 1160 No 
Cheshire Employer and 
Skills Development 
Limited v HMRC 
UT: [2011] UKUT 329 (TCC), [2012] 
STC 69 
No 
DCC Holdings (UK) 
Limited v HMRC 
HC: [2008] EWHC 2429 (Ch), [2009] STC 77 
CA: [2009] EWCA Civ 1165, [2010] STC 
80 
Yes 






Case name Citations identified Included 
SC: [2010] UKSC 58, [2011] STC 326 
Explainaway Limited 
and other v HMRC 
FTT: [2011] UKFTT 414 (TC), [2011] SFTD 1105 No 
Fidex Limited v HMRC FTT (No. 1): [2011] UKFTT 713 (TC) 
FTT (No. 2): [2013] UKFTT 212 (TC), [2013] SFTD 
964 
UT: [2014] UKUT 454 (TCC), [2015] 
STC 702 
CA: [2016] EWCA Civ 385, [2016] STC 1920 
Yes 
GDF Suez Teesside 
Limited (formerly 
Teesside Power Limited) 
v HMRC 
FTT: [2015] UKFTT 413 (TC) 
UT: [2017] UKUT 68 (TCC), [2017] STC 1622 
Yes 
Greene King PLC and 
another v HMRC 
FTT: [2012] UKFTT 385 (TC), [2012] SFTD 1085 
UT: [2014] UKUT 178 (TCC), [2014] STC 2439 
CA: [2016] EWCA Civ 782, [2017] STC 615 
Yes 
Hancock and another v 
HMRC 
FTT: [2014[ UKFTT 695 (TC), [2014] SFTD 1163 No 
R. (on the application of 
Huitson) v HMRC 
CA: [2011] EWCA Civ 893, [2011] STC 1860 No 
Lankhorst-Hohorst 
GmbH v Finanzamt 
Steinfurt  
ECJ: (Case C-324/00), [2003] STC 608 No 






Case name Citations identified Included 
Lloyds TSB Equipment 
Leasing (No 1) Ltd v 
HMRC 
CA: [2014] EWCA Civ 1062, [2014] STC 2770 No 
MJP Media Services 
Limited v HMRC 
FTT: [2010] UKFTT 298 (TC), [2010] SFTD 1038 
UT: [2011] UKUT 100 (TCC), [2011] STC 2290 
No 
Potts Executors HL: [1951] 1 All ER 76 (HL) No  
R. (on the application of 
Shiner) v HMRC  
CA: [2011] EWCA Civ 892, [2011] STC 1878 No  
Smith and Nephew 
Overseas Limited and 
others v HMRC 
FTT: [2017] UKFTT 151 (TC), [2017] SFTD 678 Yes 
Stagecoach Group Plc 
and another v HMRC 
FTT: [2016] UKFTT 120 (TC), [2016] SFTD] 982 Yes  
Travel Document 
Services v HMRC424 
FTT: [2015] UKFTT 582 (TC), [2016] SFTD 186 
UT: [2017] UKUT 45 (TCC), [2017] STC 973 
Yes  
Verteegh Limited v 
HMRC (sub nom 
Spritebeam Ltd and 
others v HMRC and 
another) 
FTT: [2013] UKFTT 642 (TC), [2014] SFTD 547 
UT: [2015] UKUT 75 (TCC), [2015] STC 1222 
Yes 
Vocalspruce Limited v 
HMRC 
CA: [2014] EWCA Civ 1302, [2015] STC 861 Yes 
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A.2 Rationale for exclusion 
With the exception of the MJP Media425 and Lankhorst-Hohorst426 cases, a review 
of each case indicated that loan relationships were not the primary subject matter. This 
determination was based on a review of the facts contained within Simon’s Tax Cases 
summary introducing the judgement. Where the case was not included in Simon’s Tax 
Cases, the summary used was either from Simon’s First-tier Decisions and All England 
Law Reports. The below table outlines the primary subject matter of each case. The use 
of one of these two alternative sources is indicated by the abbreviations ‘STFD’ or ‘All 
ER’ as appropriate.  
Case Subject Matter 
Abbey National Treasury Services Plc Derivative contacts 
Autoclenz v Belcher  Employment status 
Bowring Trusts 
Chappell Income tax – manufactured overseas 
dividend  
Charlton Discover assessments (SFTD) 
Cheshire Employer and Skills 
Development Limited 
National Insurance Contributions  
Explainaway Derivatives  
Hancock Capital Gains Tax – Qualifying Corporate 
Bonds (SFTD) 
                                                     
425 MJP Media (CA, 2012) (n 42). 
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Case Subject Matter 
Huitson [R. (on the application of 
Huitson)] 
Income tax – double tax relief  
Lloyds TSB Equipment Leasing (No 1) Ltd Capital allowance  
Potts Executors Trusts (All ER) 
Shiner [R. (on the application of Shiner)] Income tax – double tax relief 
 
With respect to the final two excluded cases, namely MJP Media and Lankhorst-
Hohorst, although both involved money debts held by corporates, neither were 
considered relevant to this dissertation. The question in MJP Media was whether an 
intra-group debt arose from a transaction of the lending of money and therefore should 
be considered a loan relationship. There did not appear to be an avoidance motive 
involved, and instead it comes down to the question of whether the taxpayer could 
evidence whether the debts in question arose from a transaction of the lending of 
money (which they could not). Lankhorst-Hohorst is not considered relevant because it 
is a German tax case and it does not appear to involve tax avoidance. 






APPENDIX B: STATUS OF THE RELEVANT CASES 
Case name Highest Court to 
date 
Victory for Current status 
A.H. Field  UKFTT (2012) HMRC Final427 
Bank of Ireland EWCA Civ (2008) Taxpayer Final428 
Cater Allen  UKFTT (2015) HMRC Final429 
DCC Holdings  UKSC (2010) HMRC Final430 
Fidex  EWCA Civ (2016) HMRC Final431 
GDF Suez Teesside  UKUT (2017) HMRC Awaiting CA 
judgement432 
Greene King EWCA Civ (2016) HMRC Assumed final433 
Iliffe News and 
Media 
UKFTT (2012) Mixed434 Final435 
                                                     
427 As the FTT’s decision was handed down in 2012, it seems reasonable to assume this case is no subject 
to appeal 
428 As CA’s judgement was handed down in 2008, it seems reasonable to assume this case is no subject to 
appeal. 
429 As the FTT’s decision was handed down in 2015, it seems reasonable to assume this case is no subject 
to appeal 
430 As the Supreme Court is the highest court in the UK, this can cannot be subject to further appeal. 
431 As this case is not shown as being subject to appeal in Tax Journal’s Case Tracker and the CA’s 
judgement was handed down in 2016, it seems reasonable to assume this case is no subject to appeal 
(Tax Journal [n 241]). 
432 HM Courts & Tribunals Service, ‘Case Tracker for Civil Appeals [Re: Suez Teesside]’ 
<https://casetracker.justice.gov.uk/getDetail.do?case_id=20171070> accessed 26 May 2018. 
433 As this case is not shown as being subject to appeal in Tax Journal’s Case Tracker and the CA’s 
judgement was handed down in 2016, it seems reasonable to assume this case is no subject to appeal 
(Tax Journal [n 241]). 
434 Overall, the FTT found in favour of HMRC, however, it was a mixed result on Section 441 issue as 
although the FTT found that the taxpayer had an unallowable purpose for being party to the loan 
relationship in question, the FTT found that on a just and reasonable basis, none debits arising from that 
loan relationship were attributable to that unallowable purpose.   
435 As the FTT’s decision was handed down in 2012, it seems reasonable to assume this case is no subject 
to appeal 






Case name Highest Court to 
date 
Victory for Current status 
Smith and 
Nephews  
UKFTT (2017) The taxpayer UT was due to hear 
appeal in June 
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437 Although this case is not shown on Tax Journal’s Case Tracker, as it is not shown as listed as being 
subject to appeal on HM Courts and Tribunals Services website, it appears reasonable to assume that this 
case is no subject to appeal (ibid; ‘Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery) Hearings and Register’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/upper-tribunal-tax-and-chancery-register-of-
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441 BMBF (HL, 2004) (n 45). 
442 Although BMBF is not cited in Lord Walker SCJ’s sole judgement in this case, within the Simon’s Tax 
Cases summary of this case, BMBF is lists as being referred to in the list of authorities. 
443 Notwithstanding that Simon’s Frist Tier Decisions summary of this case indicates that that Ramsay case 
was cited, a review of the decision shows that although Ramsay principle was referred to, the Ramsay 
case was not explicitly cited.   
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444 Notwithstanding that Simon’s Frist Tier Decisions summary of this case indicates that that Ramsay case 
was cited, a review of the decision shows that although Ramsay principle was referred to, the Ramsay 
case was not explicitly cited.   






APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT CASES  
Prior to outlining the analysis for each of the Relevant Cases, the structure of these 
analyses will be briefly considered. As noted in Section II.2.2, these case analyses are 
based on the examples provided in Part D of HMRC’s GAAR Guidance.445 Within Part D, 
HMRC’s analysis of each example is structured as follows.  
1. HMRC provide a summary of the background to the provisions which are 
relevant to the arrangement. 
2. HMRC outlines the facts for each arrangement, noting the relevant 
provisions and the taxpayer’s analysis. 
3. HMRC undertakes a GAAR analysis on the arrangement by considering five 
questions, namely: 
a. Are the substantive results of the arrangements consistent with any 
principles on which the relevant tax provisions are based (whether 
express or implied) and the policy objectives of those provisions? 
b. Do the means of achieving the substantive tax results involve one 
or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
c. Are the arrangements intended to exploit any shortcomings in the 
relevant tax provisions?  
d. Does the arrangement include any of the indicators of abusiveness 
within s207(4) of FA 2013?  
                                                     
445 HMRC, ‘2018 GAAR Guidance’ (n 96). 






e. Do the tax arrangements accord with established practice and has 
HMRC indicated its acceptance of that practice?  
4. Finally, HMRC concludes on whether it is the type of arrangement they 
would seek to use the GAAR to counteract. 
The structure of the case analyses contained within this appendix are similar: 
1. First, the facts of the schemes are outlined, together with the taxpayer’s 
analysis and a brief summary of the outcome of the case. These sections 
are largely based on the judgements of the courts in each of the cases. 
Although analyses do not contain a separate section detailing the 
background of each of the relevant provisions, their purpose is considered 
as part of the GAAR and LR TAAR analyses. 
2. In order to consider whether the GAAR or LR TAAR would apply, six key 
questions are considered. Of these, the first four are the same as the first 
four questions, or slightly shorted versions, contained within HMRC’s 
GAAR analysis. The two additional questions are: 
a. Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, 
CTA 2009? - This question mirrors one of the questions asked within 
HMRC’s analysis (see question (d) above), except it refers to the 
examples Section 455D, rather that the indicators as Section 
207(4). 
b. Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 






In addition to using the facts of the Relevant Cases, when answering 
these questions, particular emphasis is placed on any relevant 
comments made by the judges who heard the cases.  
For completeness, these analyses have been undertaken on the 
assumption that these schemes do not accord with established practice 
and have never been accepted by HMRC. 
3. The final section of the analyses concludes on whether HMRC would look 
to use the GAAR or LR TAAR against the schemes in question. 
D.1 A.H. Field446 
D 1.1 Outline of scheme 
The scheme in this case is relatively simple. A.H. Field (Holdings) Limited (‘Field’) 
was a subsidiary of A.H. Field (Overseas Investments) Limited (‘Overseas’), which in turn 
was owned by A.H. Field (Holding) Jersey Limited (‘Holdings Jersey’). Field borrowed 
£2m for a bank, which was repayable in three days. This cash was used to pay a dividend 
to Overseas, which then paid a dividend to Holdings Jersey. Field then issued Jersey 
Holdings a discounted zero-coupon note (the ‘ZCN’) repayable in 363 days. The ZCN had 
an issue price of £2m and a nominal value of £2.15m. The proceeds from this bond issue 
were used to repay the bank.  
Field claimed a tax deduction in respect of the unwinding of the discount on the 
ZCN. Although Holdings Jersey was taxable on the unwinding of the discount, at the 
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time, the corporation tax rate in the UK was 30%, whereas the corporation tax rate in 
Jersey was only 2%, this structure therefore gave rise to a tax saving of 28%. 
D 1.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.1.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
This question is more complex that it first appears. This is because this case is so 
clearly within the scope of Section 441, to be able to undertake properly a GAAR or LR 
TAAR analysis in accordance with the methodology, it is necessary first to presuppose 
the reasons why Section 441 did not apply. There are two options why this may have 
been the case, either Section 441 did not exist or for some for some technical reason, 
Section 441 could not have been applied. However, the challenge undertaking an 
analysis on the basis of the second presupposition, is that it would depend on the 
reasons why Section 441 did not apply. For instance, is it because of a natural weakness 
in the legislation, 447 or did the taxpayer manipulate the situation to prevent Section 441 
from applying, or something else? Given these challenges, the only reasonable basis to 
undertake a GAAR and LR TAAR analysis appeared to be to assume that Section 441 did 
not exist.  
On the presumption that Section 441 did not exist, taking a deduction for the 
debits arising from the unwinding of the discount on the ZCNs would have been 
consistent with the purposes the loan relationship regime. That is because Fields was 
legally party to a loan relationship, giving rise to accounting debits in its P&L, which 
                                                     
447 It is interesting to note Lord Walker SCJ’s comment in DCC Holdings that HMRC did not seek to apply 
Section 441 in that case “partly it seems because of doubts (since removed by an amendment) as to its 
efficacy” (DCC Holdings (SC, 2010) [n 21] [22]). 






prima facia should be deductible. Notwithstanding the ZCN were put in place with a tax 
avoidance motive in mind, without Section 441, there are no reasons why a deduction 
for such debits should be disallowed.  
This position should be challenged by arguing it would be inconsistent with the 
broader purposes of the tax regime for a deduction to be claimed for a cost that did not 
have a valid business purposes. The difficulty with this position would be that had the 
loan relationship regime lacked Section 441 (or an equivalent), then relying on that 
deficit would not be seeking to exploit a shortcoming or ‘loop-hole’ but merely relying 
on the legislation applying as intended.    
D.1.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
Although the taxpayer sought to argue that it had a commercial purpose for 
putting the ZCNs into place, the FTT found a lack of evidential support for this argument. 
Furthermore, the FTT found that “the structure set in place was largely self-
cancelling.”448 As such, the answer to this question should be yes. 
D.1.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
On the presumption that Section 441 did not exist, then the answer would 
probably be no, the scheme did not exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions. For 
without Section 441, the debits arising from a loan relationship would not need to be 
tested to determine if that relationship had an allowable purpose. 
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D.1.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
No, from the taxpayer’s point of view, the unwinding of the discount on the ZCNs 
gave rise to a commercial cost, for which a deduction was claimed. Even from a group 
perspective, the deduction claimed by Fields should have been offset set by matching 
income in Holdings Jersey, which were not subject to UK corporation tax.  
D.1.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Again, the answer is no, for the reasons outlined above in respect of Section 
207(4).  
D.1.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Given the analysis of AH Fields is being undertaken on the presumption that 
Section 441 did not exist when the transaction was entered into, this question is no 
longer relevant. That said, the FTT did find that the “ZCN had as one of its main purposes 
the obtaining of a tax advantage, namely the tax deductions available in the UK for the 
discount element of the ZCN.”449 
D 1.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.1.3(a) GAAR 
Although there was limited commercial rationale for entering into the scheme 
and, in effect, it was circular, in the event that Section 441 did not exist, the GAAR is 
unlikely to have applied. This is because none of the indicators of lists at Section 207(4) 
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are present and the outcome of the scheme was consistent with the purpose of the 
relevant provisions (in the absent of Section 441).  
D.1.3(b) LR TAAR 
In the absence of Section 441, the outcome of the scheme would have been 
consistent with the purposes of the loan relationship regime and none of the examples 
which would indicate non-exclusion were present. As such, the TAAR is unlikely to be 
applicable. 
D.2 Bank of Ireland Britain450 
D 2.1 Outline of scheme 
The taxpayer in this case was Bank of Ireland Britain Holdings Limited (‘BH’), which 
was a UK subsidiary of Bank of Ireland (‘BI’), an Irish resident company. This scheme was 
sold by the Morgan Stanley group, and involved two Cayman Island companies within 
the Morgan Stanley group, MSDW Birkdale Limited (‘Birkdale’) and its subsidiary MSDW 
Portrush Limited (‘Portrush’). The scheme involved the following: 
1. Portrush issued preference shares to Birkdale for consideration of £225m. 
2. On 10 November 2000, Birkdale, BI and BH agreed to enter into a tripartite 
sale and repurchase agreement in respect of the Portrush preference 
shares. 
3. On 14 November 2000 BI acquired the preference shares from Birkdale for 
£225m. During the period that BI owned the preference shares, it received 
£3.6m of dividends. 
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4. On 23 February 2001 BI sold the preference shares to BH for £225m.451 
During the period that BH owned the preference shares, it received £0.4m 
of dividends. 
5. On 5 March 2001, Birkdale repurchased the preference shares for £225m 
plus the equivalent of 8.3% p.a. interest and breakage costs, less the 
dividends received by BI and BH divided by 0.7. The scheme was designed 
to ensure that these adjustments cancelled each other out such that the 
repurchase price was £225m. 
BH sought to argue that the tax legislation worked such that it should be treated 
as making a deductible deemed manufactured payment of £4m (i.e. 8.3% pa interest on 
the deemed loan from Birkdale), whereas it should only be taxed on the dividend it 
received giving rise to a net deduction of £3.6m. Interestingly, this is one of the few 
cases where the taxpayer succeeded in their argument that the scheme gave rise to the 
desired result, with the Court of Appeal finding that: 
it is true that in this case a tripartite scheme has been devised which 
takes advantage of a mis match between the two sets subsections. … 
But I do not consider that there is any legitimate process of 
interpretation which seeks to solve the revenue’s problem.452 
                                                     
451 Under the terms of the preference shares, dividends were payable monthly, with the directors of 
Portrush having the discretion to pay special dividends at other times. These provisions were used during 
the scheme, such the when BH and BI sold the preference shares, they would receive a special dividend 
such that in total, the dividends accruing during their period of ownership were paid to them. 
452 Bank of Ireland (CA, 2008) (n 19) [44]. 






D 2.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.2.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
No, the Court of Appeal considered that the relevant legislation was designed to 
mirror the economic substance of the arrangement, that is to say, as if the repo gave 
rise to a loan. If BH was taxed in such a way, it would have realised a profit of £0.4m. 
However, as this scheme allowed BH to claim a deduction for a net loss of £3.6m, the 
result was not consistent with the purpose of the relevant legislation. 
D.2.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
Although the Court of Appeal’s judgement does not refer to why the scheme was 
entered into, based in the facts of the case, it seems reasonable assume that this scheme 
was contrived.  
D.2.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
Yes, Collins LJ found that this is a case where “a tripartite scheme has been devised 
which takes advantage of a mismatch between two sets of section.”453 
D.2.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, the indicator listed at Section 207(4)(a) and (b) were relevant as the scheme 
allowed the company to claim a net deduction of £3.6m, whereas, in reality it made an 
economic profit of £0.4m. 
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D.2.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, the examples listed at Section 455D(1)(a) and (b), for the reasons noted in 
respect of Section 207(4). 
D.2.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Although not mentioned by the Court of Appeal, given the scheme, it is likely that 
had there been a deemed loan relationship between BH and Birkdale, it would have had 
an unallowable purpose. 
D 2.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.2.3(a) GAAR 
HMRC are likely to have sought to use the GAAR against the scheme in this case as 
it clearly sought to exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions and enabled BH to 
claim a loss of £3.6m, whereas, it realised a gain of £0.4m 
D.2.3(b) LR TAAR 
HMRC are likely to have sought to use the LR TAAR against the scheme in this case 
for the reasons mentioned in respect of the GAAR. 
D.3 Cater Allen454 
D 3.1 Outline of scheme 
The taxpayer in this case, Abbey National Treasury Services plc (‘ANTS), was a 
subsidiary of a Spanish bank, Banco Santander SA (‘Santander’). Prior to entering into 
the scheme, ANTS had acquired two mortgage-backed floating-rate securities (‘FRSs’) 
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worth a total of €4.9bn from Santander for commercial reasons.  As part of the scheme, 
in March 2007 ANTS and Santander entered into a sale and repurchase agreement455 
whereby ANTS sold the right to receive the interest accruing on the FRSs between 
January 2007 to July 2007 for €86m, with a repurchase date of no later than 2 July 2007 
(the ‘Repo’). During the period of the Repo, two interest payments were received by 
ANTS totalling €78m, which were passed onto Santander. ANTS then repurchased the 
right to receive the interest arising for €6m. 
From an accounting perspective, ANTS was treated as continuing to be entitled to 
receive the income arising from the FRSs throughout the period of the Repo and the 
amount received by ANTS upon entering into the Repo was treated as secured loan. As 
ANTS continued to reconsider the FRSs on its balance sheet, the interest received by 
ANTS during the Repo period gave rise to a P&L credit. 
ANTS sought to argue that the interest income it received was not taxable. 
Although ANTS submitted a number of arguments to support its position, there were 
two main ones. Firstly, the interest paid on the FRSs did not belong to ANTS and, 
secondly, the transaction should be taxed in accordance with its legal form. The FTT 
rejected ANTS’s argument and found that the interest received by ANTS from the FRSs 
did give rise to taxable income. 
                                                     
455 For completeness, the repurchase of the FRSs by ANTS was ensured as a result of the existence of cross 
options between ANTS and Santander, rather than the repurchase being pre-contracted.   






D 3.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.3.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
No, the taxpayer’s analysis led to a result which would have been inconsistent with 
the relevant provision. The taxpayer in this case sought to avoid needing to bring into 
account credits for tax purposes because they related to interest income that does not 
legally belong to ANTS. This can be contrasted with the FTT finding that the starting point 
for determining a company’s loan relationship profits are those shown in its accounts 
and that “it is only in relatively unusual circumstances the tax legislation should move 
away from that.”456 
D.3.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
The FTT’s decision does not specifically comment on whether the taxpayer 
undertook this scheme for commercial reasons and banks do enter repo transactions for 
bona fide commercial reasons. That said, the FTT does note that the scheme was 
notifiable to HMRC under the DOTAS regime, which would indicate that this scheme was 
at least partly tax driven. Given the lack of specific evidence it is difficult to conclude on 
this point, however, for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the main reason 
ANTS entered into the Repo was the anticipated tax benefit.  
D.3.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
The purpose of the loan relationship regime is to bring into account for tax 
purposes the accounting profit or loss arising from loan relationships. Given that repo 
transactions are accounted for in accordance with their economic substance, as 
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opposed to their legal form, the loan relationship regime includes specific provisions to 
ensure that their treatment for tax purposes is aligned to how they are accounted for. 
For instance, Paragraph 16, Schedule 9, FA 1996 provides that the legal disposal of a 
loan relationship under a repo agreement is not considered a related transaction. The 
taxpayer in this case sought to exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provision by arguing 
the interest income it recognised in its accounts could not be brought into account 
because that interest did not arise from a loan relationship it was legally party to. 
However, it appears clear that the relevant provisions were intended to bring that 
interest income into tax.  
D.3.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, specifically the example at Section 207(4)(a) as, on the taxpayer’s analysis, 
although commercially it generated a profit from the interest it received, it did not need 
to bring all of the income into tax.  
D.3.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, specifically the example at 455D(1)(a), for the same reasons as in respect of 
Section 207(4)(a). 
D.3.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Although the FTT acknowledged that ANTS acquired the FRNs from Santander for 
commercial reasons, the FTT’s decision does not comment on whether ANTS also had a 






commercial reason for entering into the repo. In any case, given that this scheme sought 
to prevent interest income from being taxable, Section 441 was not relevant. 
D 3.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.3.3(a) GAAR 
On the assumption that ANTS did not have a good commercial reason for entering 
into the repo, it is likely that the GAAR would have applied to the scheme in this case, 
as it is clearly designed to allow the taxpayer to prevent a tax charge arising on the 
interest income it received on the FRNs. 
D.3.3(b) LR TAAR 
For similar reasons, it is likely that the LR TAAR would have applied. Although the 
LR TAAR does not specifically refer to ‘shortcomings’, given that the scheme is clearly 
intended to exploit a shortcoming in the loan relationship regime, it is would be difficult 
to argue that the overall result is consistent with the purposes of the loan relationship 
regime. 
D.4 DCC Holdings457 
D 4.1 Outline of scheme 
The scheme in this case, like in Bank of Ireland, involved the use of a repo.  DCC 
Holdings (UK) Limited (‘DCC’) undertook a series of transactions with Bank X (an 
overseas bank), in which DCC purchased gilts from Bank X for a total of £812.2m, with 
Bank X agreeing to repurchase the gilts for £785.2m approximately 18 ½ days later. 
Under the terms of the repo, DCC was entitled to retain any interest paid on the gilts 
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during its period of ownership, although the repurchase price would be reduced by the 
interest received. During DCC’s ownership, it received £28.8m of interest from the gilts. 
The net result of these transactions was that DCC made a commercial profit of £1.8m. 
The taxation of these transactions can be split into three elements. Firstly, how 
should the difference between the original purchase price and the repurchase price be 
brought into tax? In this regard, both DCC and HMRC agreed that when calculating the 
profit or loss arising to DCC, the interest received by DCC needed to be added to the 
repurchase price, such that DCC made a net taxable profit of £1.8m. Secondly, as under 
the relevant statutory provisions DCC was treated as paying a ‘deemed manufactured 
dividend’ equal to the interest received on the gilts; how should this deemed 
manufactured dividend should be brought into account? DCC sought to argue that under 
the relevant provisions, the whole of the deemed manufactured dividend should be 
treated as deductible. Thirdly, how should the interest income received by DCC be 
taxed? DCC sought to argue that as it only had beneficial ownership of the gilts for a 
short period of time, under an accrual’s basis of accounting, it only needed to recognise 
the element of the interest which accrued during its ownership. This lead to the 
conclusion that DCC should only be required to bring into tax £2.9m of interest income, 
rather than the £28.8m it in fact received. Had DCC been successful in asserting its 
arguments, then it would have been able to claim a deduction for the whole deemed 
manufactured dividend, but only taxed on an element of the interest it received from 
the gilts. 
HMRC successfully challenged this scheme by arguing that the amounts 
recognised by DCC did not ‘fairly represent’ the profits arising to DCC from its loan 






relationships. In the Supreme Court, Lord Walker considered “that the majority of the 
Court of Appeal were right to see the overwhelming need for a symmetrical solution”458 
whereby the taxable debits from the deemed manufactured dividend equalled the 
credits arising from the interest received on the gilts.  
D 4.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.4.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
Lord Walker SCL, who gave the sole judgement in the Supreme Court, considered 
that the purpose of the relevant provisions was to tax the economic substance of the 
repo. That is to say, the relevant provisions were designed to apply in such a way that 
DCC Holding should be taxed on the £1.8m of income it generated. However, the scheme 
was designed to give rise to DCC Holding obtaining a net deduction of £24.1m, a result 
which was inconsistent with the relevant provisions.  
D.4.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
As the repo agreement were only outstanding for a short period of time (an 
average of 18 ½ days), it seems reasonable to assume this scheme contained contrived 
steps. 
D.4.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
Given that Lord Walker SCJ described the result of DCC Holding’s analysis as 
absurd, it seems clear that the scheme was designed to exploit a shorting coming in the 
relevant provisions. Specifically, it was designed to exploit inconsistences between how 
the repo rules operated and the accruals basis of accounting. 
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D.4.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, the indicator listed at Section 207(4)(a) and (b), as it was designed to allow 
DCC Holdings to claim a net deduction of £24.1m, whereas, in reality it made an 
economic profit of £1.9m. 
D.4.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, the examples listed at Section 455D(1)(a) and (b), for the reasons noted in 
respect of Section 207(4). 
D.4.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Lord Walker SCJ indicated that HMRC decided not to invoke Paragraph 13 in this 
case because of they had doubts whether Paragraph 13 was effective. 
D 4.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.4.3(a) GAAR 
HMRC are likely to have sought to use the GAAR in the case because it attempted 
to exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions and enabled the DCC Holdings to 
claim a large tax deduction when in fact the company made an economic profit from the 
arrangement. 
D.4.3(b) LR TAAR 
HMRC are likely to have sought to use the LR TAAR in this case for the reasons 
outline above in respect of the GAAR. 







D 5.1 Outline of scheme 
This case involved a tax avoidance scheme designed by Swiss Re and involving 
Fidex Limited (‘Fidex’), a company in the BNP Paribas Group. Under the scheme Fidex, a 
company which held a loan portfolio, issued five classes of preference shares to Swiss 
Re, the terms of which gave Swiss Re, 95% of the economic rights arising from Fidex’s 
loan portfolio. At the time the shares were issued, Fidex’s accounts were prepared under 
UK GAAP. At the end of 2005, Fidex decided to convert from UK GAAP to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’). As, under the terms of the preference shares, 95% 
of the economic rights associated with the loan portfolio were transferred to Swiss Re, 
upon conversion to IFRS Fidex was required to de-recognise 95% of the loan portfolio 
from its balance sheet.  
Under the loan relationship regime, upon conversion to IFRS, if the value of an 
asset or liability changes, then the resulting debit or credit is to be brought into account 
for tax purposes. In Fidex’s case, converting to IFRS gave rise to a €84m debit, which was 
treated as deductible. 
HMRC challenged this scheme by arguing that Fidex had both an allowable 
purpose and an unallowable purpose for holding the loan portfolio at the time of the 
scheme, with the whole debit arising upon conversion to IFRS attributable to that 
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unallowable purpose, such that the debit was non-deductible as a result of Paragraph 
13. The FTT agreed with HMRC’s analysis in this regard. 
D 5.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.5.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
The purpose of Paragraph 19A, appears to be to ensure that when a company 
converts to IFRS any credit or debit arising as a result of the conversion are subject to 
tax. This provision is necessary to ensure that either a non-taxable credit (which would 
be to the detriment of HMRC) or a non-deductible debit (which would be to the 
detriment of the taxpayer) does not arise. There is an argument that this scheme is 
consistent with the purpose of this provision as the debit in question only arises as a 
result of conversion to IFRS, albeit the decision to convert was tax driven. 
However, this argument appears to be over reliant on taking a narrow view of the 
purpose of Paragraph 19A, given the specific transaction was designed to ensure that 
only debits arose. A broader view of this paragraph would see its purpose as ensuring 
that all debits and credits arising from loan relationships are brought into account where 
discontinuities could arise as a result of conversion. In effect, this is an attempt to ensure 
a ‘fair’ result arises upon conversion to IFRS. Although when it comes to tax matters, 
there is a broad range of views as to what is fair, the view that this scheme gave rise to 
an unfair tax result would be difficult to contest. As such, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the outcome of this scheme was not consistent with the purpose of 
Paragraph 19A.  






D.5.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
As this scheme was specifically designed to give rise to a tax deduction and there 
does not appear to be a commercial purpose for issuing the preference shares, this 
scheme should be considered wholly contrived. This position is further supported by the 
Court of Appeal’s finding that the “debit arose from and was entirely attributable to 
Project Zephyr [the code name of the transaction]. But for this tax avoidance scheme 
there would have been no debit at all.”460  
D.5.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
It would be difficult to argue that this scheme exploited a ‘shortcoming’ in 
Paragraph 19A. Although arguably this paragraph was designed to produce a 
symmetrical result, whereas the scheme produced an asymmetrical result, it would 
appear reasonable to assume that the parliamentary draughtsman should have 
contemplated that some companies would convert to IFRS solely to obtain a tax benefit. 
Consequently, it seems unreasonable to conclude that the failure of this provision to 
prevent this kind of tax avoidance arrangement arose from the exploitation of a 
shortcoming. 
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D.5.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, this scheme “delivered a trading loss equal to the reduction in value of the 
bonds, without any economic loss being suffered.”461 This language mirrors the language 
contained within Section 207(4)(a). 
D.5.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, for the reasons outlined above in respect of Section 207, this scheme exhibits 
the example listed at Section 455D(1)(a) 
D.5.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
The Court of Appeal was “content to assume that Fidex would have held the bonds 
from the start of 2005 [the first year Fidex prepared its accounts under IFRS] irrespective 
of the unallowable purpose” arising from the scheme.462 
D 5.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.5.3(a) GAAR 
This is the type of scheme to which HMRC would look to apply the GAAR. It would 
be difficult to argue that the scheme could reasonably be regarded as a reasonable 
course of action in relation to Paragraph 19A. This is because the issuance of the 
preference shares was clearly designed to allow most of Fidex’s loan portfolio to be 
derecognised on conversion to IFRS and therefore produce a deductible debit.  
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D.5.3(b) LR TAAR 
Given that it would be challenging to argue that the result of this scheme is 
reasonably consistent with the purpose of the relevant provisions, HMRC would likely 
use the LR TAAR to try to counteract it, particularly given that the scheme appears to be 
the embodiment of one of the examples in Section 455D (namely 455D(1)(a)). 
D.6 Greene King463 
D 6.1 Outline of scheme464 
The scheme in Greene King involved three companies within the Greene King 
group, Greene King PLC (‘PLC’), Greene King Brewing and Retailing Limited (‘GKBR’, a 
direct subsidiary of PLC) and Greene King Acquisitions Limited (‘GKA‘, an indirect 
subsidiary of PLC). At the time of the transaction, there was a £300m interest bearing 
debt between PLC, as lender, and GKBR, as borrower (the ‘Loan’). Under the terms of 
the scheme, PLC assigned the right to receive the interest payable on the Loan to GKA 
in exchange for an issue of preference shares. GKA accounted for this transaction as 
giving rise to a receivable in respect of the interest due from GKBR with the associated 
credit going to share capital and share premium. Within PLC’s accounts, the loan 
continued to be held at its face value of £300m. Thereafter, GKBR paid £21.3m to GKA 
in respect of the assigned interest, which was treated as a repayment of the interest 
receivable with the excess of £800k giving rise to a P&L credit. 465 
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HMRC sought to challenge this scheme on multiple grounds. In respect of PLC, it 
argued that PLC should have partially derecognised the loan to reflect its net present 
value (‘NPV’) at the time of the assignment. HMRC argued that this derecognition did 
not give rise to a deductible debit as the debit should have increased PLC’s investment 
in GKA, rather than being treated as a P&L debit (PLC’s accounting expert witness agreed 
with HMRC’s accounting expert on this point466). The subsequent increase in the NPV of 
the Loan over its remaining life would have given rise to taxable income in PLC. The Court 
of Appeal agreed that PLC should have partially derecognise the Loan in its accounts, 
thereby prevented this scheme from producing the desired tax saving. 
This case is discussed further at Section VI.6.1. 
D 6.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.6.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
It would be difficult to argue that the outcome of the scheme was consistent with 
the underlying purpose of the loan relationship regime as a whole since it gave rise to a 
situation where £20.5 million of interest expense was deductible in one group company, 
but the associated interest income was not taxable in another. 
D.6.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
The Court of Appeal judgement references no commercial purpose for the scheme 
and, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the scheme was designed solely for 
the purposes of avoiding tax. 
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D.6.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
Although the overall result of the scheme is not consistent with the underlying 
purpose of the loan relationship regime, it would be difficult to argue that this scheme 
exploited a shortcoming in the relevant provisions. The reason the assignment of the 
interest did not give rise to a taxable credit in GKA was that Section 84(2)(a) specifically 
states that credits which go to share premium do not need to be brought into account. 
Although it seems reasonable to assume that this section was not designed to facilitate 
a scheme such as this one, the outcome of the scheme for GKA is perfectly consistent 
with the intention of this section (on a plain reading of the legislation). 
D.6.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, the scheme was clearly designed to produce an abusive result because, had 
the scheme not been undertaken the full £21.3m would have been taxable rather than 
only £800k. This result is clearly within the scope of Section 207(4)(a). 
D.6.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, for the same reasons as in respect of Section 207(4)(a), the scheme exhibits 
the example listed at 455D(1)(a). 






D.6.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Although Section 441 could potentially be in point, in so far as the deductibility of 
the debits arising in GKBR could be challenged, the FTT noted in their judgement that 
GKBR was party to the loan for good commercial reasons.467 
The Court of Appeal found that PLC should have derecognised a proportion of the 
Loan when it assigned the interest to GKA. It was their view that the corresponding debit 
should have gone to investments (i.e. the balance sheet) rather than to the P&L. Had 
the debit gone to P&L then potentially Section 441 would have been in point, however, 
as noted above, the FTT found that PLC had a good commercial purpose for being party 
to the Loan. 
D 6.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.6.3(a) GAAR 
HMRC would most likely seek to apply the GAAR to schemes like this one. The 
result of the scheme is clearly abusive and given that there does not seem to be any 
commercial rationale for undertaking it, this is exactly type of scheme that HMRC 
designed the GAAR to counteract. 
D.6.3(b) LR TAAR 
This scheme would clearly be within the scope of the LR TAAR. Although HMRC 
was able to successfully challenge it, had the LR TAAR been in force at the time it was 
implemented, HMRC would have found it significantly easier. Indeed, had the LR TAAR 
been in force it would have been unlikely that the scheme would have been 
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implemented due to the likelihood of the LR TAAR applying. HMRC succeeded in the 
Court of Appeal, not on the basis of a legal argument, but rather on the basis that it 
found that as a matter of fact PLC had not adopted the correct accounting treatment.  
D.7 Iliffe468 
D 7.1 Outline of scheme 
Iliffe involved a scheme designed to shift profits to Iliffe News & Media Limited 
(‘INML’) from its subsidiaries. Both INML and its subsidiaries were tax resident in the UK. 
The desire to shift profits to INML was commercially driven as having profitable 
subsidiaries increased the risks of competitors entering the market and risked giving 
more leverage for the unions to use in wage negotiations. The profits were shifted into 
INML as a result of the subsidiaries transferred the unregistered trademarks they held 
to INML at net book value (which was nominal), then acquired a 5-year licence to use 
those trademarks from INML for up-front premium using cash lent to them by INML.  
A tax benefit arose from this scheme as a result of the fact that relicensing the 
trademarks to the subsidiaries gave rise to the intellectual property (‘IP’) becoming New 
IP for the purposes of the Intangible Fixed Assets Regime Part 9, CTA 2009 (i.e. it was 
created on or after 1 April 2002) in the hands of the subsidiaries and therefore they 
could claim a deduction for the amortisation of the premium. On the other hand, the IP 
remained Old IP for INML and therefore, the premium it received was treated as giving 
rise to a part disposal of the IP, which did not give rise to a tax charge as a result of 
Section 171, the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992.  
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HMRC challenged the effectiveness of this scheme on multiple grounds including 
by using non-tax arguments concerning IP law and Company IP. From a technical 
perspective, HMRC sought to argue that the anti-avoidance provision at Paragraph 111, 
FA 2002 applied as a result of the scheme having as one of its main purposes a tax 
avoidance motive. The application of Paragraph 111 would result in the subsidiaries not 
being able to claim a deduction for the amortisation of the premium. The FTT found in 
favour of HMRC for a number of reasons, including that the transfer of the IP to INML in 
the first place was void because unregistered trademarks can only be transferred along 
with the goodwill of the business to which they relate. Furthermore, the FTT found that 
even if the transfer was valid, Paragraph 111 would have applied as a result of the 
scheme having as one of its main purposes a tax avoidance motive, and therefore, the 
amortisation of the premium in the subsidiaries would not have been deductible.  
Although this scheme primarily involved the transfer of an intangible fixed asset, 
it also considers one loan relationship point, namely, did Paragraph 13 apply to deny the 
subsidiaries a deduction for the interest payable to INML on the loan used to fund the 
payment of the premium paid to acquire a licence to use the IP? On this point, the FTT 
found in favour of the taxpayer, finding that although the loan relationship has an 
unallowable purpose, it also had an allowable purpose and on a just and reasonable 
basis all of the debits should be attributed to that allowable purpose. Consequently, the 
application of Paragraph 13 did not prevent the subsidiaries claiming a deduction for the 
interest they paid to INML. 






D 7.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
Note: the below summary is only concerned with the loan relationship aspects of 
this case.  
D.7.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
On the basis that Paragraph 13 did not apply to this debt, then allowing the 
subsidiaries to claim a deduction for the interest they paid to INML would be perfectly 
consistent with the relevant provisions. Assuming that there were not trapped losses in 
INML, then although the subsidiaries were able to claim a deduction for interest paid, 
INML was required to recognise an equal amount of interest income.   
D.7.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
Although the FTT found certain aspects of the scheme were altered to ensure that 
a tax benefit was obtained, these alterations did not affect the nature of the loan 
relationships. Therefore, although the scheme as a whole may have contained abnormal 
steps, those steps are not relevant to the loan relationship analysis. 
D.7.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
No, for the reasons noted above, the loan relationship provisions applied as 
expected in this case.  
D.7.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
No, although the subsidiaries were able to claim a deduction for the interest 
arising on the debits, the deduction was equal to the economic loss they suffered. 
Furthermore, that income was fully taxable in the hands of INML. 






D.7.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
No, for the same reasons as mentioned in respect of Section 207(4). 
D.7.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
The FTT found that the subsidiaries had both allowable and unallowable purposes 
for being party to the debt. However, on a just and reasonable basis, the debits arising 
were wholly attributable to the allowable purpose and therefore, no disallowance arose.  
D 7.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.7.3(a) GAAR 
HMRC are unlikely to have sought to use the GAAR to counteract the loan 
relationship aspects of this case. This is because the ability of the subsidiaries to claim a 
deduction for interest arising on the debit is consistent with the purposes of the loan 
relationship regime and the loan relationship aspects of this case are not contrived.  
D.7.3(b) LR TAAR 
HMRC are unlikely to have sought to use the LR TAAR against the scheme in this 
case for the reasons outlined above in respect of the GAAR. 
D.8 Smith & Nephew469  
D 8.1 Outline of scheme 
Although the scheme in this case gave rise to a deductible foreign exchange loss 
in three companies within the Smith & Nephew group (the ‘SN Group’) headed by Smith 
& Nephew PLC (‘SN PLC’), given that the transactions undertaken by each were broadly 
                                                     
469 Smith and Nephew (FTT, 2017) (n 16). 






similar, this summary focuses on the transactions undertaken by the lead taxpayer, 
Smith & Nephew Overseas Limited (‘SN Overseas’). 
SN Overseas would have been a dormant company, except for the fact that it held 
an interest free receivable of £1.63bn due from Smith & Nephew Investment Holdings 
Limited (‘SNIH’). Although SNIH was incorporated in the Cayman Islands, at the material 
times it was UK tax resident. At the time, the SN Group had two main trading groups. 
The first, comprised of the group’s international operations, used US dollars as its 
functional currency, with the second ‘UK sub group’ comprising of its UK operations, 
using sterling at its functional currency. 
The first step involved SNIH selling SN Overseas to SN PLC for cash. This resulted 
in SN Overseas functional currency changing from sterling to US dollars as it moved out 
of the UK sub group. The second step of the scheme involved PLC transferring the shares 
of another group company to SN Overseas, which had the effect of reducing SN 
Overseas’s net intra-group receivable to $200k.470 As a result of changing functional 
currencies, SN Overseas recognised a foreign exchange loss of $877m, which it claimed 
a deduction for. HMRC challenged the deductibility of this loss on three grounds: firstly, 
SN Overseas accounts were not GAAP compliant; secondly, it loss was not an ‘exchange 
loss’ for the purpose of Section 103, FA 1996; and thirdly, the loss did not fairly represent 
the losses arising to the company from its loan relationships. The FTT found in favour of 
SN Overseas on all three grounds. 
                                                     
470 The FFT’s decision does not explain the precise mechanism by which the effect was produced.  






In addition to outlining the facts of this case, it may be informative to explore some 
of the background. Prior to entering into the scheme, SNIH wrote to HMRC to seek 
clearance that it could waive the loan between SNIH and SN Overseas without giving rise 
to adverse tax consequences. Self considered that: 
the proposed transaction appears to have been a sensible proposal: the 
balances would be waived, with no taxable credits or allowance debits 
for loan relationship purposes, and with the debt waivers being 
disregarded for capital gains tax purposes. In other words, the balance 
sheets would be tidied up on a tax neutral basis.471 
Although HMRC confirmed that no taxable loan relationship credits or debits 
would arise if the debt was waived, they refused to grant clearance that the transaction 
would be ignored for capital gains tax purposes. As a result, the SN Group considered 
alternative methods to eliminate the debt.  
Initially, PwC came up with a ‘proposal’ which would have resulted in 
tax deductible losses. The proposal involved moving the subsidiaries 
into another part of the group, with US dollar functional currency, and 
then entering into a ‘non-hedging derivative transaction’. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the PwC proposal was considered to be too complex 
and to give rise to a high risk of HMRC challenge. 472 
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It was only at this point that SN Group decided to enter into the scheme 
considered by the FTT.  
D 8.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.8.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
The FTT found that the provisions dealing with foreign exchange gains and loss are 
designed to tax arithmetical differences arising when translating amounts from one 
currency to another currency at different points in time. Given that the FTT found that 
the foreign exchange losses in this case arose as a result of factors outside of the group’s 
control, obtaining a deduction appears consistent with the purposes of the relevant 
legislation. 
D.8.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
As this question was not relevant to the matters discussed by the FTT, it made no 
relevant comments in this regard. Although the scheme was designed to achieve a 
commercial purpose, it seems reasonable to assume that elements of it were changed 
to ensure that it achieved the desired tax benefits. 
D.8.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
If the FTT’s view of the purpose of the relevant provisions are upheld, then the 
results of this scheme were consistent with the relevant provisions and, therefore, this 
scheme did not seek to exploit any shortcomings in the relevant provisions. 






D.8.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
To answer this question, one must first answer what Section 207(4)(b) means 
when it refers to an economic loss. Although these foreign exchange losses were 
recognised in the taxpayer’s accounts, they did not give rise to a loss in the group’s 
consolidated accounts. This would point to no economic loss incurring. However, if one 
accepts the FTT’s finding that the relevant provisions are designed to tax arithmetical 
differences, then the taxpayers are simply claiming a deduction for such a difference. 
Following the FTT’s logic would lead to the conclusion that none of the indicators of 
abusiveness are present, however, this conclusion is open to question. 
D.8.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
The most likely answer is no, for the reasons given in respect of Section 2017(4)(b). 
For completeness, there is an argument that the example listed at Section 455D(d) is 
present as this scheme is designed to ensure that the taxpayers changed their functional 
currency to US dollars. However, there is a counter argument that this did not affect 
how the loan relationship was accounted for; it simply affects the basis on which the 
taxpayer prepares its accounts.  
D.8.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
As HMRC did not raise Paragraph 13 before the FTT, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the debts were not held for an unallowable purpose. 






D 8.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.8.3(a) GAAR 
Given the position of the FTT, it would be challenging to argue that one cannot 
reasonably hold the position that obtaining a deduction for these foreign exchange 
losses is consistent with the relevant provisions. As such, HMRC would be unlikely to 
apply the GAAR to the scheme in this case. 
D.8.3(b) LR TAAR 
Although, given the shift of the burden of proof in LR TAAR cases, it seems slightly 
more likely that HMRC would seek to use it to challenge this scheme, to do so, HMRC 
would need to robustly challenge the FTT’s view of the relevant legislation. 
D.9 Stagecoach473 
D 9.1 Outline of scheme474 
At the time the scheme was entered into, one company within the group, 
Stagecoach Holdings Limited (“Holdings”), was technically insolvent and, as part of the 
scheme, Stagecoach Group PLC (“Group”) sought to recapitalise it using a Forward 
Subscription Agreement (“FSA”). At the time, there was a loan of £88m between Group, 
as creditor, and its direct subsidiary Stagecoach Transport Holdings PLC (“Transport”), 
as debtor (the “Loan”). Under the FSA, Group contributed capital to Holdings of £20k 
plus a sum equal to 22.4% of the amount of the Loan which was repaid, capped at a total 
contribution of £20m, in exchange for Holdings issuing shares to its parent, The 
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Integrated Transport Company Limited (“ITCO”, a direct subsidiary of Transport). Upon 
entering into the FSA, under the relevant accounting standards, Group was required to 
derecognise c.£20m of the Loan (i.e. the element of loan due to be contributed to 
Holdings475). This derecognition gave rise to a credit to loan receivables, with the 
corresponding debit going to investments.476 
Group sought to argue that, notwithstanding the debit arising from the 
derecognition went to the balance sheet and therefore did not give rise to a P&L 
expense, Section 320, CTA 2009 provides that such LR debits should be brought into 
account as if they were P&L debit. 
HMRC challenged the deductibility of the debit arising in Group from the 
derecognition of the Loan, for two main reasons. Firstly, HMRC argued that the debit did 
not arise ‘in respect’ of a loan relationship and therefore did not fall to be taxed in 
accordance with the loan relationship regime. Secondly, they argued that even if the 
debit fell to be taxed under the loan relationship regime, Section 320 was subject to the 
‘fairly represent’ rule at Section 307(3) and, therefore, as the debit did not ‘fairly 
represent’ a loss accruing to Group from its loan relationship, it should not be considered 
deductible. The FTT found in favour of HMRC on both of these points. 
                                                     
475 For completeness, £19,736k was derecognised rather than £19,980k (i.e. £20m less £20k). This 
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This case is discussed further at Section VI.6.2. 
D 9.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.9.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
As Ghosh points out, the purpose of this section is to allow a company to take a 
tax deduction for financing costs where the relevant accounting standards require those 
financing costs to be capitalised as part of the cost of a fixed asset.477 Consequently, it 
would be difficult to argue that the purpose of Section 320 is to allow a company a 
deduction for the derecognition of a loan in this type of situation. 
This position is further supported by the fact that shortly after the scheme was 
implemented, The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, David Gauke MP, announced 
new legislation to prevent this type of scheme from being effective, which had 
immediate effect.478 
D.9.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
Although the FTT found that the scheme was designed to crystallise a tax benefit, 
the scheme also achieved a commercial purpose, namely, the recapitalisation of 
Holdings. Although they found that this recapitalisation could have been undertaken via 
alternative means, it did accept that “these [alternatives] may have been 
administratively more complex.”479 That said, they found no commercial reason “for 
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specifying the consideration for the shares by reference to a calculation of a proportion 
of the loan proceeds.”480 
As a result, the linking of the consideration payable for the shares with the interest 
payable on the Loan, should be considered an abnormal step. 
D.9.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
Arguably, the scheme in this case sought to exploit two shortcomings in the 
relevant provisions. The first was, on the taxpayer’s argument, that Section 320 allows 
a deduction to be obtained for the debit arising on the derecognition of the Loan, even 
though that debit went to the balance sheet. As noted above, the purpose of this section 
was to allow a company to take a deduction for capitalised interest, and therefore, the 
taxpayer would have needed to exploit a shortcoming in Section 320 to obtain this 
deduction. On the other hand, it could be argued that the taxpayer merely relied on how 
the section applied, and if HMRC wished to restrict the use of Section 320 to capitalised 
interest, it should have drafted the language of Section 320 differently.  
The second shortcoming the taxpayer sought was that when a debit is treated as 
deductible as a result of Section 320, that debit is not subject to the fairly represents 
requirement.  
D.9.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, the taxpayer in this case sought to claim a deduction for a loss where, from 
an economic perspective, no actual loss arises, which is an example of the indication 
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listed at Section 207(4)(b). This position is based on the FTT’s finding that the relevant 
debit “[p]roperly analysed … enhance[d] the assets of the subsidiaries”.481  
D.9.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, this scheme gives rise to a result which mirrors the example at Section 
455D(1)(b) for the reason outlined above in respect of Section 207(4)(b).  
D.9.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
As a finding of fact, the FTT found that the Loan was entered into for good 
commercial purposes. This fact was not in dispute and accepted by counsel for HMRC.  
D 9.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.9.3(a) GAAR 
Although HMRC would have most likely sought to use the GAAR to challenge the 
scheme in this case, once could make an argument that it could be considered a 
reasonable course of action, particularly if one emphasised that Transport was 
technically insolvent and, as the FTT accepted, other methods to recapitalise would have 
been more administratively complex. On the other hand, the FTT also found that 
elements of the transaction were designed solely to ensure that a tax benefit would 
arise.  
As such, the question becomes whether the insertion of these tax driven elements 
of the scheme are sufficiently significant to prevent the scheme from being reasonably 
regarded as a reasonable course of action. Had the GAAR been in effect when the 
                                                     
481 Stagecoach (FTT, 2016) (n 16) [98]. 






scheme was entered in to, the FTT would probably have explored this area in further 
detail and made further findings of fact. However, given that this information is not 
contained within the FTT’s decision, it is difficult to conclude on this point.   
D.9.3(b) LR TAAR 
Overall, it should be easier for HMRC to apply the TAAR to this scheme. This is 
because to prevent the LR TAAR from applying, the taxpayer would need to positively 
show that the result was consistent with the loan relationship regime, rather that HMRC 
needing to provide to opposite. 
D.10 Suez Teesside482 
D 10.1 Outline of scheme483 
In Suez Teesside, the taxpayer company, GDF Suez Teesside Limited (‘Teesside’) 
had various claims against companies within the former Enron group, which fell to be 
treated as loan relationships. The scheme involved Teesside incorporating a wholly 
owned subsidiary in Jersey called Teesside Recoveries and Investments Limited (‘TRAIL’) 
and then transferring the Enron claims to it. At the time of the transfer, because the 
Enron group was in a variety of insolvency proceedings, the taxpayer was unlikely to 
receive the full value of its claims. However, a valuation of these claims indicated that 
their fair value was c.£200m. For accounting purposes, these claims were treated as 
contingent assets and, as such, they were not recognised on Teesside’s balance sheet. 
Teesside transferred the claims to TRAIL in exchange for an issue of new shares, which 
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were held on Teesside’s balance sheet at the carrying value of the claims prior to the 
transfer (that is to say nil). The transfer did not give rise to a gain as these claims were 
treated as being disposed of at their carrying value, not their fair value. This was justified 
on the basis that the value of the TRAIL shares was wholly dependent on the value of 
the claims and, therefore, accounting for the disposal at fair value would have in effect, 
required Teesside to recognise a contingent asset at its fair value, contrary to GAAP.  
When TRAIL received the claims, they accounted for them at their fair value of c. £200m, 
although this did not give rise to a gain in TRAIL. 
HMRC sought to bring into account the c.£200m gain which Teesside would have 
recognised if it had accounted for the disposal of the claims at fair value. The First Tier 
Tribunal was asked to opine on four issues, which in substance can be summarised by 
two questions. Firstly, were Teesside’s accounts GAAP compliant; and secondly, 
notwithstanding the answer to the first question, was Teesside required to bring into 
account a credit of c.£200m to ensure that its taxable profits ‘fairly represents’ the 
profits arising. The FTT found that although Teesside’s accounts were GAAP compliant, 
it was required to bring in a credit of c.£200m. On appeal, the UT upheld the substance 
of FTT’s decision.  
This case is discussed further at Section VI.6. 
D 10.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.10.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
This complex question can be summarised as to what extent does the loan 
relationship provision respect the accounting treatment of a loan relationship, when 






that treatment gives rise to a tax result which is considered unfair. Ignoring the fairly 
represents requirement, the principles on which the loan relationship regime is based 
mean that the accounting treatment should be followed. That said, there is an argument 
that the scheme sought to exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions as it allowed 
the taxpayer to transfer a valuable asset out of the UK without giving rise to a tax charge.  
D.10.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
As neither the UT nor FTT mention a commercial purpose for transferring the 
claims to TRAIL, it seems reasonable to assume that this scheme is wholly contrived. 
D.10.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
According to the UT, Teesside sought to exploit the accounting rules to allow it to 
transfer the claims to TRAIL without giving rise to an accounting profit. This could be 
described an exploiting a shortcoming in the relevant provisions as, normally, when a 
company transfers an asset outside of the UK, it needs to recognise it as a disposal at 
market value. The UT made particular reference to the fact that, like “Schrodinger’s cat, 
the Claims were dead and unrecognised in [Teesside], while simultaneously alive and 
well in TRAIL.”484 However, the counter-argument to this would be that the taxpayer 
simply relied on the loan relationship rules applying as they were designed to. 
D.10.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Arguably, the answer to this question is no. Although at the time of the transfer, 
the claims were valuable, the transfer of the claims did not allow Teesside to realise any 
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value. Instead, Teesside swapped a contingent asset for shares, the value of which was 
wholly attributable to that contingent asset. Therefore, the transfer did not give rise to 
an economic gain for Teesside.  
D.10.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
No, for the reasons outlined in respect of Section 207(4). 
D.10.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
No, the claims arose as a result of historical trading activities with the Enron group. 
D 10.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.10.3(a) GAAR 
This is a borderline case. On the one hand, this scheme enabled Teesside to 
transfer a valuable asset out of the UK without giving rise to a tax charge. On the other 
hand, Teesside was seeking to rely on a plain reading of the legislation, which equated 
an asset’s tax value to its accounting value. In addition, the transfer of the claims to 
TRAIL did not allow Teesside to crystalize any value from them. Although HMRC are likely 
to have attempted to use the GAAR against this scheme, it is questionable whether a 
GAAR challenge would have been successful if HMRC had used it. 
D.10.3(b) LR TAAR 
For the reasons outlined above in respect of the GAAR, HMRC are likely to have 
used the LR TAAR to challenge this scheme. As this would be a borderline case, due to 
the burden of proof being shifted to the taxpayer, the courts would have been more 
likely to find that the LR TAAR applied. 






D.11 Travel Document Services485 
D 11.1 Outline of scheme 
This scheme involved a complex series of transactions involving a number of 
entities in the Ladbroke group, with the key steps being as follows. Travel Document 
Services (‘TDS’) entered into a total returns swap with Ladbroke Betting and Gaming 
Limited (‘LB&G’) in respect of the shares of TDS’s subsidiary Ladbroke Group 
International (‘LGI’).486 As a result of the total return swap, the shares held by TDS in LGI 
were treated as non-qualifying and therefore TDS’s shareholding fell to be taxed as if it 
were a loan relationship which was accounted for at fair value. As a result of various 
inter-group transactions, including the novation of intergroup payables to LGI, the fair 
value of LGI decreased by £254m. TDS sought to argue that this decrease in fair value 
gave rise to a deductible loan relationship debit. Furthermore, LGI claimed a deduction 
for the interest it paid on the loans novated to it. 
HMRC challenged the deductibility of the debits claimed by both TDS and LGI using 
Paragraph 13. TDS rejected HMRC’s position on the basis:  
that purposes referred to in para 13 are the subjective purposes of the 
company, and that it is not possible for a company to have subjective 
purposes for being party to a deemed loan relationship because the 
loan relationship is a legal fiction.487   
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LGI also sought to argue that Paragraph 13 should not apply to the debits it 
claimed. Of the three arguments it used to support its position, the most notable one is 
that, in the event Paragraph 13 applied to the debits claimed by TDS, then Paragraph 13 
could not apply to LGI’s debits as the scheme did not in fact give rise to a tax advantage. 
The FTT found in favour of HMRC and therefore the debits claimed by both TDS 
and LGI were treated as non-deductible as a result of Paragraph 13. This decision was 
upheld by the UT488 and Court of Appeal489. 
D 11.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.11.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
No, the existence of Paragraph 13 implies that one of the purposes of the loan 
relationship regime is to ensure that a company only obtains a tax deduction for 
expenses related to loan relationships taken out for good commercial reasons, which 
are within the scope of corporation tax. Given this scheme was intended to create a 
deductible debit, the scheme cannot be consistent with the purposes of the loan 
relationship regime. 
D.11.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
This scheme was partially designed to effect a synthetic transfer of another 
Ladbroke company’s business to LB&G. Although there were easier ways through which 
this could be done, there were some commercial difficulties in doing so due to a number 
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of property leases. The UT does not comment specifically on whether this scheme 
involved contrived or abnormal steps, although the answer is likely to be yes. 
D.11.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
Yes, if the deemed loan relationship was a real loan relationship, then Paragraph 
13 would have clearly applied to disallow the debit. The taxpayer sought to exploit a 
loophole in Paragraph 13 which meant that it could not apply to deemed loan 
relationships. 
D.11.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, this scheme was designed to create a deductible fair value loss in a situation 
where that loss was attributable to value being shifted out of LGI into other group 
companies. This resulted in TDS being able to claim a tax deduction for a loss that, from 
the group’s perspective, did not occur. This is an example of the indicator listed at 
Section 207(4)(b). 
D.11.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, the example listed at 455D(b), for the same reasons mentioned in respect of 
Section 207(4)(b). 
D.11.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Yes, although the FTT accepted that TDS had commercial reasons for owning the 
shares of LGI, they also found that TDS had an unallowable purpose, namely obtaining a 
tax deduction for the fair value loss. 






D 11.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.11.3(a) GAAR 
HMRC are likely to have sought to use the GAAR against the scheme in this case. 
This is because it is designed to exploit a shortcoming in Paragraph 13 and allow TDS to 
claim a deduction for a fair value loss that resulted from value being deliberately shifted 
out of LGI to obtain a tax advantage. 
D.11.3(b) LR TAAR 
HMRC are likely to have sought to apply the LR TAAR to this scheme as it is 
designed to give rise to a result which is inconsistent with the purposes of the loan 
relationship regime. 
D.12 Versteegh490 
D 12.1 Outline of scheme 
This scheme involved three companies, Versteegh Limited (the ‘Lender’) and its 
two subsidiaries Nestron Limited (the ‘Borrower’) and Spritebeam Limited (the ‘Share 
Recipient’). Under the terms of the scheme, the Lender lent the Borrower £102m (the 
‘Loan’). Instead of charging interest on the debt, the Lender directed the Borrower to 
issue the Share Recipient preference shares equal to the value of the interest that would 
have being charged had it been a normal loan.   
The taxpayers sought to argue that the interest arising on the loan was deductible 
with no corresponding taxable credit arising in the Lender.  Furthermore, they sought to 
argue that the issue of shares to the Share Recipient did not give rise to taxable income. 
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The UT found that although the interest arising on the loan was not taxable in the 
hands of the Lender, it did give rise to taxable income for the Share Recipient. 
For completeness, HMRC also challenged the deductibility of the debits arising in 
the Borrower. Although the FTT discussed the unallowable purpose rule, they 
commented that: 
the way the issue has been put to us is a little unusual. We have not 
been provided with all the facts, nor have we heard evidence referable 
to the unallowable purposes issue. Instead, we are asked to determine 
whether HMRC’s argument must succeed on the basis of certain 
agreed facts only, and irrespective of any other facts which we might 
have found had we been presented with further factual evidence.491  
Specifically, the FTT were asked to consider whether Paragraph 13 could disallow 
all of the debits arising on the loan as a result of the fact that the terms of the loan were 
purely tax driven, or whether the Borrower’s commercial need for the funds also needed 
to be considered. The FTT found that the Borrower’s commercial need of the loan did 
need to be considered. Given that HMRC acknowledged that the Borrower had a 
commercial need for the loan, the unusual situation the FTT was in meant that they did 
not consider the significance of that commercial purpose compared to the tax avoidance 
purpose of the loan.  
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D 12.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.12.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
One of the purposes of the LR regime is to ensure that intragroup financing 
arrangements are treated in a symmetrical manner (for instance, the purpose of 
requiring companies to account for intergroup financing on an amortised cost basis is to 
ensure that “the value of the loan cannot be artificially depressed and that debits in the 
one company are matched by credits in the other”492). Given that the scheme creates 
an asymmetrical result, it would be difficult to argue that the results of this scheme are 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the tax provisions. 
D.12.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
Although the FTT’s decision did not consider the purpose of the loan in detail, 
HMRC did accept that the Borrower had a commercial purpose for seeking the finance. 
That said, both parties agreed that the “only reason for the design, structure and terms 
of the Loan was to obtain a tax advantage”493. 
As such, this scheme did contain one or more abnormal step. 
D.12.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
While the loan was drafted in a way to ensure that although a debit would arise in 
the Borrower, no credit would arise in any other group company, this was to ensure that 
the desired outcome was achieved from an accounting perspective rather than ensuring 
that certain tax provisions applied. That said once that accounting treatment had been 
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achieved, the LR regime applied as intended, albeit the overall result was inconsistent 
with the purpose of the LR regime. As such, there is an uncertainty over whether this 
amounts to the exploitation of a shortcoming in the relevant provisions. 
D.12.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, the factor at Section 207(4)(a) is present. This is because in effect this scheme 
allowed the Lender to make an interest-bearing loan to the Borrower without giving rise 
to taxable income for the Lender.  
D.12.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, the abusiveness factor listed at Section 455D(1)(a) is present in this scheme, 
for the reasons outlined above in respect of Section 207(4). Furthermore, there is an 
argument that the abusiveness factor listed at Section 455D(1)(d) is also present 
because had the Borrower issued the preference shares to the Lender then the 
associated credit arising in Lender is likely to have been subject to tax under the loan 
relationship regime. As such, changing the terms of the loan to require that the 
preference shares be issued to a third company in the group ensured that for accounting 
purposes the credit arose in a company not party to the loan relationship and, therefore, 
not taxable under the loan relationship regime.  
D.12.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
Although the FTT discussed the unallowable purpose rule, as noted above the 
presentation of this issue was unusual. As a result, although the FTT acknowledged that 






the Borrower had a commercial need for the loan, they did not consider the significance 
of that commercial purpose compared to the tax avoidance purpose of the loan.  
D 12.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.12.3(a) GAAR 
HMRC are likely to use the GAAR to challenge this type of scheme. Although they 
were able in this case to challenge this scheme using technical arguments, of the four 
technical arguments put in front of the FTT, HMRC only succeeded on one of them. 
However, had the GAAR being in force at the time, then HMRC’s success would have 
been less dependent on a complex interpretation of legislation and case law.  
D.12.3(b) LR TAAR 
Given that this scheme was designed to create an asymmetrical tax result, it is 
likely that HMRC would seek to apply the LR TAAR to counteract the tax advantage 
gained. 
D.13 Vocalspruce494 
D 13.1 Outline of scheme 
This case involved Brixton PLC (‘Brixton’) and a number of its subsidiaries. As part 
of the scheme, Brixton subscribed for zero coupon loan notes (the ‘ZC Loans’), issued at 
a discount by Brixton’s subsidiaries. In total, the nominal value of the ZC Loans were 
£55.4m, with Brixton subscribing for these ZC Loans for £51.5m.  Brixton then entered 
into a share subscription agreement with Vocalspruce Limited (‘Vocalspruce’), whereby 
Brixton agreed to subscribe for ordinary shares in Vocalspruce with a nominal value of 
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£51.7m495 and share premium of £3.7m (i.e. the difference between £51.7m and 
£55.4m). In satisfaction of Brixton obligations in respect of these share’s nominal value, 
Brixton transferred the ZC Loans to Vocalspruce. With respect to the share premium, 
Brixton and Volcalspruce agreed that on redemption of the ZC Loans, the profits realised 
would be capitalised in satisfaction of Brixton’s obligation to fund the share premium. 
From an accounting perspective, the income arising to Vocalspruce was first recognised 
in its P&L, before an amount equal to that profit being transferred to its share premium 
account. 
Vocalspruce sought to argue that, as the income it generated from the ZC Loans 
needed to be recognised within its share premium account, Section 84(2)(a), FA 1996 
applied such that the income from the ZC Loans was not taxable. HMRC challenged this 
position by asserting two arguments. Firstly, Section 84(2)(a) did not apply because the 
income arising did not arise from the ZC Loans, instead, it arose as a result of the share 
subscription agreement. As such, the initial recognition of the income within the P&L 
gave rise to a credit which was taxable under the loan relationship regime, with this 
position being unaffected by this credits subsequent transfer to share premium. HMRC’s 
second argument was that group continuation rules applied such that transfer of the 
income to the share premium account should be disregarded when determining how 
the income should be taxed under the loan relationship regime. 
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When this scheme came before the Court of Appeal, it found in favour of the 
taxpayer in respect of the HMRC’s first argument, but found in favour of HMRC in 
respect of its second argument. 
D 13.2 Key elements of the tax analysis 
D.13.2(a) Is the result consistent with the purpose of the relevant tax provisions? 
In the Court of Appeal, Gross LJ found that the purpose of the group continuity 
rules was to enable a group to transfer debts between group companies in a tax neutral 
way. Therefore, this scheme was designed to give rise to a result which was inconsistent 
with the purpose of these rules, since it aimed to ensure that the transfer of a ZC Notes 
between group companies allowed a loan relationship credit to be non-taxable. 
Furthermore, the group continuity rules are designed to ensure that when a debt is 
transferred between group companies, the company receiving the debt is taxed in the 
same way that the original company would have been - which is not the case in this 
scheme as Brixton would have realised taxable income from the ZC Notes.  
D.13.2(b) Does the arrangement involve one or more contrived or abnormal steps? 
As Gross LJ notes that the scheme was part of a marketed tax avoidance, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the scheme in this case is wholly contrived. 
D.13.2(c) Does the arrangement exploit a shortcoming in the relevant provisions? 
Yes, the scheme sought to rely on the fact that the group continuity applied such 
that although the disposal of the ZC Notes by Brixton should be disregarded, the transfer 
of income arising from the ZC Notes to share premium should be respected. In effect, 
this would lead to the transaction being treated differently in different entities, whereas 






the group continuity rules are designed to ensure there is symmetry in inter-company 
transactions. 
D.13.2(d) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the indicators of abusiveness listed 
in Section 207(4), FA 2013? 
Yes, specifically the indication listed at Section 207(4)(b). This is because the 
scheme was designed to avoid the income arising from the ZC Notes needing to be 
brought into tax. 
D.13.2(e) Does the arrangement exhibit any of the examples in Section 455D, CTA 
2009? 
Yes, in addition to avoiding needing the bring a commercial profit into tax (which 
mirrors the example as Section 455D(1)(b), this scheme gives rise to a result which 
mirrors the example at Section 455D(1)(g) as it is designed to ensure that the group 
continuity rules apply such that no company in the group is required to bring into 
account a credit in respect of the income arising from the ZC Notes. 
D.13.2(f) Does the LR have an unallowable purpose? 
The Court of Appeal’s judgement does not discuss whether the issuers of the ZC 
Notes had a commercial need for the funding that those notes provided. However, on 
the basis that HMRC did not challenge the deductibility of the unwinding of the discount, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the borrowers had a commercial requirement for 
the funding provided. 






D 13.3 Summary of conclusions 
D.13.3(a) GAAR 
In addition to this scheme being a marketed avoidance scheme, it is clearly 
designed to manipulate the group continuity rules. As such, HMRC are likely to have 
sought to use the GAAR to counteract it. 
D.13.3(b) LR TAAR 
Given that this scheme so closely mirrors the example shown a Section 455D(1)(g), 
it is likely that HMRC would seek to apply the LR TAAR in this case. 
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